Comparisons are often invidious. Still, consider the following. About twenty-two hundred years ago, Cyrus The Great freed the Jews of Persia. He happily sent them packing back to the land of Israel to rebuild their Temple. Some twenty-two centuries years later, Ahmadinejad, the current Iranian President, would like to expunge the Jewish nation which still flourishes on the same land to which Jews were astutely allowed to return by Iran’s greatest historical personage. Indeed, times and leaders have changed, most notably in Iran, once known and widely admired as Persia.
Consider, if you will, that Cyrus was the first person in history to be known as “The Great.” That appellation was no mere historical happenstance. Cyrus built an expansive empire, the size and achievements of which had been previously unknown to that ancient world. The great Cyrus understood the need to respect diversity. He preserved disparate ethnic identities. He welcomed pluralism and encouraged free expression of belief. He accommodated differing cultures and lifestyles throughout his empire. Notably, Cyrus proclaimed and disseminated history’s first charter of human rights. In fact, because of his unusual psycho-social largesse and diplomatic perspicacity, Cyrus was widely known –even among his Jewish subjects- as “The Annointed Of The Lord.”
More importantly, Cyrus reflects the apogee in the development of Persian pride. He elevated the Persian character to a level of nobility. It is undisputed that Cyrus still exemplifies everything positive and admirable to which Persians and their Iranian descendants could aspire. Indeed, Iranians properly regard Cyrus as the Father of the Iranian Nation. So, what has happened in the interim?
Within two centuries of Cyrus’ death, Alexander The Great overran the then fading Persian empire. That event signaled the beginning of a tragedy that has afflicted Persians for the better part of some 2,270 years. During that seeming eternity, Persia was repeatedly subjected to foreign domination and/or occupation. The Persians were ruled by the Greeks, the Parthians, the Moslem Arabs, the Mongols, and then -for 700 years- by the Ottoman Turks. That virtually continuous foreign rule was a catastrophe for Iranian self-esteem. It was a massive insult to and humiliation of the Persian national ego.
But there was light at the end of the long historical tunnel. World War II ended the Ottoman empire’s stranglehold on the Mideast. That event signaled the fitful reemergence of Persia under a new name and under new leadership. Persian pride was tentatively reawakened under Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlevi. In due course, Iran was on route to becoming the dominant regional power, especially in the Arabian Gulf.
And then, in 1979, the Shah was overthrown in a coup led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei. Almost immediately thereafter, Iran was forced to fight a disastrous and debilitating eight year war with Iraq which both sides lost. In that war’s aftermath, Iran was once again reduced to a less-than-formidable force, even in its own regional backyard.
In 1989, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became the new Supreme Leader of Iran’s Islamic Republic. He has cleverly dominated and quietly presided over Iranian affairs to this very day. Indeed, it was under Khamenei’s leadership during the nineties that Iran entered upon a covert nuclear project arguably designed to rejuvenate Iran’s self-image and to rehabilitate its national ego. That effort –finally exposed to the West after eighteen years of protracted mendacity and profuse denial- continues apace.
Enter Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He became Iran’s populist, but periodically unpopular and bellicose, President in 2005. He presides over Iran with the imprimatur and in the shadow of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Unlike his boss, Ahmadinejad does not have the unilateral power to declare war, to set foreign policy, to control the media, and even to dictate what sermon should be preached and by whom in each mosque at noon each Friday!
So, when Ahmadinejad rants (denying the Holocaust, defaming Israel and/or vilifying America) it is not simply to espouse his distorted and perverted views, it is also because Khamenei sanctions those damnable disquisitions. That Ahmadinejad chooses to fulminate in gutter diplomacy and to fume in the sewers of incivility only demonstrates the depths to which Iranian leadership has descended from the lofty heights once enjoyed by Persians during the days of Cyrus.
That said, Cyrus The Great assuredly represents the pinnacle of Persian achievements and Iranian aspirations. Conversely, Ahmadinejad’s perverse and small-minded bellicosity only manifests the darkest recesses of some prominent Iranians’ psyche. Regrettably, Ahmadinejad’s personal comportment also reflects the perigee in Persian pride.
Premises considered, one is reminded of a pithy G.B. Shaw aphorism. He mused: “Greatness is only one of the sensations of littleness.” Undoubtedly, part of Cyrus’ greatness was his uncommon comprehension of existential and historical realities. This complemented a remarkable insight into his place and Persia’s role in the grand scheme of things. Not so Ahmadinejad!
So, if and when Ahmadinejad enters Persian heaven, he may chance to meet Cyrus. That is when Cyrus The Great may deem it proper to simply excoriate the current Iranian President as Ahmadinejad The Small.
Sunday, April 26, 2009
Wednesday, April 8, 2009
North Korea Has Juche!
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) may be the world’s most egregious nuclear proliferator, most flagrant WMD prevaricator, most Machavellian nuclear negotiator and most provocative missile manufacturer. These circumstances may well be a direct outgrowth of No. Korea’s cornerstone ideology known as Juche. That doctrine (promulgated in 1956 by No. Korea’s eternal president, Kim Il Song) advocates the relentless pursuit of self-reliance. That concept, enshrined in Article III of the DPRK Constitution, was and is the guiding principle of all No. Korean workers. And yet, Juche has never been achieved by the DPRK, except in the sphere of nuclear and missile development.
Indeed, when No. Korea first established a missile research facility at Hamhung in 1965, few nations paid much attention. When No. Korea acq uired the Russian FROG missile system in 1967, that event went largely unnoticed. When No. Korea began reverse engineering more advanced Russian missile systems, the West was already hamstrung by its own geopolitical ineptitude. When No. Korea initiated a multi-faceted ballistic missile program to counter So. Korea’s White Bear (Paethon) program, the West watched helplessly. When the DPRK signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, the West was a bit beguiled, but mostly befogged. And when, in 1992, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Association) discovered that No. Korea was diverting plutonium for its nuclear program, U.N. sanctions had no pronounced effect.
So, when No. Korea announced (in 1993) its intentions to withdraw from the NPT, that withdrawal was averted only by the 1994 signing of The Agreed Framework between the United States and No. Korea. The Agreed Framework specified that the DPRK would freeze its illicit plutonium production in exchange for two proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors plus the receipt by the DPRK of one-half million tons of heavy fuel oil. Not unexpectedly, the DPRK received its fuel, but observed its agreement in the breach.
That said, in 1998, the DPRK launched its long-range Taepodong 1 missile with the purported intent of placing a small satellite into orbit. That launch over Japan was deemed to be provocative. But life on the North Korean peninsula proceeded apace without measurable impact from the world’s vocal disapproval.
When No. Korea began enriching uranium in an effort to produce an atomic bomb, the West blustered and threatened, but did little else of consequence. By 2002, the United States had labeled No. Korea as a charter member of The Axis of Evil.
So, it was no surprise when the DPRK expelled IAEA inspectors in 2003. This led to the initiation of the so-called Six Party Talks. That characterization was unusually apt. Six years later, the parties are still talking, albeit with disquieting infrequency and associated duplicity. It must assuredly be observed that each of the other five parties possesses its own self-interested agenda with reference to No. Korea. More pointedly, the positions and postures of the parties are often diametrically at odds with each other. North Korean negotiators are undoubtedly bemused by that recurring diplomatic spectacle.
In due course, the DPRK (in 2006) saw fit to launch its Taepodong 2 long-range missile. Its alleged purpose was to place a small satellite into orbit. That missile launch was also deemed to be a provocative act. But the world’s ensuing bluster had no quantifiable effect. And when No. Korea finally exploded an atomic device in late 2006, it did so with substantial impunity.
In the meantime, No. Korea has been an unenthusiastic, but cleverly calculating, participant in at least six rounds of essentially futile Six-Party Talks. Still, by early 2008, it superficially appeared that the Six Party negotiations (involving China, Russia, Japan, So. Korea, the United States and North Korea) were finally yielding some positive results. Yes, No. Korea had agree d to not only dismantle, but also to disable its nuclear program. Yes, No. Korea had agreed to disclose the sites of nuclear activity. But yes, No. Korea had once again snookered the West into providing more heavy fuel oil. This time the fuel oil was to be in an amount double that specified by the 1994 Agreed Framework.
So, as was eminently foreseeable based upon No. Korea’s prior behavior patterns, the Six Party Talks have now floundered and all-but fallen apart. The reasons for this have long been readily apparent, except to Chief U.S. negotiator Chris Hill, who (in early 2008) effusively proclaimed substantive progress because there were “lots of details; very useful.”
Initially, the parties agreed that No. Korea would dismantle and disable its nuclear program “as quickly as possible.” That phraseology was eerily reminiscent of the U.S. Supreme Court decision that required race desegregation “with all deliberate speed.” And everyone knows what that meant.
More importantly, the 2008 Six Party Agreement was plagued by an absurd and deafening silence on numerous critical issues. Pointedly, there was no requirement for No. Korea to destroy its existing nuclear arsenal; there were no details concerning how the Yongbyon reactor was to be disabled; there was no timetable for reporting the existence or status of nuclear materials; there was absolutely no discussion concerning the fact that No. Korea’s missile program would remain intact. There was, however, a clear mandate for the U.S. to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK plus the guarantee that the U.S. would remove No. Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Even at the date of this last Agreement, it was all to clear that these arrangements were an exercise in diplomatic double-speak. That Agreement purposely deflected attention from unresolved issues, it masked realities, it obscured critical concerns and it beshrouded the plain truth in diplomatic circumlocution.
It was, therefore, eminently foreseeable that No. Korea would sooner or later –in the face and in spite of widespread international opprobrium- launch yet another long-range ICBM over Japan and eastward across the Pacific toward the USA. It did so on April 5, 2009. And once again, No. Korea claimed that it was merely seeking to place a satellite into orbit. In response, the Obama Administration is stridently seeking strong Security Council resolutions. But any resulting sanctions –due to Chinese and Russian predispositions on North Korea- are likely to be void, vacuous and vacant of substance and/or substantially unenforceable. Of course, North Korea fully understands, calculates and depends upon these repeated international exercises in diplomatic futility.
Premises considered, it is likely that No. Korea will ultimately return to the six party negotiating table with a renewed set of demands. For No. Korea, this has become an almost seamless process. Indeed, while No. Korea remains one of the poorest and least self-reliant nations on earth (especially regarding food and fuel), it has also displayed unusual diplomatic perspicacity in pursuit of its goals. So, perhaps the No. Koreans really do have a lot of Juche, at least in sphere of geopolitical know-how. It certainly seems that No. Korea has developed a uniquely successful and productive formula for diplomatic self-reliance.
One can only hope that the Iranians (with their nuclear aspirations) are not learning from the lessons being so diligently taught by No. Korea. If No. Korea can continually squeeze more Juche from its diplomatic pouch, then Iran certainly has abundant wherewithal to replace the nationalistic Juche the once flowed so freely under Cyrus The Great during the awesome Persian Empire.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) may be the world’s most egregious nuclear proliferator, most flagrant WMD prevaricator, most Machavellian nuclear negotiator and most provocative missile manufacturer. These circumstances may well be a direct outgrowth of No. Korea’s cornerstone ideology known as Juche. That doctrine (promulgated in 1956 by No. Korea’s eternal president, Kim Il Song) advocates the relentless pursuit of self-reliance. That concept, enshrined in Article III of the DPRK Constitution, was and is the guiding principle of all No. Korean workers. And yet, Juche has never been achieved by the DPRK, except in the sphere of nuclear and missile development.
Indeed, when No. Korea first established a missile research facility at Hamhung in 1965, few nations paid much attention. When No. Korea acq uired the Russian FROG missile system in 1967, that event went largely unnoticed. When No. Korea began reverse engineering more advanced Russian missile systems, the West was already hamstrung by its own geopolitical ineptitude. When No. Korea initiated a multi-faceted ballistic missile program to counter So. Korea’s White Bear (Paethon) program, the West watched helplessly. When the DPRK signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, the West was a bit beguiled, but mostly befogged. And when, in 1992, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Association) discovered that No. Korea was diverting plutonium for its nuclear program, U.N. sanctions had no pronounced effect.
So, when No. Korea announced (in 1993) its intentions to withdraw from the NPT, that withdrawal was averted only by the 1994 signing of The Agreed Framework between the United States and No. Korea. The Agreed Framework specified that the DPRK would freeze its illicit plutonium production in exchange for two proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors plus the receipt by the DPRK of one-half million tons of heavy fuel oil. Not unexpectedly, the DPRK received its fuel, but observed its agreement in the breach.
That said, in 1998, the DPRK launched its long-range Taepodong 1 missile with the purported intent of placing a small satellite into orbit. That launch over Japan was deemed to be provocative. But life on the North Korean peninsula proceeded apace without measurable impact from the world’s vocal disapproval.
When No. Korea began enriching uranium in an effort to produce an atomic bomb, the West blustered and threatened, but did little else of consequence. By 2002, the United States had labeled No. Korea as a charter member of The Axis of Evil.
So, it was no surprise when the DPRK expelled IAEA inspectors in 2003. This led to the initiation of the so-called Six Party Talks. That characterization was unusually apt. Six years later, the parties are still talking, albeit with disquieting infrequency and associated duplicity. It must assuredly be observed that each of the other five parties possesses its own self-interested agenda with reference to No. Korea. More pointedly, the positions and postures of the parties are often diametrically at odds with each other. North Korean negotiators are undoubtedly bemused by that recurring diplomatic spectacle.
In due course, the DPRK (in 2006) saw fit to launch its Taepodong 2 long-range missile. Its alleged purpose was to place a small satellite into orbit. That missile launch was also deemed to be a provocative act. But the world’s ensuing bluster had no quantifiable effect. And when No. Korea finally exploded an atomic device in late 2006, it did so with substantial impunity.
In the meantime, No. Korea has been an unenthusiastic, but cleverly calculating, participant in at least six rounds of essentially futile Six-Party Talks. Still, by early 2008, it superficially appeared that the Six Party negotiations (involving China, Russia, Japan, So. Korea, the United States and North Korea) were finally yielding some positive results. Yes, No. Korea had agree d to not only dismantle, but also to disable its nuclear program. Yes, No. Korea had agreed to disclose the sites of nuclear activity. But yes, No. Korea had once again snookered the West into providing more heavy fuel oil. This time the fuel oil was to be in an amount double that specified by the 1994 Agreed Framework.
So, as was eminently foreseeable based upon No. Korea’s prior behavior patterns, the Six Party Talks have now floundered and all-but fallen apart. The reasons for this have long been readily apparent, except to Chief U.S. negotiator Chris Hill, who (in early 2008) effusively proclaimed substantive progress because there were “lots of details; very useful.”
Initially, the parties agreed that No. Korea would dismantle and disable its nuclear program “as quickly as possible.” That phraseology was eerily reminiscent of the U.S. Supreme Court decision that required race desegregation “with all deliberate speed.” And everyone knows what that meant.
More importantly, the 2008 Six Party Agreement was plagued by an absurd and deafening silence on numerous critical issues. Pointedly, there was no requirement for No. Korea to destroy its existing nuclear arsenal; there were no details concerning how the Yongbyon reactor was to be disabled; there was no timetable for reporting the existence or status of nuclear materials; there was absolutely no discussion concerning the fact that No. Korea’s missile program would remain intact. There was, however, a clear mandate for the U.S. to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK plus the guarantee that the U.S. would remove No. Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Even at the date of this last Agreement, it was all to clear that these arrangements were an exercise in diplomatic double-speak. That Agreement purposely deflected attention from unresolved issues, it masked realities, it obscured critical concerns and it beshrouded the plain truth in diplomatic circumlocution.
It was, therefore, eminently foreseeable that No. Korea would sooner or later –in the face and in spite of widespread international opprobrium- launch yet another long-range ICBM over Japan and eastward across the Pacific toward the USA. It did so on April 5, 2009. And once again, No. Korea claimed that it was merely seeking to place a satellite into orbit. In response, the Obama Administration is stridently seeking strong Security Council resolutions. But any resulting sanctions –due to Chinese and Russian predispositions on North Korea- are likely to be void, vacuous and vacant of substance and/or substantially unenforceable. Of course, North Korea fully understands, calculates and depends upon these repeated international exercises in diplomatic futility.
Premises considered, it is likely that No. Korea will ultimately return to the six party negotiating table with a renewed set of demands. For No. Korea, this has become an almost seamless process. Indeed, while No. Korea remains one of the poorest and least self-reliant nations on earth (especially regarding food and fuel), it has also displayed unusual diplomatic perspicacity in pursuit of its goals. So, perhaps the No. Koreans really do have a lot of Juche, at least in sphere of geopolitical know-how. It certainly seems that No. Korea has developed a uniquely successful and productive formula for diplomatic self-reliance.
One can only hope that the Iranians (with their nuclear aspirations) are not learning from the lessons being so diligently taught by No. Korea. If No. Korea can continually squeeze more Juche from its diplomatic pouch, then Iran certainly has abundant wherewithal to replace the nationalistic Juche the once flowed so freely under Cyrus The Great during the awesome Persian Empire.
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
Pakistan Is No Wonderland
When Alice In Wonderland proclaimed that matters were becoming curiouser and curiouser, she could have been ruminating about Pakistan. Just a fleeting glance Through The (geopolitical) Looking Glass reveals that virtually every aspect of life in Pakistan is beset by some level of consternation, confusion and commotion, often bordering on chaos. The disarray afflicting Pakistan could even make the March Hare’s delirious confusion more disturbing. Assuredly, Pakistan’s profusion of disorder would make the Mad Hatter’s eccentric behavior almost seem tame.
Yet in light -or in spite- of the foregoing, the Obama Administration has now announced plans to send 4.3 billion dollars in aid to Pakistan. Given this substantial bequest of American taxpayer funds, it seems fitting to examine the plight of Pakistan in greater detail. In fact, Richard Holbrooke, America’s special envoy to Pakistan, recently addressed an influential group of Pakistanis and queried: “What is the crisis of Pakistan?” One wonders if the responses he received included the following concerns.
Pakistan’s most pressing problem may be the rapid spread of Afghanistan’s Taliban insurgency into and across north-west Pakistan. That concern is exacerbated by the fact that Pakistan’s notorious ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence Agency) has been flagrantly lending succor and support to the Taliban. Pakistan’s President has admitted that militants hold “huge amounts of land.” The Obama Administration has openly conceded the bitter truth of these egregious circumstances. Yet, while the U.S. is sending more and more troops to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan, projected U. S. aid to Pakistan may well –at least indirectly- aid the Taliban. Curiouser and Curiouser.
The threat of anarchy poses another problem for Pakistan. It is little reported, but there have been more than sixty suicide bombings during the past two years in Pakistan. Attacks on government entities and roadside bombs are almost daily events. There is an incipient revolt brewing in the Pakistani state of Baluchistan. The Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorist group (which admittedly supplied the operational know-how and training for last November’s terrorist attack on Mumbai) continues to operate and retains substantial support among Pakistan’s ISI.
And, of course, it was less than a year ago that Pakistan’s government was rocked by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Her husband (Ali Zadari), Pakistan’s current president, also fears for his life. He may have good cause. Eighty-one percent of Pakistanis dislike him. Additionally, Zadari is at visceral odds with Nawaz Sharif, his bitter and popular political opponent. The latter (Sharif) likes to remind his adversaries of his bold decision (when he was Pakistan’s Prime Minister) to test a Pakistani nuclear device in 1998 despite threats from the world powers. One wonders what Sharif now thinks about Iran’s nuclear ambitions? Lest we forget, the Sunni (Moslem) Pakistanis already possess the nuclear device to which its neighboring Shia (Moslem) Iranians so assiduously aspire. And there is certainly no love lost between the Sunnis and the Shia.
Of equal interest, Mr. Sharif heads up Pakistan’s Muslin League. The Pakistani Muslim League has its roots in the All-India Muslim League. The latter was founded in 1906 to protect the interests of Muslims in what was then British India. In 1940, the Muslim League adopted the Lahore Resolution (usually referred to as the "Pakistan Resolution") and successfully spearheaded the movement for the creation of an independent homeland for Indian Muslims, i.e. Pakistan. But, then, the tension between Pakistan’s Moslems and Hindu India is yet another major issue that has long beset and befogged Pakistani affairs. Kashmir is the face of that issue.
Jammu & Kashmir, as that region is properly known, is India’s only Muslim majority state. That situation –in and of itself- has major implications for other areas of India which are heavily populated by 154 million Moslems. Still, while India controls most of Kashmir, Pakistan has –not without substantial justification- historically laid claim to every inch of Kashmir. Clearly, most Kashmiris (including virtually all Kashmiri Muslims) resent being a part of India. If Kashmiris would be allowed to vote (as India originally promised, but which promise has never been kept), Kashmiris would undoubtedly vote to secede from India. Whether they would choose to join Pakistan is quite another matter.
That said, neither India nor Pakistan is prepared to relinquish their continually contentious -and often volatile- claims to Kashmir. On one side of the issue, the Pakistani military has a decided predilection to antagonize India. That attitude is predicated upon the belief that Hindu India was and is Pakistan’s mortal enemy.
On the other hand, India is fully aware that the major rivers (the Indus tributaries) feeding Pakistan flow through the Indian-controlled vale of Kashmir. The implications to Pakistan of this geopolitical circumstance are all too clear. As such, it is unlikely that India will ever permit the Kashmiris to vote or that India will ever make serious concessions to Pakistan on Kashmir. If conceivable, the Palestinian-Israeli issue may be easier to resolve. One wonders if that is why Sen. Mitchell was sent to the Mideast and Mr. Holbrooke was sent to Pakistan?
Of course, all the foregoing assumes an awareness of the presence of Islamist terrorists (probably including al-Qaeda and Osama) in Pakistan’s tribal area where the Wuziristan region borders Afghanistan. To suggest that this area is akin to America’s old wild west is to severely understate the unruly realities on the ground north, west and south of Peshawar. For the record, Peshawar is no shrinking violet when it comes to rough and rowdy towns.
Need it also be said that Pakistan is anything-but-immune to the global economic slowdown. Thus, about one third of Pakistan’s textile factories have ceased operations. Notably, Pakistan’s textile industry provides a virtual majority of industrial employment in Pakistan. Textiles are also the source of approximately half of Pakistan’s foreign-exchange earnings. As a proximate result of this state of economic disarray, Pakistan had to plead to the International Monetary Fund for a 7.6 billion dollar bailout to avoid defaulting on its external debt. Undaunted, the USA is still about to funnel many more billions into Pakistani coffers. Curiouser and curiouser. Still, is throwing good money after bad a proper political prerequisite given the exigencies in Pakistan? That’s a riddle worthy of the Mad Hatter.
In the final analysis, it is perhaps best to return to the plight of Alice in Wonderland. She was famously asked by the Mad Hatter: “Why is a raven like a writing desk?” Having received no reply, the Mad Hatter then queried Alice: “Have you guessed the riddle yet?” “No, I give up,” Alice replied. “What’s the answer?” To which the Mad Hatter promptly responded: “I haven’t the slightest idea.” Regrettably, the same can be said about resolving the pressing problems in Pakistan!
When Alice In Wonderland proclaimed that matters were becoming curiouser and curiouser, she could have been ruminating about Pakistan. Just a fleeting glance Through The (geopolitical) Looking Glass reveals that virtually every aspect of life in Pakistan is beset by some level of consternation, confusion and commotion, often bordering on chaos. The disarray afflicting Pakistan could even make the March Hare’s delirious confusion more disturbing. Assuredly, Pakistan’s profusion of disorder would make the Mad Hatter’s eccentric behavior almost seem tame.
Yet in light -or in spite- of the foregoing, the Obama Administration has now announced plans to send 4.3 billion dollars in aid to Pakistan. Given this substantial bequest of American taxpayer funds, it seems fitting to examine the plight of Pakistan in greater detail. In fact, Richard Holbrooke, America’s special envoy to Pakistan, recently addressed an influential group of Pakistanis and queried: “What is the crisis of Pakistan?” One wonders if the responses he received included the following concerns.
Pakistan’s most pressing problem may be the rapid spread of Afghanistan’s Taliban insurgency into and across north-west Pakistan. That concern is exacerbated by the fact that Pakistan’s notorious ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence Agency) has been flagrantly lending succor and support to the Taliban. Pakistan’s President has admitted that militants hold “huge amounts of land.” The Obama Administration has openly conceded the bitter truth of these egregious circumstances. Yet, while the U.S. is sending more and more troops to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan, projected U. S. aid to Pakistan may well –at least indirectly- aid the Taliban. Curiouser and Curiouser.
The threat of anarchy poses another problem for Pakistan. It is little reported, but there have been more than sixty suicide bombings during the past two years in Pakistan. Attacks on government entities and roadside bombs are almost daily events. There is an incipient revolt brewing in the Pakistani state of Baluchistan. The Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorist group (which admittedly supplied the operational know-how and training for last November’s terrorist attack on Mumbai) continues to operate and retains substantial support among Pakistan’s ISI.
And, of course, it was less than a year ago that Pakistan’s government was rocked by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Her husband (Ali Zadari), Pakistan’s current president, also fears for his life. He may have good cause. Eighty-one percent of Pakistanis dislike him. Additionally, Zadari is at visceral odds with Nawaz Sharif, his bitter and popular political opponent. The latter (Sharif) likes to remind his adversaries of his bold decision (when he was Pakistan’s Prime Minister) to test a Pakistani nuclear device in 1998 despite threats from the world powers. One wonders what Sharif now thinks about Iran’s nuclear ambitions? Lest we forget, the Sunni (Moslem) Pakistanis already possess the nuclear device to which its neighboring Shia (Moslem) Iranians so assiduously aspire. And there is certainly no love lost between the Sunnis and the Shia.
Of equal interest, Mr. Sharif heads up Pakistan’s Muslin League. The Pakistani Muslim League has its roots in the All-India Muslim League. The latter was founded in 1906 to protect the interests of Muslims in what was then British India. In 1940, the Muslim League adopted the Lahore Resolution (usually referred to as the "Pakistan Resolution") and successfully spearheaded the movement for the creation of an independent homeland for Indian Muslims, i.e. Pakistan. But, then, the tension between Pakistan’s Moslems and Hindu India is yet another major issue that has long beset and befogged Pakistani affairs. Kashmir is the face of that issue.
Jammu & Kashmir, as that region is properly known, is India’s only Muslim majority state. That situation –in and of itself- has major implications for other areas of India which are heavily populated by 154 million Moslems. Still, while India controls most of Kashmir, Pakistan has –not without substantial justification- historically laid claim to every inch of Kashmir. Clearly, most Kashmiris (including virtually all Kashmiri Muslims) resent being a part of India. If Kashmiris would be allowed to vote (as India originally promised, but which promise has never been kept), Kashmiris would undoubtedly vote to secede from India. Whether they would choose to join Pakistan is quite another matter.
That said, neither India nor Pakistan is prepared to relinquish their continually contentious -and often volatile- claims to Kashmir. On one side of the issue, the Pakistani military has a decided predilection to antagonize India. That attitude is predicated upon the belief that Hindu India was and is Pakistan’s mortal enemy.
On the other hand, India is fully aware that the major rivers (the Indus tributaries) feeding Pakistan flow through the Indian-controlled vale of Kashmir. The implications to Pakistan of this geopolitical circumstance are all too clear. As such, it is unlikely that India will ever permit the Kashmiris to vote or that India will ever make serious concessions to Pakistan on Kashmir. If conceivable, the Palestinian-Israeli issue may be easier to resolve. One wonders if that is why Sen. Mitchell was sent to the Mideast and Mr. Holbrooke was sent to Pakistan?
Of course, all the foregoing assumes an awareness of the presence of Islamist terrorists (probably including al-Qaeda and Osama) in Pakistan’s tribal area where the Wuziristan region borders Afghanistan. To suggest that this area is akin to America’s old wild west is to severely understate the unruly realities on the ground north, west and south of Peshawar. For the record, Peshawar is no shrinking violet when it comes to rough and rowdy towns.
Need it also be said that Pakistan is anything-but-immune to the global economic slowdown. Thus, about one third of Pakistan’s textile factories have ceased operations. Notably, Pakistan’s textile industry provides a virtual majority of industrial employment in Pakistan. Textiles are also the source of approximately half of Pakistan’s foreign-exchange earnings. As a proximate result of this state of economic disarray, Pakistan had to plead to the International Monetary Fund for a 7.6 billion dollar bailout to avoid defaulting on its external debt. Undaunted, the USA is still about to funnel many more billions into Pakistani coffers. Curiouser and curiouser. Still, is throwing good money after bad a proper political prerequisite given the exigencies in Pakistan? That’s a riddle worthy of the Mad Hatter.
In the final analysis, it is perhaps best to return to the plight of Alice in Wonderland. She was famously asked by the Mad Hatter: “Why is a raven like a writing desk?” Having received no reply, the Mad Hatter then queried Alice: “Have you guessed the riddle yet?” “No, I give up,” Alice replied. “What’s the answer?” To which the Mad Hatter promptly responded: “I haven’t the slightest idea.” Regrettably, the same can be said about resolving the pressing problems in Pakistan!
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