Taming The Russian Bear

It is springtime and the Russian Bear is both hungry and unhappy. This time the Russian Bear has emerged from its winter hibernation in reaction to a series of arguably offensive, if not actually threatening, events initiated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The Bear was abruptly awakened in early May when two Russian diplomats were unceremoniously stripped of their diplomatic credentials and summarily ejected from NATO headquarters in Brussels. The Russians were accused of espionage with reference to the actions of an Estonian spy. Predictably, the Russians denied the charge, but their diplomats were expelled nonetheless. The expulsions infuriated the Kremlin. Its Ambassador called for a “harsh and decisive” response. So, two NATO envoys were expelled from Russia. Tit-for-tat diplomacy is how the game is played.

Still, the Russian Bear dislikes such unsavory annoyances. Regrettably, the Bear’s anger was fed further when (on May 6th) NATO initiated a series of military exercises at the Vaziani army base in –of all places- Georgia. Indeed, according to Russia’s irascible NATO Ambassador, a psychiatric hospital would have been a more appropriate place to conduct those exercises. Certainly, the Russian Bear could hardly forget that it had done battle in that Caucasus region less than a year ago. Back then, in August 2008, the Russians had been (rather easily) provoked into a brief, but bitter, war with Georgia. Those events directly related to Russian citizens in the states of Abkazia and So. Ossetia.

The war ended badly for Georgia. The Russian Bear stayed in Georgia longer than the West or NATO wanted. But the Bear’s paw print clearly showed that the Russian Bear is quite willing to use force when it sees fit. Not so curiously, speculation was rife that Russia was just waiting for a sufficient excuse to send the Bear into Georgia. Not unexpectedly, the Georgians fell into the Russian bear trap and provided an excuse.

But back to the current NATO exercises in Georgia. NATO had originally planned to involve some 1,300 troops drawn from nineteen NATO members and ally states. But, the nations of Kazakstan, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova and Armenia all withdrew their troops before the exercises began. Clearly, these nations form a part of Russia’s “near abroad.” We’ll return later to that pregnant concept.

In the meantime, NATO proceeded with its military exercises in Georgia. It was then that Russian President Medvedev denounced the exercises as war games and described them as an "open provocation." NATO demurred. It complained that the Russian Bear was simply overreacting to minimal military machinations which involved just 400 troops, mostly in a classroom. In fact, NATO even grumbled that the Russians had been invited as observers, but had refused to attend. Still, does anyone at NATO truly believe that the Russian Bear wants or needs to go to class? More pointedly, NATO exhibited an arrogant effrontery by presuming to tell the Russian Bear when and how to react to events occurring in its own backyard, the near abroad?

Indeed, the notion of a near broad provides a critical insight into the mindset of the Russian Bear. As such, in 2005 Vladimir Putin referred to the breakup of the Soviet Union as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of twentieth century.” In same speech, Putin specifically lamented that "tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory." Those fringes are now identified by Russians as their “near abroad.” More importantly, there are those who argue that the Russian Bear may now be acting to reverse that "catastrophe." Indeed, such seems to be the clear implication of current Russian foreign policy. In that light, the behavior of the Russian Bear seems quite clear.

Reversing that catastrophe explains the Kremlin’s strident opposition to Georgia and the Ukraine being admitted into NATO. It explains Russia’s feral antagonism to the E.U.’s persistent and threatening encroachment into regions adjacent to or that once formed a part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It explains Russia’s zero tolerance for breakaway independence movements anywhere, but especially in the Caucasus or along the fringes of current Russia. It explains the psychological predisposition and predilection for the Russian Bear’s muscular intervention in Georgia. It explains Russia’s visceral hostility to the USA’s proposed missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. It explains why Russia just last week took control of the borders of Abkazia and So. Ossetia in spite of its pledge to NATO not to do so. Even more pointedly, it explains why the Russian Bear was so enraged when Belarus (Russia’s near abroad neighbor) was expressly warned that recognizing So. Ossetia and Abkazia would jeopardize Belarus’ prospects of joining the E.U.

And yet, the Russian Bear had spent much of 2008 licking the sweetness of massive oil profits from its prodigious paws. So, when the Russian Bear recently awoke, it was also hungry for more oil sweetness. Unfortunately for the Bear, it found that the windfall oil profits -which had so sweetened the Russian economy- had all but disappeared. The Bear is not a happy camper. It needs a fix.

It was, therefore, no wonder that also just last week the Kremlin released a paper described as a “National Security Strategy Document.” That document (designed to guide Russia through 2020) states that Russia will follow a “rational and pragmatic” foreign policy. Well and good. But, precisely what does “rational and pragmatic” mean to the Russian Bear? Fortunately or not, the aforesaid document is not silent on the subject. It specifically foresees violent competition for oil and natural gas supplies. It states that Russia is prepared to fight for its share of the world’s resources. It asserts that “in the face of competition for resources, the use of military force to solve emerging problems cannot be excluded.” Taken at face value, it seems like the Russian Bear is about to go on the prowl, if not to gobble up the real estate in its near abroad, then to claw its portion of natural resources from wherever it chooses.

But wait. Has the Chinese Dragon not embraced a substantially identical foreign policy to satisfy its still voracious appetite for more resources? Of course it has. The Chinese Dragon is simply more deft and dexterous than the clumsy Russian Bear. Indeed, both resurgent Russia and emergent China are only following what is -for them- a clearly “rational and pragmatic” foreign policy in pursuit of their respective national best interests. That these interests do no conveniently coincide with the best interests of the West is both self-evident and threatening. Still, is that not the existential nature of life under the big tent in the world’s geopolitical circus?

So, should the West merely keep a close watch the Russian Bear or try to tame it? That, geopolitically speaking, is a trick question. If geopolitical affairs are deemed to truly be a circus, is it not presumptuous for the West to usurp the role of ringmaster? And even if the West arrogates ringmastership to itself, it must still find a foil to handle the uncaged Russian Bear and to cope with the Chinese Dragon which is also on the loose. One thing seems certain, a dominating 800 pound gorilla is missing from this century’s geopolitical circus.

In the final analysis, taming the Russian Bear may have to wait. It is too large to be devoured by the Chinese Dragon and it will not be readily tranquilized by the talons of the balding American eagle. In the spirit of resetting relationships, the West may well consider sending the Bear some politically palatable honey. But how or should one soothe a Dragon?