Afghanistan Anguish

“We do know, of certain knowledge, that (Bin Laden) is either in Afghanistan or in some other country or dead.” Thus spoke Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Secretary of Defense who arrogantly asserted that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. As wrong as Rumsfeld was about Iraq, he was also equally uninformed about the whereabouts of Bin Laden and the nature of Afghanistan. That said, Afghanistan remains a confounding and confusing conundrum even to those who truly are in a position to be informed. General Stanley McCrystal, the commander of military operations in Afghanistan, is a prime case in point.

The good General has candidly admitted that affairs in Afghanistan are beclouded and beshrouded not only by Afghanistan’s rugged topography and its fractious demographics, but also by its societal organization, its culture, its religion, its government, its illiteracy, its history and by virtually every category through which one might seek to develop understanding. Indeed, General McCrystal has studiously bemoaned the fact that: “Every day I realize how little about Afghanistan I actually understand.”

Admittedly, that absence of transparency is truly not Afghanistan’s problem; rather, it is a demonstrable and virtually incomprehensible problem to and for Westerners. Generally speaking, Westerners, perhaps understandably –but inconveniently- have little awareness or cognition of the nature of daily life in southwest Asia, let alone of behavior patterns and practical affairs in Afghanistan. So, a cursory inspection into what Afghanistan is all about may be in order.

As one starting point to understanding Afghanistan, Westerners might well begin by retrojecting themselves several hundred years back into the state of affairs that once existed in the American West. That region was then wild, woolly and untamed. So is 21st century Afghanistan.

More pointedly, the American West was populated by diverse tribes of Indians (Apaches, Commanches, Sioux, Blackfoot, Cheyenne, Kiowa, Ojibwa, Pawnee and many others) who were -more often than not- at odds with and hostile to each other. While the analogy to American Indians may be facile and superficial, a not unsimilar state of affairs exists in modern Afghanistan. Indeed, one of the major hallmarks of Afghanistan is that it was, is and will foreseeably continue to be an ethnically diverse and distinctly tribal society.

Consider, if you will, that there are multiple ethnicities in Afghanistan, e.g. Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Pashtuns. The latter group alone boasts at least sixty different Pashtun tribes. These are, in turn, divided into some 400 sub-tribes or clans of Pashtuns. Each tribe and/or clan has its own predispositions and predilections. Many of the tribes, let alone different ethnic groups, are hostile to each other. Even many of the sub-tribal clans harbor an intense distaste for fellow tribesmen of a different clan. Indeed, a well-known anecdote concerning relations between the Meshud-Pashtuns and the Waziri-Pashtuns is revealing.

Thus, it is told about what would happen if member of the Meshud tribe walked into a room where he was confronted by a venomous snake and by an unarmed member of the Wazir tribe. In that situation, the Meshud tribesman would first kill the Waziri. Only then, would the Meshud kill the snake. The anecdote exposes the hostility that is not unexpected or even abnormal in Afghanistan’s tribal society.

In actual fact, the Meshuds consider the Waziris to be slow-witted and untrustworthy. The Waziris regard the Meshuds as vagabonds and cattle-rustlers. Yet, both the Meshuds and the Waziris are Pashtun tribesmen by birth. They both profess belief in Islam and both are arguably faithful to its practice. Indeed, Islam prohibits the very thievery which both project upon the other. Even a prominent lullaby chanted by Waziri mothers to their infant children intones the prayerful directive: “Be a thief and may Allah go with you.” As such, the unusual diversity, complexity and inexplicable contradictions of life in Afghanistan begin to emerge.

It is certainly true that each of Afghanistan’s distinctive ethnic groups and tribes subscribe to their own particular and often peculiar set of cultural mores and practices. But the Pashtun code of conduct is particularly critical and unusually illuminating. Pashtun society and daily living are governed by the Pashtun’s unique and comprehensive Code of Honor known as “Pashtunwali.”

The multiple elements of Pashtunwali are deeply engrained and inextricably embedded into the fabric of Pashtun society. Among the foremost features of Pastunwali are: self-respect, independence, hospitality and revenge. And let there be no mistake, Pastunwali arrogates unto itself unquestioned precedence over both dedication to Islam and allegiance to Afghan nationalism. Pastunwali is the mechanism that controls Pashtun society and makes the Pashtuns tick.

Simply put, the principles of Pashtunwali are and will presumably continue to be the dominant force in the lives, culture and identity of Afghanistan's 13.5 million Pashtuns. In fact,Pashtunwali demands that every Pashtun practice that code of behavior as a personal duty. Failure to adhere to the principles of Pashtunwali (de Pashtunwali perawano) leads wayward Pashtuns to becoming “durvand” i.e. non-Pashtun. That is not merely ethnically and tribally unacceptable, it constitutes ethnic and tribal heresy. It is worse than apostasy from Islam; it is significantly more severe than treason to the Afghan nation.

Being a Pashtun is substantially more critical to a Pashtun than being a Moslem. One’s identity as a Pashtun is a much more elevated and infinitely more prized status than one’s status as an Afghan national. For a country of some thirty-two million people, it is fearful folly to fail to understand the nature and role of the Pashtuns who comprise 42% of that nation’s population. Assuredly, Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic, diverse and disunited state. But its political center of gravity has always been and remains Pashtun.

That said, the insurgency center in Afghanistan is located in Helmand province. Helmand province is overwhelmingly Pashtun in population. Helmand province has a literacy rate of little more than 5% compared to a 30% literacy rate for the rest of Afghanistan. The Pashtuns are Sunni Moslems. They consider Afghanistan’s ethnic Hazaras, who constitute 9% of Afghan population and who are Shiite Moslems, to be damnable heretics and perverse pagans. Helmand province is arguably Afghanistan’s bloodiest province. It is also the unabashed stronghold of the Taliban.

Understanding that gives rise to the recognition that Afghanistan’s President is a Pashtun. Indeed, Hamid Karzai was elected (sic) President at the expense of Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. Not unexpectedly, Dr. Abdullah is not a Pashtun, but an ethnic Tajik. During the Taliban era, Dr. Abdullah was Foreign Minister of the Northern Alliance. That entity was Afghanistan’s officially recognized government. Notably, the Northern Alliance opposed the Taliban. Perhaps understandably then, Dr. Abdullah sometimes unconvincingly protests –for politically expedient reasons- that his father was a Pashtun.

More importantly, the current Afghan Defense Minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak, is a Pashtun. He proudly traces his lineage to tribal Pashtun chieftans. Mr. Wardak still conspiciously maintains strong Pashtun relationships. In the past, General Wardak was a Mujahadeen commander who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. And now, in spite of his Pashtun upbringing, Defense Minister Wardak –somewhat unconvincingly- advocates a strong central Afghan government. That posture conveniently suits his personal proclivities; it is seemingly at diametric odds with his Pashtun predispositions.

Given all the foregoing, is it any wonder that understanding the dynamics of Afghanistan society is often an exercise in psychological exasperation, if not futility. Recent events in Afghanistan’s Korengal Valley illuminate this anguish.

In April 2010, a contingent of U.S. soldiers was airlifted out of the Korengal Valley in East Afghanistan. Because forty-two U.S. soldiers had died there during the next preceding twelve months, the region had been nicknamed “The Valley Of Death.”

Interestingly enough, only four thousand five hundred Afghanis live in the Korengal valley. Those people are known as Pashais. Their precise ethnic origin is unclear. They may be, but probably are not, Pashtun by lineage. But they do speak their own Pashto (Pashtun) dialect and they do practice their own unique brand of Sunni Islam.

What is important here is that the Pashtun-dominated Taliban government never really controlled the Pashais of the Korengal valley. And the people of that valley never became pro-Taliban. Quite the contrary. According to one local elder (Haji Nizamuddin), the Pashai people simply wanted to be left alone.

That was the state of affairs when U.S. forces arrived in the Korengal Valley in
2009. Regrettably, according to General McCrystal, instead of bringing stability to Korengal, the troops “largely proved to be an irritant to the people…and there was probably more fighting here than there would have been if U.S. troops had not come.”

In the final analysis, Afghanistan is infinitely more complex and confusing than most pundits, politicians and military planners are prepared to admit. Indeed, many –especially those who argue adamantly(pro and/or con)about the U.S. presence in Afghanistan- would do well to heed the admonition of General McCrystal. He cautioned: “If you do not understand the dynamics (of Afghanistan), you have no chance of getting it right!” That sounds like sage counsel. But who is listening, are they learning anything
and –if so- what?

What’s Crooked About The Strait Of Hormuz?

On 26 April 2010, Iran's Revolutionary Guard completed a five day series of naval war games in the Strait of Hormuz. In spite of the Strait's close quarters, those maneuvers did not spawn an international incident. Still, it may be illuminating to know what has been and is currently going on in those troubling waters.

Indeed, circumstances in The Strait Of Hormuz are
usually difficult to get straight because they are,
in fact, often crooked. That said, some straight
talk about the The Strait of Hormuz is critical.

Pointedly, the Strait of Hormuz is perhaps the most critical and potentially most explosive place on earth. It is one of the three most crucial commercial chokepoints in the world. And all three chokepoints (the Strait of Hormuz; the Strait of Malacca; and the Bab Al Mandab) are all located in the Indian Ocean. That makes the Indian Ocean the locus for rabid commercial competition, for competing spheres of economic influence and for associated military rivalries, most especially between China and India. As such, commercial and military matters in the Indian Ocean and in the Strait of Hormuz, in particular, are almost always tense.

But even more to the point, a strong argument can
be made that the Strait of Hormuz is the most
critical commercial chokepoint in the world. As such, some truly straight talk about the Strait of Hormuz is in order. That said, there is much about the Strait of Hormuz that is and has been clearly crooked, especially since 1988. Since then,
the Strait of Hormuz has been and continues to be the site of an accident waiting
to happen or a war eager to find reason to start.

Indeed, 3 July 1988 is a date which will live in infamy, at least in Iran.
On that day, at precisely 10:17 AM, Iran Air Flight #655 took off from Iran’s Bandar Abbas International Airport on its scheduled 28 minute flight across The Strait of Hormuz to Dubai. But Iran Air #655 never made it to Dubai. In fact, that flight never made it across the Strait of Hormuz. What happened? The chaotic, confusing and arguably crooked chain of events surrounding the fate of IR 655 are hard to get straight. Here are those facts in a nutshell.

Iran Flight #655 took off from Bandar Abbas 27
minutes late. Its scheduled flight path was to take
it over the Strait of Hormuz directly
to Dubai. No one now disputes that IR 655
was a commercial Airbus 300 aircraft flying at an
altitude of 14,000 feet. It had 290 civilians aboard.
It had a well-seasoned pilot who had logged
7,000 hours in a cockpit. He was correctly proceeding
on his designated flight path. The aircraft was,
without any dispute, cruising in Iranian airspace.

But as IR 655 crossed over Iran’s Qeshm Island into the wild blue yonder directly above the Strait of Hormuz, it got no further. Iran Air 655 was unceremoniously and wittingly shot down by a missile launched directly from the U.S. guided missile cruiser Vincennes. Why? Here is where it is difficult to make the crooked facts speak straight.

Multiple questions arise. What was the U.S.S. Vincennes doing in Iranian
territorial waters when it shot down IR 655? Why did a sophisticated U.S.
warship outfitted with an advanced, computer-guided radar detection andtracking system (The Aegis System) shoot down a civilian Iranian airliner? Why did the crew of the U.S.S. Vincennes wrongly identify the civilian Iranian airliner as an F-14 Tomcat, a military jet fighter? Why did that American warship never attempt to contact the Iranian airliner on normal air trafficcontrol frequencies? Why is it that two other nearby American warships(The Sides and The Montgomery) correctly and simultaneously identified IR 655 as a civilian airliner?

Furthermore, it is also true that even if Iran
Air 655 had been an Iranian F-14 fighter, the
U.S. warship would still have had no right to
shoot it down. The aircraft was flying within
Iranian airspace and did not, in fact, follow
a path that could have been considered an
attack profile. Additionally, the alleged
Iranian F-14 did not illuminate the Vincennes
with radar which it would have done if it was
attacking. So why did the Captain of the
Vincennes, Wm. C. Rogers, III, issue orders
to shoot Iran Air 655 down?

This latter question is even more pertinent because the Iranian airliner was transmitting the standard “friend or foe” identification code regularly usedby civilian aircraft. Still, Captain Rogers inexplicably believed that this didnot mean that the airliner was not “hostile?” Why is it that Captain Rogers was advised that the IR 655 was diving (i.e. descending in attack mode) instead of climbing?

At least three final questions remain curiously
and studiously unresolved. Why is it that just two
years later, in 1990, Captain Rogers was awarded
the Legion Of Merit for “exceptionally meritorious
conduct in the performance of outstanding service
as commanding officer ... from April 1987 to May
1989." The award was given for Rogers’ service as
the Commanding Officer of the Vincennes, but the
citation conspicuously made no mention of the
downing of Iran Air 655.

The two remaining questions may be the most puzzling and/or most suggestive that said incident may well have been less than savory (i.e. crooked). Those questions are: Why is it that America has not to this very day ever admitted responsibility for shooting down IR 655? Any why, since the U.S.A. paid 61.8 million in compensation to the Iranian families of IR 655 victims, has the United States of America never issued an apology to the Iranian people or to the Iranian government for this tragic event in the Strait of Hormuz?

Fast forward to March 29, 2010. The situation in the Strait of Hormuz is arguablyas tense now as it was in 1988 when the Iran-Iraq war was about to end. Only now the United States is at war in Iraq. Tensions with Iran are escalating daily. The U.S. has –of necessity- expressly retained its option to attack a continually bellicose Iran which continues to feverishly seek admission into the nuclear fraternity.

That said, other continuing factors further exacerbate matters in the Strait of Hormuz. Each day at least fifteen oil tankers traverse each two mile wide (each way) sea lane through the Strait of Hormuz. These sea lanes pass through the territorial waters of both Iran and Oman. These identical waters are regularly plied by U.S. Navy warships based in Bahrein.

To further complicate an already grievously complex situation, an actual flotilla of some fifty speedboats, operated by Iranians smuggling contraband into Iran, continually crosses and bisects these sea lanes while shuttling contraband material from Khasab, Oman into Iran. It is not without some irony that these speedboats often deposit their goods on Qeshm Island. That island is just slightly east of where Iran Air 655 was shot down by the U.S.S. Vincennes whose helicopter was aloft and was taking fire from Iranian military speedboats.

More pointedly, on 29 March 2010, I stood, watched and talked –albeit haltingly- with a cadre of these Iranian smugglers. They were hand-loading their speedboats from diminutive pick-up trucks which arrived in a steady stream on an unpaved road which mercifully ends at a series of pitifully primitive piers in Khasab, Oman. We watched as the speedboats were loaded with motorcycles, refrigerators, computers, DVDs, soft drinks, tea and juices. These were clearly visible. What manner of goods were encased in and/or enshrouded by multiple orange tarps is an open question.

Most all of the 35-40 speedboats make several one hour trips a day across the 29 mile wide Strait of Hormuz from Khasab, Oman to Iran. The speedboats deftly dodge the omnipresent oil tankers, they evade U.S. Navy warships and they willingly pay baksheesh (bribes) to Iranian maritime officials. It’s all a serious game of abundant, but seriously illegal, commercial activity in a terribly serious place.

That said, the Iranian smugglers only spoke broken English. My Farsi is virtually non-existent and my Arabic is almost equally impoverished. But the smugglers did,upon my request, voluntarily give me a thumbs up. And, however haltingly, we did actually communicate, at least until I told them I was American. Their thumbs then turned down, much like the Roman Emperor did in The Gladiator.

It is worth noting that the smugglers’ bossman was less-than-delighted by my presence. Upon noticing that his men were talking to me, the bossman (who was the visible antithesis of a classic, corporate C.E.O) did not hesitate to viscerally vent his spleen at me and his men (most were aged 18-35). It was not necessary to know either Farsi or Arabic to understand the bossman’s invective. The loading then continued without interruption as my red-headed wife (with whom the Iranians had begged to take photos) and I hastily departed the area.

In due course, an Iranian speedboat smuggling contraband is destined to run afoul of a fully loaded oil tanker or a U.S. warship itching for a fight. Then all the commotion will start in earnest. Thankfully, I will not be there. But let there be no doubt, the Strait of Hormuz is a dangerous place. It has all the ingredients necessary to precipitate a war. It has a fleet of oil tankers that transport 40% of the world’s oil (and 40% of China’s oil requirements), it has warships, it has congested sea lanes, it has the cramped territorial waters of a belligerent Iran, it has smugglers criss-crossing the Strait in speedboats and it is perhaps the world’s most critical commercial chokepoint.

In sum, the Strait of Hormuz is not simply an international incident waiting to happen. It is a body of water that has already consumed 290 souls from Iran Air 655. Assuredly, the Strait of Hormuz is a narrow channel that is unusually broad in its implications for world affairs. In fact, affairs in the Strait of Hormuz are normally complex and often convoluted. But it is also crystal clear that the Strait of Hormuz was, is and will foreseeably remain crooked to the derogation and possible damnation of the world’s best interests.

Postcript: On 5 May 2010, as nuclear non-proliferation talks were about to begin in
New York, Iran's military initiated an eight day series of war games in the Strait of
Hormuz. As such, dangerous - and potentially explosive- activity in the Strait continues unabated!