The Brewing Mideast Storm

Tehran had an early snow last week. This past week the I.A.E.A. issued a stormy report about Iran’s nuclear intentions. Last week Israeli hawks fretted about a possible flight to chill Iran’s nuke program. At the same time, Russia was frosty about enhanced Security Council sanctions against Iran. Meanwhile, the Arab League suspended Syria because it continued to rain bullets on dissidents. The geopolitical weather in the Mideast last week was rotten. Even the future forecast is dismal.

Actually, unsettled conditions seem to be the norm in the always fractured and fractious Mideast. The continuing turbulence in Syria combined with Iran’s legendary duplicity suggests that a geopolitical storm may be brewing.

Consider that Iran and Syria have been allies for the past thirty years. In fact, the Iranian-born Lebanese Shiite cleric Musa Sadr provided religious legitimacy to the Assad regime. In a 1973 Fatwa, Sadr declared that Syria’s ruling Alawites are Shiites. Sadr also acted as liaison between Hafez al-Assad and Khomeini's aides before the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Indeed, the relationship between Iran and Syria is a marriage of convenience that has repeatedly satisfied both parties’ diplomatic needs. And that is the crux of an incipient problem for the region.

Long before the current situation in Syria, Iran aided and abetted the Syrian regime. It served Iranian objectives to foster Syria’s meddling in Lebanon, to encourage Syria’s less-than-furtive flirtation with Hezbollah and to goad Syria’s insidious assignation with Hamas.

In so doing, Iran covertly exploits its overtly explicit anti-Israel and anti-West agenda. By collaborating with the Assad regime, Iran seeks to extend its strategically significant influence across the arc of the Mideast all the way to the Mediterranean .

By continually enabling the Assad regime, Iran is betting that Assad –if he somehow survives Syria’s Arab spring- will be even more eager to accommodate Iranian aspirations to be the regional hegemon. That is a craving deeply rooted in the Iranian psyche.

It also seems clear that Iranian aspirations have been newly enhanced in Iraq, which –not incidentally- borders both Syria and Iran. The recently announced U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq presents a power vacuum which Iran is eager to fill.

The current Iraqi government is dominated by Shia leaders. They have a decided affinity with the Iranian Shia. The latter are sufficiently astute to have studiously cultivated relations with Syria’s ruling Alawites who are Shia. It is also noteworthy that the three Arab League nations that did not vote to suspend Syria's membership (Iraq, Lebanon & Yemen) all have politically vocal Shiite populations.

That said, America’s apparent loss of influence in Iraq combined with an Assad win in Syria could dramatically alter the balance of power in the Mideast. The geopolitical map could then reflect a swath of Iranian sway that extends from the Persian Gulf across Iraq and Syria into Lebanon and then down into the Gaza strip.

Not coincidentally, this scenario –at least theoretically- places Iran on the borders of Israel. Of course, it can be argued that, by dint of existential circumstances, Iran is already there. Still, Iran’s position will be immeasurably enhanced assuming that the Assad regime outlasts Syria’s soggy Arab Spring.

On the other hand, Assad's downfall would deal a distinct blow to Iran's broad diplomatic machinations. As such, Iran is watching the Syrian spring with bated breath. But others –with equally bated breath- are also watching.

Turkey, which not so long ago was attempting to broker a peace between Syria and Israel, has all but severed relations with both the Assad regime and with Israel. Of course, Turkey has its own self-serving agenda. It wants to be the region’s top dog.

It is in Turkey’s bests interests to disrupt any scenario that might elevate Iran’s claim to hegemony. As such, Turkey has abruptly sided with Syria's Sunni dissidents. It is not that the Turks like Syria’s dissidents so much more than Assad, it is just that they dislike the Iranians with much greater intensity. Furthermore, ingratiating itself with the Arab Spring also serves to enhance Turkey’s aspirations to regional leadership.

Pointedly, both the Turks and the Iranians are Moslems. But the Turks are Sunnis whereas the Iranians are Shiites. The long-festering animosity between these Islamic sects is palpable. Furthermore, there is no love lost between ethnic Turks and ethnic Persians. Need it also be said that neither the Turks nor the Iranians are Arabs. Complicating matters, the Turks and the Iranians not particularly fond of the Arabs and vice versa. So the plot thickens.

The Saudis are Arabs. The Saudis are Sunni. The Saudis absolutely abhor the ruling Syrian Alawites who are Shiites. The Saudis say the Syrian Alawites are apostates, polytheists and pagans. Conversely, the Syrian Alawites disparage the Saudis for their “Bedouin thinking” and extreme fundamentalist Sunni (Wahabi) beliefs. But the Saudis also look with equally derisive contempt at the Iranians and at the repugnant possibility of a Shiite crescent across the Mideast.

That leaves us with the Israelis. They are not ethnic Persians or ethnic Turks. The Israelis are ethnic Semites. So are the Arabs. Most Arabs are Sunni Moslems. With exceptions, Israelis are not Moslems. That said, the Israelis have no love lost for Assad, an Alawite/Shiite Moslem. But neither are the Israelis sanguine about the possibility of seeing Assad replaced by a fundamentalist Sunni Moslem regime.

Both the Iranians and the Turks want to rule the Mideast roost. That prospect is exquisitely distasteful to the Saudis. The Israelis have their hands full detaching themselves from the Palestinians. But like the Saudis and the Turks, the Israelis are justifiably apprehensive about the possibility of a Shiite/Iranian crescent overspreading the Mideast.

All of which may breathe renewed relevance into that caustic Arabic adage: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend!”

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Al-The-Alevi & Syria’s Arab Spring

Syria’s Arab Spring sprung about nine months ago. During that pregnant period, Syria’s dissidents have labored to terminate Bashir al-Assad's unsavory regime. So far, the dissidents have utterly failed. Instead, Syria’s nascent Arab Spring has seemingly miscarried.

In fact, many reports about the Syrian opposition originate outside Syria and/or from anti-Assad elements inside Syria. These reports may well be skewed and/or self-serving. They depict images and relate stories detailing violent repression and/or predicting Assad's impending demise.

It has been incredulously alleged that Al Jazeera, the most popular Arab news channel, has fabricated footage depicting suppression of anti-government demonstrations. Purportedly, Al Jazeera even built replicas of Syrian towns as backdrops for faked violence against dissidents. Indeed, much of what is said and printed about the Syrian situation is, arguably, hype and/or flimflam.

That said, the real truth on-the-ground is hard to come by, especially in a police state like Syria. But some semblance of actuality periodically leaks out in curious places. Take the tennis court for example.

Several weeks ago, I happened to play several sets of tennis with a Syrian physician who now practices in the American South. Let’s just call him “Al.” And, lest you think I jest, Al is not an abbreviation for Alabama nor is it a veiled allusion to Al-Jazeera, to al-Arab or to al-Assad.

So, who is Al and what does he say about Syria?

Well, Al is a native of Tartous, Syria. His Arab parents still live there. Al visits Tartous regularly. When I met Al on a Florida tennis court, he had just returned from Syria. He was surprised to learn that I have not only visited his hometown, but that I know a little -precious little- Arabic.

In fact, Al even paused to correct my pronunciation of the term “Alevi.” That is the name of the Syria’s ruling elite sect. Syrian President Bashir al-Assad is an Alevi. Depending on who is counting, between six and ten percent of the Syrians are Alevis. The Syrian military is heavily Alevi. Syria’s business elite is predominantly Alevi. The richest man in Syria is Alevi (He is also Bashir al-Assad’s cousin). Even Dr. Al is an Alevi. And that may be precisely on point.

Clearly, Dr. Al espouses the perspective of Syria’s ruling Alevi elites. Al has vested interests in seeing the continuing rule of the Assad regime. But, Al’s vision did not seem unduly blurred by media depictions of the Arab Spring in Syria. After all, Al had just flown into and out of Damascus. He had just visited extensively with family in Tartous. He had just met with neighbors, shared refreshments with friends and conversed with colleagues. He had just been out on the town in Tartous. Surely, Al had a feel for –and even a taste of- the bona fide realities in Syria.

So, between points for the better part of two hours, Al and I conducted a running (we were playing tennis) conversation about the state of affairs in Syria. I flatly questioned Al: “What’s really happening in Syria? Will Assad fall? Are things on the ground as bad as the press says they are?”

Al pointedly responded: “Everything’s pretty cool. Don’t get bent out of shape about what you hear. Yes, there is always some dissent. It depends where you look and what you want to see. But what you read and hear is terribly overblown.” Perhaps.

Certainly, it is critically important to recognize that Assad’s military is loyal, disciplined and highly organized. Syria’s military, its officer corps and a host of governmental appointees (a disproportionate number of whom are Alevi) have a strong vested interest in preserving their privileged position in the status quo.

Pointedly, the Alevi (aka Alawites) are a distinct and often reviled religious minority in heavily (74%) Sunni Syria. The Alawites are an extreme offshoot of Shiite Islam. Some Alawite beliefs are not only secret, but also incorporate some Christian elements. In fact, Sunnis customarily deem the Alawites to be unbelievers, polytheists and apostates. As such, Alevi lives, both professionally and personally, may well be imperiled if and when the Assad regime dissolves.

On the other hand, Assad's decidedly disloyal opposition is undisciplined, disorganized, fragmented, effectively leaderless, essentially unarmed and both tactically and strategically impoverished. Score a couple of clear aces for Assad’s side.

Now then, you might also want to serve up the fact that Syria has been a police state for the better part of four decades. Indeed, Hafez al-Assad (President Bashir al-Assad’s father) came into power shortly after Colonel Qadaffi conducted his own coup in Libya. Syria’s secret police (the feared Mukhabarat) has a long history of ruthlessly suppressing dissent under the rule of both Hafez and Bashir al-Assad. That said, Qadaffi is dead, but the Mukhabarat yet lives. Score another critical point for the Assad regime.

Need it also be said that, for almost fifty years (since 1963), Syria officially operated under emergency rule. That Emergency Law even predated the Assads’ dictatorial reign. The oppressive reality of a half-century of emergency rule clearly qualifies as sustained, pervasive and daunting governmental control.

Yet, this past April, while under intense pressure from dissidents, President Bashir al-Assad actually abolished that long-standing Emergency Law. But the simple stroke of Bashir’s pen could not and will not glibly obliterate or cavalierly expunge the haunting spectre of emergency rule from Syria’s public psyche. Score yet another decisive point for the Assad regime.

And not least of all, Syrian dissidents cannot help but be continually reminded of the single deadliest act by any Arab government against its people in the modern Mideast. That event was the massacre of 15,000 dissidents at Hama, Syria in 1982. Said action was orchestrated by the fiat of then President Hafez al-Assad. Is it conceivable that Bashir al-Assad has not learned to replicate his father’s deadly home court serve? Score one more blistering, overhead smash for the Assad regime.

Premises considered, if Al-The-Alevi was a tennis broadcaster, he could ably articulate the current contest against Assad. I can almost hear Al’s slightly-accented Arab voice: “O.K., that’s game, set and…well, not quite match. Assad remains in firm control. But no one is invincible. Even court dictators like Federer and Nadal now lose to that dissident Djokovic. Syria’s fracas could still be a long five-setter. So far, Assad leads his opposition two sets to love. Only one thing is certain, there is absolutely no love lost or left in Syria’s Arab Spring!”