What's Really Going On In Gaza?

Amidst all the current fanfare and furor surrounding
Israel’s blockade of Gaza,it may be illuminating to
inspect what’s really going on in Gaza. The U.N.’s
summer camp program for Gaza teenagers is
instructive and illuminating.

By way of introduction, the United Nations,
thru its Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA),
funnels some 500 million dollars a
year into Gaza. UNRWA also sets up,
operates and oversees summer beach-camp for
some 200,000 Gaza teenagers. Many parents
in Hamas controlled Gaza willingly opt to
send their kids to the UNWRA beach camps
instead of directing them to attend
competing summer camps run by Hamas.

The Hamas summer camp experience offers
Koran recitation, Koran memorization,
guerrilla training with plastic or wooden
rifles plus some other seemingly normal
summertime activities like arts and crafts,
volleyball and soccer on the beach and swimming
in the Mediterranean. But, for a fleeting
period earlier this spring, it actually appeared
that the UNWRA camps (to the dismay and chagrin
of the Hamas camps) were going to have a surge
in attendance by Gaza’s teenagers. Why?

The answer is embedded in the definition of
precisely what constitutes a proper summer
camp. According to Hamas spokesman,Younis
al-Astel, the UNRWA summer camps are coed,
that UN camps teach campers how to dance,
and that UNWRA camps even had activities
which promote reconciliation between the
Palestinians and Hamas further flatly
asserts that UNRWA’s for Gaza’s teenagers
are little more than“… summer
camps of debauchery!"

Some Hamas officials also (falsely) claim
that UNWRA “lets boys and girls play together.”
Hamas’ Minister Of Culture actually
hotly protested that the UNWRA camps
“…even let pubescent girls swim in the sea.”
With such alleged activities, is it any wonder
that Gaza’s youth are attracted to UNWRA’s
summer camps? Indeed, Hamas complains that
"UN summer camps have affected our summer
activities this year because they (the UN camps)
attract the children by offering them
“entertaining games” (emphasis added).
Now that is assuredly intolerable, is it not?

Much of what Hamas alleges about the UNWRA
summer camp experience is patently false. But
that is apparently irrelevant to Hamas which
has a clearly different notion of what
activities should be offered at its many
Gaza summer camps. According to Ihab al-Eisawai,
Hamas’ summer camp media officer,
"each Hamas summer camp carries the name of
a Hamas militant killed by the Israeli
occupation, or the name of a village destroyed
in Palestine in 1948 and the
names of the prisoners….Our camps are different;
we carry out cultural, media, arts and technology
activities, in addition to focusing on teaching
them about the real Islam." In fact,Ismail Haniya,
Gaza’s titular head of the Hamas, announced that
campers who excelled in Koran memorization
would receive a prize that would pay travel
expenses for a pilgrimage to Mecca. What
red-blooded Gaza kid would not aspire to
that loftly goal?

Some Gaza kids who joined Hamas’ camps on the
first-day of the summer camp activities waved
Palestinian flags, others carried pictures of
shaheeds (Hamas’ martyrs) waved banners
imprinted with the names of Hamas prisoners
or held up placards with slogans such as:
“Victory For Gaza-The Glory Of Jerusalem.”

Apparently, the looming success of the quite
different UNWRA camping experience was too
much for Hamas afficiandos to tolerate.So,
on this past May 23rd, a group of thirty masked,
armed and benighted male Gazans assaulted,
torched and otherwise vandalized UNWRA’s largest
summer camp site on the Gaza beach. The zealots
tied up a guard and left a note and
three bullets threatening the life of UNWRA’s
local director, John Ging, unless UNWRA
cancelled camp for 200,000 Gaza kids. Perhaps
more importantly, Hamas security forces
conspiratorially allowed the
masked vandals unimpeded entry into the UNWRA
summer camp site. The Hamas security forces
then blocked UN supporters who tried in vain
to protest.

So, given knowledge of and insight into the
foregoing circumstances,a number of matters
concerning Gaza become less befogged and less
beshrouded in emotionally charged Hamas propaganda
or in activist press releases. First, you certainly
do not want to plan your next vacation to be on the
Gaza strip. Second, the average American or
European-bred teenager would be wholly horrified if
required to spend his/her summer at a Gaza beach
camp operated by Hamas. Third, adult life in the
Gaza strip is assuredly no summer camp for
anyone living there. After all is said and
done, Gaza is a tiny, blockaded enclave
completely dominated and tightly controlled
by the clenched fist of terrorist-tainted Hamas.

That said, based on reports and photos from
multiple disparate sources, the overarching
majority of kids attending either the
UNWRA or Hamas summer camps appear to be
properly clothed and well-nourished.
Therefore, considering the several hundreds
of summer camps being funded and actually
operating in stark competition between UNWRA
and Hamas, it would seem reasonable to believe
that the humanitarian situation in Gaza is not
nearly so dire nor so excruciatingly oppressive
as to mandate the critical necessity of a
blockade busting flotilla. But, then, that is
only my humble opinion.

Of a certainty, my own grandkids would not be
emotionally disposed to cavorting at an UNWRA
campsite on the Gaza strip nor would
they be fitting campers to benefit from the
clearly captivating summertime activities
sponsored with such loving verve and delicate
care by Hamas at their seaside camps along the
not-so-scenic Gaza strip.

Having now learned about the above circumstances
on the Gaza strip, the caustic warning of
Alexander Pope comes to mind. He cautioned:
“A little learning is a dangerous thing;
drink deep or taste notthe Pierian spring.”

P.S. My grandkids prefer summer visits to the
sugar-white, sandy beaches of the Florida
panhandle. Well, by August, when my grandkids
arrive, the beaches on the Gaza strip may be
more inviting than Florida’s sugar white beaches.
By then, Florida’s beaches may be blackened
and polluted with BP oil still profusely gushing
into the Gulf of Mexico. Go Gaza!

Talking Turkey And Torpedoes

It’s outrageous; it’s barbaric; it’s inhumane; it’s irrational; it’s illogical; it’s simply unbelievable. No, we are not talking about Israel’s commando raid that tragically killed nine activists aboard the blockade running Turkish flotilla headed to Gaza. But, yes, we are referring to the super-cavitation North Korean torpedo that wantonly and willfully killed forty-six South Korean sailors aboard their naval vessel.

Not unexpectedly, the world’s outrage has focused –with almost microscopic exclusivity – upon the inexplicably improvident Israeli commando raid. Indeed, the Turks, the E.U., the Arabs and the entirety of the Moslem world are infuriated. They are all, separately and severally, aflame with self-righteous, moral indignation. And, let there be no mistake, the conduct of Israel’s raid –during which nine activists died- was wholly unacceptable.

Still, there is not the slightest suggestion or even thinly veiled hint from any quarter, regardless of how pro-Palestinian or anti-Israel, that Israel premeditated, willed, planned or even contemplated the tragic civilian deaths. Admittedly, those deaths were foreseeable. Commando raids are inherently dangerous and deadly. The Israelis certainly knew that. Furthermore, Israel had multiple other options to impede, interdict, block and stop the flotilla from reaching Gaza.

Need it be said that everyone everywhere customarily demands a higher standard of behavior from Israel. Traditionally, even Israel has held itself out as dedicated to acting in and on a higher moral plane. But, in this flotilla situation, Israel screwed up big time and it has frightfully little room for excuses. The Israeli commando raid was conducted with an insensitivity, irrationality and an uncharacteristic incompetence that has –of late- crept into an unseemly number of Israeli affairs. Israel must better conduct itself, if only in pursuit of its own self-respect, its own dignity and its Biblical mandate to be “a light unto the nations."

But there is an more odious flip side to the above. Sanctioning an attempt to breach the Israeli blockade of Gaza was among the most dangerous and provocative acts that Turkey could have underwritten. The Turkish government was well aware that a Turkish organization with unquestioned links to Hamas was launching a flotilla of rabid activists heading for Gaza. The Turkish authorities knowingly opted not to stop the flotilla. The Turks clearly understood that the flotilla would place Israel in an untenable situation. The powers that be in Turkey knew that the flotilla would constitute a head-on challenge to the Israeli blockade of Gaza. The Turkish organizers were cognizant that attempting to break a blockade constitutes “the use of force” under the rules of the United Nations. The Turks clearly understood that Israel proactively defends its national interests and security.

Indeed, it is or should be crystal clear –except to those whose vision is beclouded by anti-Israel myopia- that everyone with knowledge of the Turkish flotilla knew or
should have known that its mission was fraught with eminently foreseeable danger to life and limb. Blockade busting is an inherently dangerous act. It contemplates hostility; it anticipates angered antagonism; it invites armed intervention; and it solicits proactive military interdiction. It is astounding is that the Turkish flotilla did not elicit greater loss of life.

Perhaps of equal importance, the Turks – egged on by their Islamist-oriented and Israel-bashing Prime Minister- had absolutely no doubt that Israel would react to the blockade busting flotilla precisely as Israel did react. Indeed, that Israel’s raid resulted in bloodshed is a testament not only to Turkish geopolitical acumen, but –pointedly- also to Turkey’s conspiratorial complicity and behavioral culpability.

Of course, the Turkish flotilla may well have also had a humanitarian purpose. But that clearly secondary status did not mask the flotilla’s primary significance. The flotilla’s attempt to breach the Israeli blockade while attempting to deliver a completely unknown cargo (destined for Hamas) had significant military ramifications for Israel. Furthermore, the flotilla proceeded in flagrant disregard of Israel’s offer of docking rights in an Israeli port. The flotilla disdainfully rejected aid in transporting all non-military materials overland to Gaza.

Premises considered, it then became incumbent upon Israel to treat the flotilla as a hostile threat to Israel’s security and well-being. This threat was magnified exponentially because Hamas-controlled Gaza continues to unequivocally and
unapologetically deny Israel’s right to exist. There is not a nation on earth that would –in light of the foregoing scenario – forfeit its absolute right to protect itself and its national duty to safeguard its citizens.

In retrospect, Israel is responsible and accountable for its inexplicable decision to use commandoes instead of employing other alternatives to stop the flotilla. But Turkey is inescapably culpable for the tragic, but foreseeable civilian casualties. In its current bid to become the big kid on the Mideast block, Turkey –with Machiavellian premeditation- willfully chose to malignantly aid, abet and callously toy with the lives of the flotilla’s activists. For the Turkish powers that be, the activists’ lives were seemingly expendable!

So, boo to the Israelis who should certainly know better and must behave better. But shame on the Turks who also know better, thought about what they know and then wantonly decided they did not give a diddly damn about placing their activists in harm’s way.

And speaking about wanton disregard of life, let’s briefly talk about those 46 deaths attributable to the North Korean torpedo. Now that is a matter which deserved widespread outrage and international condemnation. However, more than two months after the torpedo exploded, there have still been no sanctions by the U.N., there has not been a word of protest from Russia, there is abject silence from China, and there is massive indifference and apathy from the Arab and Moslem world. That torpedo incident screams for outrage; it cries out for angry demonstrations; it begs for retribution. But international impunity, passivity and diplomatic circumlocution reign supreme when dealing with No. Korea. Even the So. Koreans have been all but mute. And all that is truly outrageous.

Imagine, if you will, that Israel had wantonly torpedoed even one ship in the Turkish flotilla. Consider, if you will, the resulting worldwide clamor seeking sanctions, retribution and revenge against Israel. Contemplate, if you will, the virulent condemnation, fanatic furor and vile opprobrium that would have engulfed Israel had one its submarines lain in wait to blast a Turkish ship into oblivion. Perhaps this scenario gives a broader perspective, a wider context and clearer illumination to the disparate standards applied to Israeli conduct in contradistinction to the behavior of No. Korea and to that other axle of evil, Iran.

In sum, perhaps Machiavelli understood the above manner of geopolitical gamesmanship best. He might well have opined: “Never have less scruple in condemning an evil nation than in excoriating a nation which deems itself upright.”

P.S. Geopolitical affairs are unusually complex and often convoluted. The highly sophisticated No. Korean super-cavitation torpedo is a case in point. This unique weapon was originally dreamed up and engineered in Russia where it is known as the Shkval torpedo. The Russians sold the torpedo to Iran. Iran then reverse-engineered the torpedo and allegedly improved it. Arguably, Iran then transferred the torpedo to North Korea in exchange for No. Korea’s nuclear technology. Boom!

Afghanistan Anguish

“We do know, of certain knowledge, that (Bin Laden) is either in Afghanistan or in some other country or dead.” Thus spoke Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Secretary of Defense who arrogantly asserted that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. As wrong as Rumsfeld was about Iraq, he was also equally uninformed about the whereabouts of Bin Laden and the nature of Afghanistan. That said, Afghanistan remains a confounding and confusing conundrum even to those who truly are in a position to be informed. General Stanley McCrystal, the commander of military operations in Afghanistan, is a prime case in point.

The good General has candidly admitted that affairs in Afghanistan are beclouded and beshrouded not only by Afghanistan’s rugged topography and its fractious demographics, but also by its societal organization, its culture, its religion, its government, its illiteracy, its history and by virtually every category through which one might seek to develop understanding. Indeed, General McCrystal has studiously bemoaned the fact that: “Every day I realize how little about Afghanistan I actually understand.”

Admittedly, that absence of transparency is truly not Afghanistan’s problem; rather, it is a demonstrable and virtually incomprehensible problem to and for Westerners. Generally speaking, Westerners, perhaps understandably –but inconveniently- have little awareness or cognition of the nature of daily life in southwest Asia, let alone of behavior patterns and practical affairs in Afghanistan. So, a cursory inspection into what Afghanistan is all about may be in order.

As one starting point to understanding Afghanistan, Westerners might well begin by retrojecting themselves several hundred years back into the state of affairs that once existed in the American West. That region was then wild, woolly and untamed. So is 21st century Afghanistan.

More pointedly, the American West was populated by diverse tribes of Indians (Apaches, Commanches, Sioux, Blackfoot, Cheyenne, Kiowa, Ojibwa, Pawnee and many others) who were -more often than not- at odds with and hostile to each other. While the analogy to American Indians may be facile and superficial, a not unsimilar state of affairs exists in modern Afghanistan. Indeed, one of the major hallmarks of Afghanistan is that it was, is and will foreseeably continue to be an ethnically diverse and distinctly tribal society.

Consider, if you will, that there are multiple ethnicities in Afghanistan, e.g. Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Pashtuns. The latter group alone boasts at least sixty different Pashtun tribes. These are, in turn, divided into some 400 sub-tribes or clans of Pashtuns. Each tribe and/or clan has its own predispositions and predilections. Many of the tribes, let alone different ethnic groups, are hostile to each other. Even many of the sub-tribal clans harbor an intense distaste for fellow tribesmen of a different clan. Indeed, a well-known anecdote concerning relations between the Meshud-Pashtuns and the Waziri-Pashtuns is revealing.

Thus, it is told about what would happen if member of the Meshud tribe walked into a room where he was confronted by a venomous snake and by an unarmed member of the Wazir tribe. In that situation, the Meshud tribesman would first kill the Waziri. Only then, would the Meshud kill the snake. The anecdote exposes the hostility that is not unexpected or even abnormal in Afghanistan’s tribal society.

In actual fact, the Meshuds consider the Waziris to be slow-witted and untrustworthy. The Waziris regard the Meshuds as vagabonds and cattle-rustlers. Yet, both the Meshuds and the Waziris are Pashtun tribesmen by birth. They both profess belief in Islam and both are arguably faithful to its practice. Indeed, Islam prohibits the very thievery which both project upon the other. Even a prominent lullaby chanted by Waziri mothers to their infant children intones the prayerful directive: “Be a thief and may Allah go with you.” As such, the unusual diversity, complexity and inexplicable contradictions of life in Afghanistan begin to emerge.

It is certainly true that each of Afghanistan’s distinctive ethnic groups and tribes subscribe to their own particular and often peculiar set of cultural mores and practices. But the Pashtun code of conduct is particularly critical and unusually illuminating. Pashtun society and daily living are governed by the Pashtun’s unique and comprehensive Code of Honor known as “Pashtunwali.”

The multiple elements of Pashtunwali are deeply engrained and inextricably embedded into the fabric of Pashtun society. Among the foremost features of Pastunwali are: self-respect, independence, hospitality and revenge. And let there be no mistake, Pastunwali arrogates unto itself unquestioned precedence over both dedication to Islam and allegiance to Afghan nationalism. Pastunwali is the mechanism that controls Pashtun society and makes the Pashtuns tick.

Simply put, the principles of Pashtunwali are and will presumably continue to be the dominant force in the lives, culture and identity of Afghanistan's 13.5 million Pashtuns. In fact,Pashtunwali demands that every Pashtun practice that code of behavior as a personal duty. Failure to adhere to the principles of Pashtunwali (de Pashtunwali perawano) leads wayward Pashtuns to becoming “durvand” i.e. non-Pashtun. That is not merely ethnically and tribally unacceptable, it constitutes ethnic and tribal heresy. It is worse than apostasy from Islam; it is significantly more severe than treason to the Afghan nation.

Being a Pashtun is substantially more critical to a Pashtun than being a Moslem. One’s identity as a Pashtun is a much more elevated and infinitely more prized status than one’s status as an Afghan national. For a country of some thirty-two million people, it is fearful folly to fail to understand the nature and role of the Pashtuns who comprise 42% of that nation’s population. Assuredly, Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic, diverse and disunited state. But its political center of gravity has always been and remains Pashtun.

That said, the insurgency center in Afghanistan is located in Helmand province. Helmand province is overwhelmingly Pashtun in population. Helmand province has a literacy rate of little more than 5% compared to a 30% literacy rate for the rest of Afghanistan. The Pashtuns are Sunni Moslems. They consider Afghanistan’s ethnic Hazaras, who constitute 9% of Afghan population and who are Shiite Moslems, to be damnable heretics and perverse pagans. Helmand province is arguably Afghanistan’s bloodiest province. It is also the unabashed stronghold of the Taliban.

Understanding that gives rise to the recognition that Afghanistan’s President is a Pashtun. Indeed, Hamid Karzai was elected (sic) President at the expense of Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. Not unexpectedly, Dr. Abdullah is not a Pashtun, but an ethnic Tajik. During the Taliban era, Dr. Abdullah was Foreign Minister of the Northern Alliance. That entity was Afghanistan’s officially recognized government. Notably, the Northern Alliance opposed the Taliban. Perhaps understandably then, Dr. Abdullah sometimes unconvincingly protests –for politically expedient reasons- that his father was a Pashtun.

More importantly, the current Afghan Defense Minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak, is a Pashtun. He proudly traces his lineage to tribal Pashtun chieftans. Mr. Wardak still conspiciously maintains strong Pashtun relationships. In the past, General Wardak was a Mujahadeen commander who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. And now, in spite of his Pashtun upbringing, Defense Minister Wardak –somewhat unconvincingly- advocates a strong central Afghan government. That posture conveniently suits his personal proclivities; it is seemingly at diametric odds with his Pashtun predispositions.

Given all the foregoing, is it any wonder that understanding the dynamics of Afghanistan society is often an exercise in psychological exasperation, if not futility. Recent events in Afghanistan’s Korengal Valley illuminate this anguish.

In April 2010, a contingent of U.S. soldiers was airlifted out of the Korengal Valley in East Afghanistan. Because forty-two U.S. soldiers had died there during the next preceding twelve months, the region had been nicknamed “The Valley Of Death.”

Interestingly enough, only four thousand five hundred Afghanis live in the Korengal valley. Those people are known as Pashais. Their precise ethnic origin is unclear. They may be, but probably are not, Pashtun by lineage. But they do speak their own Pashto (Pashtun) dialect and they do practice their own unique brand of Sunni Islam.

What is important here is that the Pashtun-dominated Taliban government never really controlled the Pashais of the Korengal valley. And the people of that valley never became pro-Taliban. Quite the contrary. According to one local elder (Haji Nizamuddin), the Pashai people simply wanted to be left alone.

That was the state of affairs when U.S. forces arrived in the Korengal Valley in
2009. Regrettably, according to General McCrystal, instead of bringing stability to Korengal, the troops “largely proved to be an irritant to the people…and there was probably more fighting here than there would have been if U.S. troops had not come.”

In the final analysis, Afghanistan is infinitely more complex and confusing than most pundits, politicians and military planners are prepared to admit. Indeed, many –especially those who argue adamantly(pro and/or con)about the U.S. presence in Afghanistan- would do well to heed the admonition of General McCrystal. He cautioned: “If you do not understand the dynamics (of Afghanistan), you have no chance of getting it right!” That sounds like sage counsel. But who is listening, are they learning anything
and –if so- what?

What’s Crooked About The Strait Of Hormuz?

On 26 April 2010, Iran's Revolutionary Guard completed a five day series of naval war games in the Strait of Hormuz. In spite of the Strait's close quarters, those maneuvers did not spawn an international incident. Still, it may be illuminating to know what has been and is currently going on in those troubling waters.

Indeed, circumstances in The Strait Of Hormuz are
usually difficult to get straight because they are,
in fact, often crooked. That said, some straight
talk about the The Strait of Hormuz is critical.

Pointedly, the Strait of Hormuz is perhaps the most critical and potentially most explosive place on earth. It is one of the three most crucial commercial chokepoints in the world. And all three chokepoints (the Strait of Hormuz; the Strait of Malacca; and the Bab Al Mandab) are all located in the Indian Ocean. That makes the Indian Ocean the locus for rabid commercial competition, for competing spheres of economic influence and for associated military rivalries, most especially between China and India. As such, commercial and military matters in the Indian Ocean and in the Strait of Hormuz, in particular, are almost always tense.

But even more to the point, a strong argument can
be made that the Strait of Hormuz is the most
critical commercial chokepoint in the world. As such, some truly straight talk about the Strait of Hormuz is in order. That said, there is much about the Strait of Hormuz that is and has been clearly crooked, especially since 1988. Since then,
the Strait of Hormuz has been and continues to be the site of an accident waiting
to happen or a war eager to find reason to start.

Indeed, 3 July 1988 is a date which will live in infamy, at least in Iran.
On that day, at precisely 10:17 AM, Iran Air Flight #655 took off from Iran’s Bandar Abbas International Airport on its scheduled 28 minute flight across The Strait of Hormuz to Dubai. But Iran Air #655 never made it to Dubai. In fact, that flight never made it across the Strait of Hormuz. What happened? The chaotic, confusing and arguably crooked chain of events surrounding the fate of IR 655 are hard to get straight. Here are those facts in a nutshell.

Iran Flight #655 took off from Bandar Abbas 27
minutes late. Its scheduled flight path was to take
it over the Strait of Hormuz directly
to Dubai. No one now disputes that IR 655
was a commercial Airbus 300 aircraft flying at an
altitude of 14,000 feet. It had 290 civilians aboard.
It had a well-seasoned pilot who had logged
7,000 hours in a cockpit. He was correctly proceeding
on his designated flight path. The aircraft was,
without any dispute, cruising in Iranian airspace.

But as IR 655 crossed over Iran’s Qeshm Island into the wild blue yonder directly above the Strait of Hormuz, it got no further. Iran Air 655 was unceremoniously and wittingly shot down by a missile launched directly from the U.S. guided missile cruiser Vincennes. Why? Here is where it is difficult to make the crooked facts speak straight.

Multiple questions arise. What was the U.S.S. Vincennes doing in Iranian
territorial waters when it shot down IR 655? Why did a sophisticated U.S.
warship outfitted with an advanced, computer-guided radar detection andtracking system (The Aegis System) shoot down a civilian Iranian airliner? Why did the crew of the U.S.S. Vincennes wrongly identify the civilian Iranian airliner as an F-14 Tomcat, a military jet fighter? Why did that American warship never attempt to contact the Iranian airliner on normal air trafficcontrol frequencies? Why is it that two other nearby American warships(The Sides and The Montgomery) correctly and simultaneously identified IR 655 as a civilian airliner?

Furthermore, it is also true that even if Iran
Air 655 had been an Iranian F-14 fighter, the
U.S. warship would still have had no right to
shoot it down. The aircraft was flying within
Iranian airspace and did not, in fact, follow
a path that could have been considered an
attack profile. Additionally, the alleged
Iranian F-14 did not illuminate the Vincennes
with radar which it would have done if it was
attacking. So why did the Captain of the
Vincennes, Wm. C. Rogers, III, issue orders
to shoot Iran Air 655 down?

This latter question is even more pertinent because the Iranian airliner was transmitting the standard “friend or foe” identification code regularly usedby civilian aircraft. Still, Captain Rogers inexplicably believed that this didnot mean that the airliner was not “hostile?” Why is it that Captain Rogers was advised that the IR 655 was diving (i.e. descending in attack mode) instead of climbing?

At least three final questions remain curiously
and studiously unresolved. Why is it that just two
years later, in 1990, Captain Rogers was awarded
the Legion Of Merit for “exceptionally meritorious
conduct in the performance of outstanding service
as commanding officer ... from April 1987 to May
1989." The award was given for Rogers’ service as
the Commanding Officer of the Vincennes, but the
citation conspicuously made no mention of the
downing of Iran Air 655.

The two remaining questions may be the most puzzling and/or most suggestive that said incident may well have been less than savory (i.e. crooked). Those questions are: Why is it that America has not to this very day ever admitted responsibility for shooting down IR 655? Any why, since the U.S.A. paid 61.8 million in compensation to the Iranian families of IR 655 victims, has the United States of America never issued an apology to the Iranian people or to the Iranian government for this tragic event in the Strait of Hormuz?

Fast forward to March 29, 2010. The situation in the Strait of Hormuz is arguablyas tense now as it was in 1988 when the Iran-Iraq war was about to end. Only now the United States is at war in Iraq. Tensions with Iran are escalating daily. The U.S. has –of necessity- expressly retained its option to attack a continually bellicose Iran which continues to feverishly seek admission into the nuclear fraternity.

That said, other continuing factors further exacerbate matters in the Strait of Hormuz. Each day at least fifteen oil tankers traverse each two mile wide (each way) sea lane through the Strait of Hormuz. These sea lanes pass through the territorial waters of both Iran and Oman. These identical waters are regularly plied by U.S. Navy warships based in Bahrein.

To further complicate an already grievously complex situation, an actual flotilla of some fifty speedboats, operated by Iranians smuggling contraband into Iran, continually crosses and bisects these sea lanes while shuttling contraband material from Khasab, Oman into Iran. It is not without some irony that these speedboats often deposit their goods on Qeshm Island. That island is just slightly east of where Iran Air 655 was shot down by the U.S.S. Vincennes whose helicopter was aloft and was taking fire from Iranian military speedboats.

More pointedly, on 29 March 2010, I stood, watched and talked –albeit haltingly- with a cadre of these Iranian smugglers. They were hand-loading their speedboats from diminutive pick-up trucks which arrived in a steady stream on an unpaved road which mercifully ends at a series of pitifully primitive piers in Khasab, Oman. We watched as the speedboats were loaded with motorcycles, refrigerators, computers, DVDs, soft drinks, tea and juices. These were clearly visible. What manner of goods were encased in and/or enshrouded by multiple orange tarps is an open question.

Most all of the 35-40 speedboats make several one hour trips a day across the 29 mile wide Strait of Hormuz from Khasab, Oman to Iran. The speedboats deftly dodge the omnipresent oil tankers, they evade U.S. Navy warships and they willingly pay baksheesh (bribes) to Iranian maritime officials. It’s all a serious game of abundant, but seriously illegal, commercial activity in a terribly serious place.

That said, the Iranian smugglers only spoke broken English. My Farsi is virtually non-existent and my Arabic is almost equally impoverished. But the smugglers did,upon my request, voluntarily give me a thumbs up. And, however haltingly, we did actually communicate, at least until I told them I was American. Their thumbs then turned down, much like the Roman Emperor did in The Gladiator.

It is worth noting that the smugglers’ bossman was less-than-delighted by my presence. Upon noticing that his men were talking to me, the bossman (who was the visible antithesis of a classic, corporate C.E.O) did not hesitate to viscerally vent his spleen at me and his men (most were aged 18-35). It was not necessary to know either Farsi or Arabic to understand the bossman’s invective. The loading then continued without interruption as my red-headed wife (with whom the Iranians had begged to take photos) and I hastily departed the area.

In due course, an Iranian speedboat smuggling contraband is destined to run afoul of a fully loaded oil tanker or a U.S. warship itching for a fight. Then all the commotion will start in earnest. Thankfully, I will not be there. But let there be no doubt, the Strait of Hormuz is a dangerous place. It has all the ingredients necessary to precipitate a war. It has a fleet of oil tankers that transport 40% of the world’s oil (and 40% of China’s oil requirements), it has warships, it has congested sea lanes, it has the cramped territorial waters of a belligerent Iran, it has smugglers criss-crossing the Strait in speedboats and it is perhaps the world’s most critical commercial chokepoint.

In sum, the Strait of Hormuz is not simply an international incident waiting to happen. It is a body of water that has already consumed 290 souls from Iran Air 655. Assuredly, the Strait of Hormuz is a narrow channel that is unusually broad in its implications for world affairs. In fact, affairs in the Strait of Hormuz are normally complex and often convoluted. But it is also crystal clear that the Strait of Hormuz was, is and will foreseeably remain crooked to the derogation and possible damnation of the world’s best interests.

Postcript: On 5 May 2010, as nuclear non-proliferation talks were about to begin in
New York, Iran's military initiated an eight day series of war games in the Strait of
Hormuz. As such, dangerous - and potentially explosive- activity in the Strait continues unabated!

Will Israel Bomb Iran?

Geopolitical pundits are hard at work attempting to dissect and/or to at least make some sense of the Obama Administration’s perceived discomfiture with Israel. That delicate discomfiture is
immeasurably complicated by the Obama Administration’s seeming inability to construct a coherent, competent and compelling framework of international sanctions and/or policies calculated to dissuade Iran from further pursuing its nuclear aspirations.

At least one internationally aware observer has cogently –but incorrectly in my judgment- argued that “the least satisfactory and most likely” way the current impasse with Iran will be broken is by a preemptive Israeli strike against Iran. I beg to differ. Here’s why:

1. A preemptive Israeli strike would –of necessity- need to be both surgical and unequivocally decisive. It is highly unlikely and unforeseeable that Israel - despite its vaunted military know how- is capable of severely disabling and/or destroying ALL Iranian nuclear sites. That scenario is militarily, logistically and tactically implausible,
at best.

In 1981 Iraq had one nuclear facility (Osiraq) which Israel completely demolished. Iran is a wholly and demonstrably different scenario. A failed preemptive strike by Israel would be a psychological disaster for Israel. Israelis does not do well with failure. A preemptive strike which did not completely disable Iranian nuclear aspirations for a quite extended period would be clearly unacceptable to Israel. An Israeli strike
which was only partially successful would only temporarily delay reconstruction, restoration and reactivation of Iranian nuclear activities. A failed or incomplete strike would impede, but not dissuade, an already rabid Iranian President from placing more centrifuges into operation. A failed or incomplete Israeli strike would only lend further froth to Ahmadinejad’s supporters, not the least of whom may well be Iran’s Supreme Leader. Indeed, Ahmadinejad clearly serves, smiles and sneers only at the behest and/or with the imprimatur of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s ultimate authority (Rehbar). He alone wields unilateral power to declare war and/or initiate any attack against Israel.

2. Any Israeli strike against Iran –whether or not successful – would
have catastrophic economic consequences for the world as a whole and for China in particular. Any Israeli strike against Iran would immediately create chaos in the Strait of Hormuz. It is precisely through that body of water that a very substantial portion of the world’s oil is shipped. The predictable closing and/or clogging of the Strait of Hormuz and the resulting oil deprivation to much of thedeveloped world would result in astronomical oil prices per barrel. Worldwide economic disruption would be not only foreseeable, but predictable and pervasive.

That said, China imports an extremely substantial amount of its oil from Iran. China is, without the slightest doubt, not constrained to deal delicately with any scenario that places its national best interests in dire straits. Assuredly, an Israeli strike on Iran would yield an anguished uproar from the Chinese dragon. Its nostrils would flare, it would breathe fire and its talons would strike when and wherever it saw fit to protect and save China from grinding to an oil deprived industrial halt.

Moreover, Israel is but a small cog in a highly complex and unquestionably interdependent world. China and its 1.2 billion people cannot and should not be cavalierly discounted or disregarded. A readily foreseeable Chinese reaction to an Israeli strike cannot be glibly dismissed. Any Israeli strike against Iran must –of absolute necessity – factor in the Chinese response into a decision to attack Iran. Indeed, while China may not yet have a functional blue water Navy, its economic prowess is undeniable, pervasive and growing.

It is no secret that Chinese economic interests in Iran and in its oil fields are formidable. China is Iran’s biggest trading partner. In consideration of this existential circumstance, China currently still -diplomatically, but fervently- rejects any and all meaningful sanctions against Iran. With that crystal clear posture, it is unthinkable that Chinese reaction to any strike against Iran (by Israel or the USA) would result in anything less than a virulent hostility and an aggravated animosity whose consequences would be momentous, massive and memorable in the extreme.

It is one thing for Iran to threaten Israel. It is quite another matter for Israel, even indirectly and/or obliquely, to threaten China’s national well-being. And, let there be no mistake, that is precisely what a successful or even partially effective Israeli strike against Iran would do to China!

3. Any preemptive Israeli strike against Iran –no matter how egregious and damnable Iranian protestations are against Israel- would have the effect of uniting the Moslem world not only against Israel, but against the West.

Assuredly, there are those who will argue that Islam and the West are already at odds. Perhaps so. But such a distorted vision of Islam does great disservice to the many disparate, diverse, divisive and the distinctly different nature of Islam as it is practiced throughout the world.

In actual fact, the Islam of Indonesia is not the Islam of India; the Moslems of Morocco are not the Wahabi Arabs of Saudi Arabia; the Sunni Turks are not theTaliban of Afghanistan and the Pashtuns of Pakistan clearly are not the Zaidi’s of Yemen or the Shia of Iran. But they are – in the final and ultimate analysis – all Moslems. Any Israeli strike against Iran would leave no doubt that Islam would once again, much as in the days of the Prophet Mohammed, become energized into one
cohesive religion fiercely united against both Israel and the West. That is a scenario which Israel –and the West – can consciously discount only at their own respective peril.

Pointedly, terrorism is a major concern in today’s world. But an Israeli strike against Iran would yield terrorist cells and unleash terrorist attacks that would make today’s terrorism threats seem puerile and paltry.

4. The forgoing notwithstanding, Israel has managed its own nuclear wherewithal with undeniable propriety and with protective, but productive secrecy. If Israel is nuclear (and no one seriously disputes Israel’s possession of multiple dozens of nuclear weapons), then Israel already possesses a massive nuclear deterrent to any Iranian threat to attack Israel. Israel knows that, the USA knows that and Iran assuredly understands that. Iranians are not blind to what Israel did in Osiraq and that Israel saw fit to obliterate an emerging nuclear facility in Syria.

While Ahmadinejad may be rabid, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard may be reactionary, Ayatollah Khamenei may truly believe that the creation of Israel was the worst event in the history of the world, there is not a shred of credible evidence that the Iranians are suicidal. And that is precisely the scenario which would ultimately eventuate from any Iranian attack on Israel. That, in and of itself, is significant reason why Israel will think
many times before it sees fit to launch any preemptive attack on Iran. Ahmadinejad’s bellicosity may be more than bluster, but Ahmadinejad is not the boss, Khamenei is. The latter is the sole decision-maker with the unilateral power to declare war and initiate an attack on Israel. Yet, Khamenei has repeatedly demonstrated a sustained capacity to retain
power and stay alive. There is little to suggest that either Khamenei, the Revolutionary Guard or any substantive Iranian entity (exclusive of apocalyptic oriented zealots like Ahmadinejad) seek or in any wise invite their own annihilation.

So, will Israel preemptively attack Iran? I think not. But then, as the Prophet Amos famously, but inaccurately, intoned: “I am not a prophet nor the son of a prophet….” So, the undersigned is merely the firstborn son of a chef of less than international distinction.Therefore, I rely upon G.B. Shaw for a measure of guidance. He opined: “If history repeats itself and the unexpected always happens, how incapable must man be of learning from experience."

As such, the bottom line is that Israel may be expected to do the unexpected if pushed too far!

P.S. One wonders if the Obama Administration is sufficiently attuned to the Iranian tick which daily grows louder in Israeli ears?

Why Ahmadinejad Rants

Why does Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, permit Ahmadinejad to be so provocative? That matter requires some insight into the Supreme Leader and his existential predispositions.

Perhaps it is well to consider the facts that Ayatollah Khamenei does not deign to give public interviews, he has never been even asked to submit a report of any kind (let alone on the state of the Iranian nation) to any Iranian legislative, administrative or other agency, he has never even attended a meeting of the Exigency Council (which he appoints) and he has never even attended a meeting of the Assembly of Experts (which appointed him, which has technical authority over him, but which has never -not once-vetoed him) and he is extremely secretive about the basis of whatever public pronouncements he chooses to make.

That said, Khamenei is not well thought of as an arguably erudite Shiite cleric even though he has been designated as an Ayatollah ( only the Shiites have such a title for their highest clerics). Indeed, to become a member of the Assembly of Experts (learned Mujtahheeds - Islamic scholars of demonstrated competence and recognized authority) one is supposed to be an exemplar of Islamic learning. There is broad - but often unspoken- consensus in Iran that Khamenei does not fit the bill as a distinguished Islamic scholar, but that he survives and functions by dint of the inherent prowess of his distinctive persona.

By way of circumlocution to answering the question of why Ahmadinejad is allowed to rant, it is worth noting that as Supreme Leader, Khamenei has antagonized multiple other bone fide Ayatollahs of immense standing as Islamic scholars. Surely the greatest of these, Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri, just died severl months ago. At that time, Khamenei prohibited demonstrations and even grieving for Montazeri anywhere except in the holy city of Qom where Montazeri lived and died. Montazeri had once been tapped to succeed Iran's first Supreme Leader Ruhallah Khomenei, but was denied that post when he and Khomenei had a falling out just prior Khomenei's death in1989.That is whenKhamenei assumed control and put Montazeri under house arrest for many years. Prior to his death, Montazeri had been a vocal supporter of Mir Hossein Mousavi, Ahmadinejad's major election adversary in Iran.

That said, Mousavi is wrongly thought by the West to be a liberal/reformer. His reforms -such as they are proposed to be- lie in domestic affairs only. In fact, Mousavi was foreign minister in Iran when the US hostages were taken in 1979 and he quite approved. He also believes Iran MUST have nukes. So, underneath it all, Ahamadinejad and Mousavi are simply the same pudding with different flavors. Furthermore, the alleged reformer Mousavi is merely another version of Ahamadinejad without the anger or inventive.

Premises considered, Khamenei can call his shots as he pleases when, in fact, allowing Ahmadinejad to rant and rave does Khamenei little harm and especially since not a single recognized leader in Iran disagrees with the substance of Ahamadinejad's foreign policy rantings. Included among these leaders are Mousavi, Karroubi, Larijani, Khatami and Iran's wealthiest person, Rafsanjani. The latter was President of Iran in the mid-late nineties. He vehemently dislikes Ahamadinejad and is often at loggerheads with Khamenei. But, most importantly, Iran seems to be substantially of one voice when it comes to foreign affairs, nukes and national pride.

The bottom line is that, in the grand scheme of things, Ahmadinejad is essentially expendable and, in the greater context of Iranian leadership, is not considered to be even on the top thirty list of all-time prominent Persians/Iranians. So, to coin a phrase, talk is cheap and Khamenei simply tolerates Ahmadinejad on domestic affairs and allows him to fulminate on the foreign affairs with which Khamenei substantially concurs.

Regarding Ahmadinejad's provocative posturing, one might well paraphrase a pithy G.B. Shaw aphorism to read: “He who can does, he who cannot rants!”

Flying Over the Iranian Cukoo's Nest

Is Ahmadinejad nuts? Is Iran becoming a lunatic asylum? Why is Iran seeking the nukes it does not need? Why is it threatening to wipe Israel off the map? These questions deserve some anaylsis. So, the following is submitted for your thoughtful contemplation and consideration.

Ahamadinejad is, without question, an ultra-bellicose, apocalyptic zealot. That said, there is not one shred of significant or otherwise credible evidence (historical, empirical or psychiatric) that Iran - as a nation- is suicidal.

Indeed, it is absolutely imperative to recognize that Ahamadinejad is not Iran's commander-in-chief, he does not set Iranian foreign policy, he does not have the authority to declare war, he does not control the national treasury, he does not designate who preaches what, when, where and why, etc. Ahmadinejad is, for practical purposes, the political puppet of the Rehbar aka The Supreme Leader aka Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Specifically and constitutionally in Iran, Ahmadinejad operates only with the overt and/or covert imprimatur of Iran's Supreme Leader. It is he and he alone- who possess the legal and actual practical authority to act unilaterally in precisely those areas where Ahamadinejad can only lash out verbally.

The ultimate question then becomes: What does Khamenei really want for Iran versus what does The Rehbar and Iran truly need? Implicit in that question is the underlying consideration of what strategies is Iran prepared to employ to achieve its goals and to what extent Iran - as a nation- is prepared to mindlessly pursue those goals regardless of the readily foreseeable consequences of an Iranian missile attack on Israel.

Furthermore, the USA has repeatedly heretofore misread both Iranian and Israeli intentions and their respective capabilities and determinations on multiple and diverse issues. Therefore, understanding the underlying aspirations as well as the bone fide persecution complexes that afflict both Israel and Iran is absolutely critical to comprehending their respective preparedness to act unilaterally and to initiate a war that would engulf not only their respective nations and the entirety of the Mideast, but would have far wider and broader implications and a worldwide impact of monumental proportions.

Moreover, the USA assuredly recognizes, as do both Israel and Iran, that China dearly depends on an open and free-flowing passage thru Strait of Hormuz for a very substantial percent of its oil. As such, any Israeli bombing of Iran -which would undoubtedly result in the severe restriction and/or closing of oil shipping in that region-would virtually be an economic declaration of war on China. Furthermore, both China and Russia have massive trade and financial interests in and with Iran. Russia presumably prefers to maintain the delicate status quo in that region. Indeed, Russia appears not to be overly interested in encouraging yet another Mideast region war.

Additionally, Russia supplies Israel with about 60% of Israel's oil. As such, Russia, in fact, may possess significant (indirect) coercive influence on any Israeli decision that would unilaterally upset the status quo in that region to the demonstrable derogation of the interests of both China and Russia.

It is worth noting that an actual outbreak of hostilities -if precipitated by Israel- would, almost of necessity, involve the USA in another war for which the USA not only has no stomach, but even less economic where-with-all to pursue when such a war -precipitated by Israel- would surely galvanize the entirety of the Muslim world (1.2 billion Shiites and Sunnis) against both Israel and the USA.

On the other hand, if Iran initiated a missile attack on Israel, Iran would -again in my judgment- be committing an act of political, economic and -most probably- even national suicide. That would require the bizarre behavior of a national society of Iranian lunatics. While Ahmadinejad may be psycholocially and religiously disposed to seek apocalyptic chaos and anarchy, that posture has not been -and arguably is not- the thrust of the broader Iranian psyche or of Iran's -seemingly more rational - leadership.

Ahmadinejad may be a passionate Shiite zealot, Iran may truly need regional recognition, but even Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomenei, when Iran was strapped for military hardware during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq, saw fit to buy arms from Israel, even though, in Khomenei's mind and in the express opinion of the current Supreme Leader of Iran, "the creation of Israel was the worst event in the history of mankind!"

So, the bottom line is, in my judgment, that Israel -no matter how verbally threatened by an arguably bellicose and decidedly duplicitous Iran- is constrained to wait until the very last second [not minute] before Israel would launch any unilateral preemptive attack on Iran's nuclear facilities (plural). The ensuing conflagration would -I strongly believe- thrust the world into an economic and military crisis of immense proportions and would be of the deepest and widest dimensions.

So, when pundits say: "If Iran wants nukes, then Israel or the USA should drop some on Iran," then that punditry is not only disingenuous, it is unseemly, it is perversely provocative and it is dangerous in the extreme to the entirety of Western civilization as we know it. But then, that is my humble opinion and -assuredly- not necessarily the posture of Mr. Netanyahu, or of Pres. Obama, or Pres. Hu Jintao or of Rootin'-Tootin' Putin and certainly not that of Mr. Ahamadinejad or of Iran's Supreme Leader.

Indeed, it is absolutely critical to recognize that each and every international actor comes to his/her/its posture predicated on its narrow self-interests, its own national aspirations and its own self-image. These may and frequently do differ in the extreme. That is why this issue is so complex and is subject to such vehement posturing by all, even presumably well-meaning and thoughtful non-combatants, as it were.

In the final ayalysis, history teaches that one can never precisely predict just what or when individuals and/or nations are -justly or unjustly- determined to take an often precipitous and lethal leap into lunacy!