Back in Israel’s early days, many Israelis happily chanted a marching song whose ideology still undergirds Israel’s persistent expansion of settlements in the Palestinian West Bank. Indeed, that song’s lyrics expressly reject the notion of any Palestinian right to the West Bank. Those poignant lyrics proclaim: “There are two banks to the Jordan. This side is ours and so is the other side...all of it!” In the parlance of Israel’s current government (Prime Minister Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman) those lyrics translate into the actionable belief that Samaria and Judea (the entire West Bank) belong to Israel, not only by conquest, but by a Biblical grant deeded from the Divine.
That attitude still retains some limited, but quite vocal, currency in Israel. More importantly, that ideology lies at the heart of Israel’s continued expansion of settlements into further reaches of the West Bank. But geopolitical clarity reveals that expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank is not a matter of Israel’s national security. Rather, it is a matter that bespeaks continuing Israeli concerns related to its demographics, culture, history, religion and Israel’s national identity.
That said, much in Israel relates in some fashion to all of these concerns. As such, settlement in the West Bank is hardly an intractable matter. Neither is it a concern that rises to the level of issues like the status of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugee problem or the persistent Arab/Palestinian demand that Israel return to pre-1967 borders. In short, expansion of West Bank settlements is, at best, a secondary (and perhaps a tertiary) issue in the grand scheme of issues confronting Israel. That appears to be why President Obama wittingly chose to publicly focus upon opposing further West Bank settlement expansion.
By seemingly laying down the gauntlet in opposition to further expanding West Bank settlements, Obama was able to make nice and look good to the Moslem world while –at the same time- not doing anything terribly substantive that would woefully offend a majority of Israelis (or most American Jews) or in any way endanger Israel’s security. Pointedly, Mr. Obama certainly knows that. Most Israelis understand that. The Saudis presumably recognize that and the Palestinians can hardly argue with that. In short, Mr. Obama has displayed unusual diplomatic perspicacity. He has thrown a fig leaf of apparent even-handedness to the Arabs and Moslem world while leaving Israel’s loins still fully covered. That appears to be a stroke of unusually deft diplomacy.
Assuredly, the issue of West Bank settlements will not cause an irreparable rift in U.S.-Israeli relations. On the contrary, by choosing to focus on further expanding West Bank settlements, Mr. Obama has simply publicly restated long-standing U.S. policy. In the process, he has studiously ascended the podium as a deliberate statesman with an ardent interest in moving the peace process along by repaving the road map to Mideast peace.
Mr. Obama’s thrust is crystal clear. He has not sought to establish new rules, he has not altered existing guidelines, has not proposed a new vision, he has not revealed a previously unknown shortcut and he has not presumed to divert to a new roadmap nor has he chosen a new route. Indeed, Mr. Obama is merely paving an old road while tangentially splashing some excess diplomatic tar on Mr. Netanyahu. The tar won't stick on Netanyahu, but it pleased the Palestinians. That was another clever move by Mr. Obama. It was obvious evidence to the Palestinians/Arabs/Moslems that the new American administration will not have its tail wantonly wagged by the new Israeli Prime Minister. This, too, fosters a positive perception of the United States in the Islamic world while not adversely affecting Israel. As for Mr. Netanyahu, he has been around the diplomatic block; he can walk on tar!
On the other hand, it is quite illuminating and unusually instructive that Mr. Obama made absolutely no reference whatsoever to dismantling or removing existing Israeli settlements in the West Bank. That would have been a momentous policy change that could have drawn a line in the diplomatic sand between Israel and the United States. But, Mr. Obama clearly and wisely opted not to pursue that confrontational route. Indeed, by focusing on not further expanding West Bank settlements, Mr. Obama chose an approach which encourages engagement and dialogue on what (in the grand scheme of things) should be substantially less than a critical issue for Israel. Obama's approach has left conspicuous wiggle room for Israel when the West Bank issue ultimately hits the roadmap's negotiating table.
The bottom line is that -amidst all the honeyed words and high sounding rhetoric- nothing substantive has changed except for the widespread and artfully created impression to the Moslem world of the new American President's apparent even-handedness. And that is surely a positive. After all, perception is a key ingredient for diplomatic progress, especially in the Arab/Moslem mindset.
That said, relations between the U.S. and Israel are not static; they are dynamic. There was a time when Israel could not exist absent U.S. aid. That situation is all but ancient history. In a troubled Mideast where Iran is threatening to acquire a nuclear arsenal, Israel remains a democratic bastion of stability. Perhaps of equal or even greater importance, Israel is an acknowledged (but not admitted) nuclear empowered geopolitical David with a gritty resolve to survive in a sea of unremitting Arab and Moslem hostility.
It is no relevation that the political pot in the Mideast is almost always boiling. Regrettably, that pot continues to seethe with a bellicose Iran which repeatedly threatens to rain nuclear dust on Israel. Even in the tumult of Iran's post-election turbulence, Tehran's street protestors found it expedient to chant "death to Israel." Yet, Israel has -thus far-exhibited remarkable rationality, pragmatism and (nuclear) forbearance viv-a-vis Iran.
However, given Israel's pervasive and omnipresent dedication to the doctrine of Never Again (not another Holocaust), Iran's continuing threats to expunge the Jewish state from the map is sorely testing Israeli tolerance for such virulent bellicosity. It should also be remembered that Netanyahu has unequivocally stated his position that "Ahmadinejad is a modern Hitler...The mistakes that were made prior to the Second World War must not be repeated...Against lunatics, deterrence must be absolute, total."
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's reelection (and, most notably, his unequivocal support by and from Iran's Supreme Leader) now compels Israel to further refine its objectives, to recalibrate its capacities and to reassess its options. The United States will certainly have input (be it direct and/or covert) into this process. Nonetheless, there is ample basis to argue that the America can also no longer preemptorily wag Israel's tail.
One matter is crystal clear, the more Iran perfects its long-range missile delivery systems and the more uranium that Iran enriches, the more will Israeli teeth be set on edge. And that is a prescription for potential Israeli reactions which make the tensions surrounding further expansion of West Bank settlements pale in comparison. Mr. Obama certainly knows that three of four Israelis believe that the United States will not be able to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. As a result, one of every two Israelis supports a preemptive strike on Iran.
Indeed, one wonders just how patient the United States and Mr. Obama will be when Kim Jong Il announces that his nation has perfected a long-range ICBM capable of delivering a North Korean nuclear device on Los Angeles, San Francisco or even Chicago? In that context, Mr. Obama also knows that the expansion of some obscure West Bank settlements is virtually inconsequential in comparison to Mr. Netanyahu's duty to protect Tel Aviv from some potentially incoming Iranian missile.
Premises considered, it is important to maintain a broad geopolitical perspective. More specifically, tunnel vision (retinitis pigmentosa) is a debilitating and disabling affliction, be it physical, diplomatic or geopolitical. In that light, the hubbub surrounding expanding Israeli settlements on the West Bank is little more than a proverbial tempest in a diplomatic tea pot. The issue of further West Bank expansion is thus best viewed as a case of geopolitical acne in comparison to the cancerous growth of uranium enriching centrifuges inside Iran. Mr. Obama has the geopolitical vision to see that.
Now that Mr. Netanyahu has provisionally accepted the "two-state" solution to the Palestinian problem, the most problematic and possibly most contentious issue confronting both United States and Israel is how and when to deal with Iran’s nuclear aspirations. Both Mr. Obama and Mr. Netanyahu certainly understand that. And on that truly critical concern, the nuclear clock is ticking….But notwithstanding Mr. Obama's prodigious ears, he certainly also knows that each and every tick is much louder and more ominous in Israeli ears!
Thursday, June 11, 2009
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
Taming The Russian Bear
It is springtime and the Russian Bear is both hungry and unhappy. This time the Russian Bear has emerged from its winter hibernation in reaction to a series of arguably offensive, if not actually threatening, events initiated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The Bear was abruptly awakened in early May when two Russian diplomats were unceremoniously stripped of their diplomatic credentials and summarily ejected from NATO headquarters in Brussels. The Russians were accused of espionage with reference to the actions of an Estonian spy. Predictably, the Russians denied the charge, but their diplomats were expelled nonetheless. The expulsions infuriated the Kremlin. Its Ambassador called for a “harsh and decisive” response. So, two NATO envoys were expelled from Russia. Tit-for-tat diplomacy is how the game is played.
Still, the Russian Bear dislikes such unsavory annoyances. Regrettably, the Bear’s anger was fed further when (on May 6th) NATO initiated a series of military exercises at the Vaziani army base in –of all places- Georgia. Indeed, according to Russia’s irascible NATO Ambassador, a psychiatric hospital would have been a more appropriate place to conduct those exercises. Certainly, the Russian Bear could hardly forget that it had done battle in that Caucasus region less than a year ago. Back then, in August 2008, the Russians had been (rather easily) provoked into a brief, but bitter, war with Georgia. Those events directly related to Russian citizens in the states of Abkazia and So. Ossetia.
The war ended badly for Georgia. The Russian Bear stayed in Georgia longer than the West or NATO wanted. But the Bear’s paw print clearly showed that the Russian Bear is quite willing to use force when it sees fit. Not so curiously, speculation was rife that Russia was just waiting for a sufficient excuse to send the Bear into Georgia. Not unexpectedly, the Georgians fell into the Russian bear trap and provided an excuse.
But back to the current NATO exercises in Georgia. NATO had originally planned to involve some 1,300 troops drawn from nineteen NATO members and ally states. But, the nations of Kazakstan, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova and Armenia all withdrew their troops before the exercises began. Clearly, these nations form a part of Russia’s “near abroad.” We’ll return later to that pregnant concept.
In the meantime, NATO proceeded with its military exercises in Georgia. It was then that Russian President Medvedev denounced the exercises as war games and described them as an "open provocation." NATO demurred. It complained that the Russian Bear was simply overreacting to minimal military machinations which involved just 400 troops, mostly in a classroom. In fact, NATO even grumbled that the Russians had been invited as observers, but had refused to attend. Still, does anyone at NATO truly believe that the Russian Bear wants or needs to go to class? More pointedly, NATO exhibited an arrogant effrontery by presuming to tell the Russian Bear when and how to react to events occurring in its own backyard, the near abroad?
Indeed, the notion of a near broad provides a critical insight into the mindset of the Russian Bear. As such, in 2005 Vladimir Putin referred to the breakup of the Soviet Union as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of twentieth century.” In same speech, Putin specifically lamented that "tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory." Those fringes are now identified by Russians as their “near abroad.” More importantly, there are those who argue that the Russian Bear may now be acting to reverse that "catastrophe." Indeed, such seems to be the clear implication of current Russian foreign policy. In that light, the behavior of the Russian Bear seems quite clear.
Reversing that catastrophe explains the Kremlin’s strident opposition to Georgia and the Ukraine being admitted into NATO. It explains Russia’s feral antagonism to the E.U.’s persistent and threatening encroachment into regions adjacent to or that once formed a part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It explains Russia’s zero tolerance for breakaway independence movements anywhere, but especially in the Caucasus or along the fringes of current Russia. It explains the psychological predisposition and predilection for the Russian Bear’s muscular intervention in Georgia. It explains Russia’s visceral hostility to the USA’s proposed missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. It explains why Russia just last week took control of the borders of Abkazia and So. Ossetia in spite of its pledge to NATO not to do so. Even more pointedly, it explains why the Russian Bear was so enraged when Belarus (Russia’s near abroad neighbor) was expressly warned that recognizing So. Ossetia and Abkazia would jeopardize Belarus’ prospects of joining the E.U.
And yet, the Russian Bear had spent much of 2008 licking the sweetness of massive oil profits from its prodigious paws. So, when the Russian Bear recently awoke, it was also hungry for more oil sweetness. Unfortunately for the Bear, it found that the windfall oil profits -which had so sweetened the Russian economy- had all but disappeared. The Bear is not a happy camper. It needs a fix.
It was, therefore, no wonder that also just last week the Kremlin released a paper described as a “National Security Strategy Document.” That document (designed to guide Russia through 2020) states that Russia will follow a “rational and pragmatic” foreign policy. Well and good. But, precisely what does “rational and pragmatic” mean to the Russian Bear? Fortunately or not, the aforesaid document is not silent on the subject. It specifically foresees violent competition for oil and natural gas supplies. It states that Russia is prepared to fight for its share of the world’s resources. It asserts that “in the face of competition for resources, the use of military force to solve emerging problems cannot be excluded.” Taken at face value, it seems like the Russian Bear is about to go on the prowl, if not to gobble up the real estate in its near abroad, then to claw its portion of natural resources from wherever it chooses.
But wait. Has the Chinese Dragon not embraced a substantially identical foreign policy to satisfy its still voracious appetite for more resources? Of course it has. The Chinese Dragon is simply more deft and dexterous than the clumsy Russian Bear. Indeed, both resurgent Russia and emergent China are only following what is -for them- a clearly “rational and pragmatic” foreign policy in pursuit of their respective national best interests. That these interests do no conveniently coincide with the best interests of the West is both self-evident and threatening. Still, is that not the existential nature of life under the big tent in the world’s geopolitical circus?
So, should the West merely keep a close watch the Russian Bear or try to tame it? That, geopolitically speaking, is a trick question. If geopolitical affairs are deemed to truly be a circus, is it not presumptuous for the West to usurp the role of ringmaster? And even if the West arrogates ringmastership to itself, it must still find a foil to handle the uncaged Russian Bear and to cope with the Chinese Dragon which is also on the loose. One thing seems certain, a dominating 800 pound gorilla is missing from this century’s geopolitical circus.
In the final analysis, taming the Russian Bear may have to wait. It is too large to be devoured by the Chinese Dragon and it will not be readily tranquilized by the talons of the balding American eagle. In the spirit of resetting relationships, the West may well consider sending the Bear some politically palatable honey. But how or should one soothe a Dragon?
The Bear was abruptly awakened in early May when two Russian diplomats were unceremoniously stripped of their diplomatic credentials and summarily ejected from NATO headquarters in Brussels. The Russians were accused of espionage with reference to the actions of an Estonian spy. Predictably, the Russians denied the charge, but their diplomats were expelled nonetheless. The expulsions infuriated the Kremlin. Its Ambassador called for a “harsh and decisive” response. So, two NATO envoys were expelled from Russia. Tit-for-tat diplomacy is how the game is played.
Still, the Russian Bear dislikes such unsavory annoyances. Regrettably, the Bear’s anger was fed further when (on May 6th) NATO initiated a series of military exercises at the Vaziani army base in –of all places- Georgia. Indeed, according to Russia’s irascible NATO Ambassador, a psychiatric hospital would have been a more appropriate place to conduct those exercises. Certainly, the Russian Bear could hardly forget that it had done battle in that Caucasus region less than a year ago. Back then, in August 2008, the Russians had been (rather easily) provoked into a brief, but bitter, war with Georgia. Those events directly related to Russian citizens in the states of Abkazia and So. Ossetia.
The war ended badly for Georgia. The Russian Bear stayed in Georgia longer than the West or NATO wanted. But the Bear’s paw print clearly showed that the Russian Bear is quite willing to use force when it sees fit. Not so curiously, speculation was rife that Russia was just waiting for a sufficient excuse to send the Bear into Georgia. Not unexpectedly, the Georgians fell into the Russian bear trap and provided an excuse.
But back to the current NATO exercises in Georgia. NATO had originally planned to involve some 1,300 troops drawn from nineteen NATO members and ally states. But, the nations of Kazakstan, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova and Armenia all withdrew their troops before the exercises began. Clearly, these nations form a part of Russia’s “near abroad.” We’ll return later to that pregnant concept.
In the meantime, NATO proceeded with its military exercises in Georgia. It was then that Russian President Medvedev denounced the exercises as war games and described them as an "open provocation." NATO demurred. It complained that the Russian Bear was simply overreacting to minimal military machinations which involved just 400 troops, mostly in a classroom. In fact, NATO even grumbled that the Russians had been invited as observers, but had refused to attend. Still, does anyone at NATO truly believe that the Russian Bear wants or needs to go to class? More pointedly, NATO exhibited an arrogant effrontery by presuming to tell the Russian Bear when and how to react to events occurring in its own backyard, the near abroad?
Indeed, the notion of a near broad provides a critical insight into the mindset of the Russian Bear. As such, in 2005 Vladimir Putin referred to the breakup of the Soviet Union as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of twentieth century.” In same speech, Putin specifically lamented that "tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory." Those fringes are now identified by Russians as their “near abroad.” More importantly, there are those who argue that the Russian Bear may now be acting to reverse that "catastrophe." Indeed, such seems to be the clear implication of current Russian foreign policy. In that light, the behavior of the Russian Bear seems quite clear.
Reversing that catastrophe explains the Kremlin’s strident opposition to Georgia and the Ukraine being admitted into NATO. It explains Russia’s feral antagonism to the E.U.’s persistent and threatening encroachment into regions adjacent to or that once formed a part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It explains Russia’s zero tolerance for breakaway independence movements anywhere, but especially in the Caucasus or along the fringes of current Russia. It explains the psychological predisposition and predilection for the Russian Bear’s muscular intervention in Georgia. It explains Russia’s visceral hostility to the USA’s proposed missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. It explains why Russia just last week took control of the borders of Abkazia and So. Ossetia in spite of its pledge to NATO not to do so. Even more pointedly, it explains why the Russian Bear was so enraged when Belarus (Russia’s near abroad neighbor) was expressly warned that recognizing So. Ossetia and Abkazia would jeopardize Belarus’ prospects of joining the E.U.
And yet, the Russian Bear had spent much of 2008 licking the sweetness of massive oil profits from its prodigious paws. So, when the Russian Bear recently awoke, it was also hungry for more oil sweetness. Unfortunately for the Bear, it found that the windfall oil profits -which had so sweetened the Russian economy- had all but disappeared. The Bear is not a happy camper. It needs a fix.
It was, therefore, no wonder that also just last week the Kremlin released a paper described as a “National Security Strategy Document.” That document (designed to guide Russia through 2020) states that Russia will follow a “rational and pragmatic” foreign policy. Well and good. But, precisely what does “rational and pragmatic” mean to the Russian Bear? Fortunately or not, the aforesaid document is not silent on the subject. It specifically foresees violent competition for oil and natural gas supplies. It states that Russia is prepared to fight for its share of the world’s resources. It asserts that “in the face of competition for resources, the use of military force to solve emerging problems cannot be excluded.” Taken at face value, it seems like the Russian Bear is about to go on the prowl, if not to gobble up the real estate in its near abroad, then to claw its portion of natural resources from wherever it chooses.
But wait. Has the Chinese Dragon not embraced a substantially identical foreign policy to satisfy its still voracious appetite for more resources? Of course it has. The Chinese Dragon is simply more deft and dexterous than the clumsy Russian Bear. Indeed, both resurgent Russia and emergent China are only following what is -for them- a clearly “rational and pragmatic” foreign policy in pursuit of their respective national best interests. That these interests do no conveniently coincide with the best interests of the West is both self-evident and threatening. Still, is that not the existential nature of life under the big tent in the world’s geopolitical circus?
So, should the West merely keep a close watch the Russian Bear or try to tame it? That, geopolitically speaking, is a trick question. If geopolitical affairs are deemed to truly be a circus, is it not presumptuous for the West to usurp the role of ringmaster? And even if the West arrogates ringmastership to itself, it must still find a foil to handle the uncaged Russian Bear and to cope with the Chinese Dragon which is also on the loose. One thing seems certain, a dominating 800 pound gorilla is missing from this century’s geopolitical circus.
In the final analysis, taming the Russian Bear may have to wait. It is too large to be devoured by the Chinese Dragon and it will not be readily tranquilized by the talons of the balding American eagle. In the spirit of resetting relationships, the West may well consider sending the Bear some politically palatable honey. But how or should one soothe a Dragon?
Sunday, April 26, 2009
Cyrus The Great And Ahmadinejad The Small
Comparisons are often invidious. Still, consider the following. About twenty-two hundred years ago, Cyrus The Great freed the Jews of Persia. He happily sent them packing back to the land of Israel to rebuild their Temple. Some twenty-two centuries years later, Ahmadinejad, the current Iranian President, would like to expunge the Jewish nation which still flourishes on the same land to which Jews were astutely allowed to return by Iran’s greatest historical personage. Indeed, times and leaders have changed, most notably in Iran, once known and widely admired as Persia.
Consider, if you will, that Cyrus was the first person in history to be known as “The Great.” That appellation was no mere historical happenstance. Cyrus built an expansive empire, the size and achievements of which had been previously unknown to that ancient world. The great Cyrus understood the need to respect diversity. He preserved disparate ethnic identities. He welcomed pluralism and encouraged free expression of belief. He accommodated differing cultures and lifestyles throughout his empire. Notably, Cyrus proclaimed and disseminated history’s first charter of human rights. In fact, because of his unusual psycho-social largesse and diplomatic perspicacity, Cyrus was widely known –even among his Jewish subjects- as “The Annointed Of The Lord.”
More importantly, Cyrus reflects the apogee in the development of Persian pride. He elevated the Persian character to a level of nobility. It is undisputed that Cyrus still exemplifies everything positive and admirable to which Persians and their Iranian descendants could aspire. Indeed, Iranians properly regard Cyrus as the Father of the Iranian Nation. So, what has happened in the interim?
Within two centuries of Cyrus’ death, Alexander The Great overran the then fading Persian empire. That event signaled the beginning of a tragedy that has afflicted Persians for the better part of some 2,270 years. During that seeming eternity, Persia was repeatedly subjected to foreign domination and/or occupation. The Persians were ruled by the Greeks, the Parthians, the Moslem Arabs, the Mongols, and then -for 700 years- by the Ottoman Turks. That virtually continuous foreign rule was a catastrophe for Iranian self-esteem. It was a massive insult to and humiliation of the Persian national ego.
But there was light at the end of the long historical tunnel. World War II ended the Ottoman empire’s stranglehold on the Mideast. That event signaled the fitful reemergence of Persia under a new name and under new leadership. Persian pride was tentatively reawakened under Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlevi. In due course, Iran was on route to becoming the dominant regional power, especially in the Arabian Gulf.
And then, in 1979, the Shah was overthrown in a coup led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei. Almost immediately thereafter, Iran was forced to fight a disastrous and debilitating eight year war with Iraq which both sides lost. In that war’s aftermath, Iran was once again reduced to a less-than-formidable force, even in its own regional backyard.
In 1989, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became the new Supreme Leader of Iran’s Islamic Republic. He has cleverly dominated and quietly presided over Iranian affairs to this very day. Indeed, it was under Khamenei’s leadership during the nineties that Iran entered upon a covert nuclear project arguably designed to rejuvenate Iran’s self-image and to rehabilitate its national ego. That effort –finally exposed to the West after eighteen years of protracted mendacity and profuse denial- continues apace.
Enter Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He became Iran’s populist, but periodically unpopular and bellicose, President in 2005. He presides over Iran with the imprimatur and in the shadow of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Unlike his boss, Ahmadinejad does not have the unilateral power to declare war, to set foreign policy, to control the media, and even to dictate what sermon should be preached and by whom in each mosque at noon each Friday!
So, when Ahmadinejad rants (denying the Holocaust, defaming Israel and/or vilifying America) it is not simply to espouse his distorted and perverted views, it is also because Khamenei sanctions those damnable disquisitions. That Ahmadinejad chooses to fulminate in gutter diplomacy and to fume in the sewers of incivility only demonstrates the depths to which Iranian leadership has descended from the lofty heights once enjoyed by Persians during the days of Cyrus.
That said, Cyrus The Great assuredly represents the pinnacle of Persian achievements and Iranian aspirations. Conversely, Ahmadinejad’s perverse and small-minded bellicosity only manifests the darkest recesses of some prominent Iranians’ psyche. Regrettably, Ahmadinejad’s personal comportment also reflects the perigee in Persian pride.
Premises considered, one is reminded of a pithy G.B. Shaw aphorism. He mused: “Greatness is only one of the sensations of littleness.” Undoubtedly, part of Cyrus’ greatness was his uncommon comprehension of existential and historical realities. This complemented a remarkable insight into his place and Persia’s role in the grand scheme of things. Not so Ahmadinejad!
So, if and when Ahmadinejad enters Persian heaven, he may chance to meet Cyrus. That is when Cyrus The Great may deem it proper to simply excoriate the current Iranian President as Ahmadinejad The Small.
Consider, if you will, that Cyrus was the first person in history to be known as “The Great.” That appellation was no mere historical happenstance. Cyrus built an expansive empire, the size and achievements of which had been previously unknown to that ancient world. The great Cyrus understood the need to respect diversity. He preserved disparate ethnic identities. He welcomed pluralism and encouraged free expression of belief. He accommodated differing cultures and lifestyles throughout his empire. Notably, Cyrus proclaimed and disseminated history’s first charter of human rights. In fact, because of his unusual psycho-social largesse and diplomatic perspicacity, Cyrus was widely known –even among his Jewish subjects- as “The Annointed Of The Lord.”
More importantly, Cyrus reflects the apogee in the development of Persian pride. He elevated the Persian character to a level of nobility. It is undisputed that Cyrus still exemplifies everything positive and admirable to which Persians and their Iranian descendants could aspire. Indeed, Iranians properly regard Cyrus as the Father of the Iranian Nation. So, what has happened in the interim?
Within two centuries of Cyrus’ death, Alexander The Great overran the then fading Persian empire. That event signaled the beginning of a tragedy that has afflicted Persians for the better part of some 2,270 years. During that seeming eternity, Persia was repeatedly subjected to foreign domination and/or occupation. The Persians were ruled by the Greeks, the Parthians, the Moslem Arabs, the Mongols, and then -for 700 years- by the Ottoman Turks. That virtually continuous foreign rule was a catastrophe for Iranian self-esteem. It was a massive insult to and humiliation of the Persian national ego.
But there was light at the end of the long historical tunnel. World War II ended the Ottoman empire’s stranglehold on the Mideast. That event signaled the fitful reemergence of Persia under a new name and under new leadership. Persian pride was tentatively reawakened under Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlevi. In due course, Iran was on route to becoming the dominant regional power, especially in the Arabian Gulf.
And then, in 1979, the Shah was overthrown in a coup led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei. Almost immediately thereafter, Iran was forced to fight a disastrous and debilitating eight year war with Iraq which both sides lost. In that war’s aftermath, Iran was once again reduced to a less-than-formidable force, even in its own regional backyard.
In 1989, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became the new Supreme Leader of Iran’s Islamic Republic. He has cleverly dominated and quietly presided over Iranian affairs to this very day. Indeed, it was under Khamenei’s leadership during the nineties that Iran entered upon a covert nuclear project arguably designed to rejuvenate Iran’s self-image and to rehabilitate its national ego. That effort –finally exposed to the West after eighteen years of protracted mendacity and profuse denial- continues apace.
Enter Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He became Iran’s populist, but periodically unpopular and bellicose, President in 2005. He presides over Iran with the imprimatur and in the shadow of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Unlike his boss, Ahmadinejad does not have the unilateral power to declare war, to set foreign policy, to control the media, and even to dictate what sermon should be preached and by whom in each mosque at noon each Friday!
So, when Ahmadinejad rants (denying the Holocaust, defaming Israel and/or vilifying America) it is not simply to espouse his distorted and perverted views, it is also because Khamenei sanctions those damnable disquisitions. That Ahmadinejad chooses to fulminate in gutter diplomacy and to fume in the sewers of incivility only demonstrates the depths to which Iranian leadership has descended from the lofty heights once enjoyed by Persians during the days of Cyrus.
That said, Cyrus The Great assuredly represents the pinnacle of Persian achievements and Iranian aspirations. Conversely, Ahmadinejad’s perverse and small-minded bellicosity only manifests the darkest recesses of some prominent Iranians’ psyche. Regrettably, Ahmadinejad’s personal comportment also reflects the perigee in Persian pride.
Premises considered, one is reminded of a pithy G.B. Shaw aphorism. He mused: “Greatness is only one of the sensations of littleness.” Undoubtedly, part of Cyrus’ greatness was his uncommon comprehension of existential and historical realities. This complemented a remarkable insight into his place and Persia’s role in the grand scheme of things. Not so Ahmadinejad!
So, if and when Ahmadinejad enters Persian heaven, he may chance to meet Cyrus. That is when Cyrus The Great may deem it proper to simply excoriate the current Iranian President as Ahmadinejad The Small.
Wednesday, April 8, 2009
North Korea Has Juche!
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) may be the world’s most egregious nuclear proliferator, most flagrant WMD prevaricator, most Machavellian nuclear negotiator and most provocative missile manufacturer. These circumstances may well be a direct outgrowth of No. Korea’s cornerstone ideology known as Juche. That doctrine (promulgated in 1956 by No. Korea’s eternal president, Kim Il Song) advocates the relentless pursuit of self-reliance. That concept, enshrined in Article III of the DPRK Constitution, was and is the guiding principle of all No. Korean workers. And yet, Juche has never been achieved by the DPRK, except in the sphere of nuclear and missile development.
Indeed, when No. Korea first established a missile research facility at Hamhung in 1965, few nations paid much attention. When No. Korea acq uired the Russian FROG missile system in 1967, that event went largely unnoticed. When No. Korea began reverse engineering more advanced Russian missile systems, the West was already hamstrung by its own geopolitical ineptitude. When No. Korea initiated a multi-faceted ballistic missile program to counter So. Korea’s White Bear (Paethon) program, the West watched helplessly. When the DPRK signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, the West was a bit beguiled, but mostly befogged. And when, in 1992, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Association) discovered that No. Korea was diverting plutonium for its nuclear program, U.N. sanctions had no pronounced effect.
So, when No. Korea announced (in 1993) its intentions to withdraw from the NPT, that withdrawal was averted only by the 1994 signing of The Agreed Framework between the United States and No. Korea. The Agreed Framework specified that the DPRK would freeze its illicit plutonium production in exchange for two proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors plus the receipt by the DPRK of one-half million tons of heavy fuel oil. Not unexpectedly, the DPRK received its fuel, but observed its agreement in the breach.
That said, in 1998, the DPRK launched its long-range Taepodong 1 missile with the purported intent of placing a small satellite into orbit. That launch over Japan was deemed to be provocative. But life on the North Korean peninsula proceeded apace without measurable impact from the world’s vocal disapproval.
When No. Korea began enriching uranium in an effort to produce an atomic bomb, the West blustered and threatened, but did little else of consequence. By 2002, the United States had labeled No. Korea as a charter member of The Axis of Evil.
So, it was no surprise when the DPRK expelled IAEA inspectors in 2003. This led to the initiation of the so-called Six Party Talks. That characterization was unusually apt. Six years later, the parties are still talking, albeit with disquieting infrequency and associated duplicity. It must assuredly be observed that each of the other five parties possesses its own self-interested agenda with reference to No. Korea. More pointedly, the positions and postures of the parties are often diametrically at odds with each other. North Korean negotiators are undoubtedly bemused by that recurring diplomatic spectacle.
In due course, the DPRK (in 2006) saw fit to launch its Taepodong 2 long-range missile. Its alleged purpose was to place a small satellite into orbit. That missile launch was also deemed to be a provocative act. But the world’s ensuing bluster had no quantifiable effect. And when No. Korea finally exploded an atomic device in late 2006, it did so with substantial impunity.
In the meantime, No. Korea has been an unenthusiastic, but cleverly calculating, participant in at least six rounds of essentially futile Six-Party Talks. Still, by early 2008, it superficially appeared that the Six Party negotiations (involving China, Russia, Japan, So. Korea, the United States and North Korea) were finally yielding some positive results. Yes, No. Korea had agree d to not only dismantle, but also to disable its nuclear program. Yes, No. Korea had agreed to disclose the sites of nuclear activity. But yes, No. Korea had once again snookered the West into providing more heavy fuel oil. This time the fuel oil was to be in an amount double that specified by the 1994 Agreed Framework.
So, as was eminently foreseeable based upon No. Korea’s prior behavior patterns, the Six Party Talks have now floundered and all-but fallen apart. The reasons for this have long been readily apparent, except to Chief U.S. negotiator Chris Hill, who (in early 2008) effusively proclaimed substantive progress because there were “lots of details; very useful.”
Initially, the parties agreed that No. Korea would dismantle and disable its nuclear program “as quickly as possible.” That phraseology was eerily reminiscent of the U.S. Supreme Court decision that required race desegregation “with all deliberate speed.” And everyone knows what that meant.
More importantly, the 2008 Six Party Agreement was plagued by an absurd and deafening silence on numerous critical issues. Pointedly, there was no requirement for No. Korea to destroy its existing nuclear arsenal; there were no details concerning how the Yongbyon reactor was to be disabled; there was no timetable for reporting the existence or status of nuclear materials; there was absolutely no discussion concerning the fact that No. Korea’s missile program would remain intact. There was, however, a clear mandate for the U.S. to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK plus the guarantee that the U.S. would remove No. Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Even at the date of this last Agreement, it was all to clear that these arrangements were an exercise in diplomatic double-speak. That Agreement purposely deflected attention from unresolved issues, it masked realities, it obscured critical concerns and it beshrouded the plain truth in diplomatic circumlocution.
It was, therefore, eminently foreseeable that No. Korea would sooner or later –in the face and in spite of widespread international opprobrium- launch yet another long-range ICBM over Japan and eastward across the Pacific toward the USA. It did so on April 5, 2009. And once again, No. Korea claimed that it was merely seeking to place a satellite into orbit. In response, the Obama Administration is stridently seeking strong Security Council resolutions. But any resulting sanctions –due to Chinese and Russian predispositions on North Korea- are likely to be void, vacuous and vacant of substance and/or substantially unenforceable. Of course, North Korea fully understands, calculates and depends upon these repeated international exercises in diplomatic futility.
Premises considered, it is likely that No. Korea will ultimately return to the six party negotiating table with a renewed set of demands. For No. Korea, this has become an almost seamless process. Indeed, while No. Korea remains one of the poorest and least self-reliant nations on earth (especially regarding food and fuel), it has also displayed unusual diplomatic perspicacity in pursuit of its goals. So, perhaps the No. Koreans really do have a lot of Juche, at least in sphere of geopolitical know-how. It certainly seems that No. Korea has developed a uniquely successful and productive formula for diplomatic self-reliance.
One can only hope that the Iranians (with their nuclear aspirations) are not learning from the lessons being so diligently taught by No. Korea. If No. Korea can continually squeeze more Juche from its diplomatic pouch, then Iran certainly has abundant wherewithal to replace the nationalistic Juche the once flowed so freely under Cyrus The Great during the awesome Persian Empire.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) may be the world’s most egregious nuclear proliferator, most flagrant WMD prevaricator, most Machavellian nuclear negotiator and most provocative missile manufacturer. These circumstances may well be a direct outgrowth of No. Korea’s cornerstone ideology known as Juche. That doctrine (promulgated in 1956 by No. Korea’s eternal president, Kim Il Song) advocates the relentless pursuit of self-reliance. That concept, enshrined in Article III of the DPRK Constitution, was and is the guiding principle of all No. Korean workers. And yet, Juche has never been achieved by the DPRK, except in the sphere of nuclear and missile development.
Indeed, when No. Korea first established a missile research facility at Hamhung in 1965, few nations paid much attention. When No. Korea acq uired the Russian FROG missile system in 1967, that event went largely unnoticed. When No. Korea began reverse engineering more advanced Russian missile systems, the West was already hamstrung by its own geopolitical ineptitude. When No. Korea initiated a multi-faceted ballistic missile program to counter So. Korea’s White Bear (Paethon) program, the West watched helplessly. When the DPRK signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, the West was a bit beguiled, but mostly befogged. And when, in 1992, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Association) discovered that No. Korea was diverting plutonium for its nuclear program, U.N. sanctions had no pronounced effect.
So, when No. Korea announced (in 1993) its intentions to withdraw from the NPT, that withdrawal was averted only by the 1994 signing of The Agreed Framework between the United States and No. Korea. The Agreed Framework specified that the DPRK would freeze its illicit plutonium production in exchange for two proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors plus the receipt by the DPRK of one-half million tons of heavy fuel oil. Not unexpectedly, the DPRK received its fuel, but observed its agreement in the breach.
That said, in 1998, the DPRK launched its long-range Taepodong 1 missile with the purported intent of placing a small satellite into orbit. That launch over Japan was deemed to be provocative. But life on the North Korean peninsula proceeded apace without measurable impact from the world’s vocal disapproval.
When No. Korea began enriching uranium in an effort to produce an atomic bomb, the West blustered and threatened, but did little else of consequence. By 2002, the United States had labeled No. Korea as a charter member of The Axis of Evil.
So, it was no surprise when the DPRK expelled IAEA inspectors in 2003. This led to the initiation of the so-called Six Party Talks. That characterization was unusually apt. Six years later, the parties are still talking, albeit with disquieting infrequency and associated duplicity. It must assuredly be observed that each of the other five parties possesses its own self-interested agenda with reference to No. Korea. More pointedly, the positions and postures of the parties are often diametrically at odds with each other. North Korean negotiators are undoubtedly bemused by that recurring diplomatic spectacle.
In due course, the DPRK (in 2006) saw fit to launch its Taepodong 2 long-range missile. Its alleged purpose was to place a small satellite into orbit. That missile launch was also deemed to be a provocative act. But the world’s ensuing bluster had no quantifiable effect. And when No. Korea finally exploded an atomic device in late 2006, it did so with substantial impunity.
In the meantime, No. Korea has been an unenthusiastic, but cleverly calculating, participant in at least six rounds of essentially futile Six-Party Talks. Still, by early 2008, it superficially appeared that the Six Party negotiations (involving China, Russia, Japan, So. Korea, the United States and North Korea) were finally yielding some positive results. Yes, No. Korea had agree d to not only dismantle, but also to disable its nuclear program. Yes, No. Korea had agreed to disclose the sites of nuclear activity. But yes, No. Korea had once again snookered the West into providing more heavy fuel oil. This time the fuel oil was to be in an amount double that specified by the 1994 Agreed Framework.
So, as was eminently foreseeable based upon No. Korea’s prior behavior patterns, the Six Party Talks have now floundered and all-but fallen apart. The reasons for this have long been readily apparent, except to Chief U.S. negotiator Chris Hill, who (in early 2008) effusively proclaimed substantive progress because there were “lots of details; very useful.”
Initially, the parties agreed that No. Korea would dismantle and disable its nuclear program “as quickly as possible.” That phraseology was eerily reminiscent of the U.S. Supreme Court decision that required race desegregation “with all deliberate speed.” And everyone knows what that meant.
More importantly, the 2008 Six Party Agreement was plagued by an absurd and deafening silence on numerous critical issues. Pointedly, there was no requirement for No. Korea to destroy its existing nuclear arsenal; there were no details concerning how the Yongbyon reactor was to be disabled; there was no timetable for reporting the existence or status of nuclear materials; there was absolutely no discussion concerning the fact that No. Korea’s missile program would remain intact. There was, however, a clear mandate for the U.S. to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK plus the guarantee that the U.S. would remove No. Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Even at the date of this last Agreement, it was all to clear that these arrangements were an exercise in diplomatic double-speak. That Agreement purposely deflected attention from unresolved issues, it masked realities, it obscured critical concerns and it beshrouded the plain truth in diplomatic circumlocution.
It was, therefore, eminently foreseeable that No. Korea would sooner or later –in the face and in spite of widespread international opprobrium- launch yet another long-range ICBM over Japan and eastward across the Pacific toward the USA. It did so on April 5, 2009. And once again, No. Korea claimed that it was merely seeking to place a satellite into orbit. In response, the Obama Administration is stridently seeking strong Security Council resolutions. But any resulting sanctions –due to Chinese and Russian predispositions on North Korea- are likely to be void, vacuous and vacant of substance and/or substantially unenforceable. Of course, North Korea fully understands, calculates and depends upon these repeated international exercises in diplomatic futility.
Premises considered, it is likely that No. Korea will ultimately return to the six party negotiating table with a renewed set of demands. For No. Korea, this has become an almost seamless process. Indeed, while No. Korea remains one of the poorest and least self-reliant nations on earth (especially regarding food and fuel), it has also displayed unusual diplomatic perspicacity in pursuit of its goals. So, perhaps the No. Koreans really do have a lot of Juche, at least in sphere of geopolitical know-how. It certainly seems that No. Korea has developed a uniquely successful and productive formula for diplomatic self-reliance.
One can only hope that the Iranians (with their nuclear aspirations) are not learning from the lessons being so diligently taught by No. Korea. If No. Korea can continually squeeze more Juche from its diplomatic pouch, then Iran certainly has abundant wherewithal to replace the nationalistic Juche the once flowed so freely under Cyrus The Great during the awesome Persian Empire.
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
Pakistan Is No Wonderland
When Alice In Wonderland proclaimed that matters were becoming curiouser and curiouser, she could have been ruminating about Pakistan. Just a fleeting glance Through The (geopolitical) Looking Glass reveals that virtually every aspect of life in Pakistan is beset by some level of consternation, confusion and commotion, often bordering on chaos. The disarray afflicting Pakistan could even make the March Hare’s delirious confusion more disturbing. Assuredly, Pakistan’s profusion of disorder would make the Mad Hatter’s eccentric behavior almost seem tame.
Yet in light -or in spite- of the foregoing, the Obama Administration has now announced plans to send 4.3 billion dollars in aid to Pakistan. Given this substantial bequest of American taxpayer funds, it seems fitting to examine the plight of Pakistan in greater detail. In fact, Richard Holbrooke, America’s special envoy to Pakistan, recently addressed an influential group of Pakistanis and queried: “What is the crisis of Pakistan?” One wonders if the responses he received included the following concerns.
Pakistan’s most pressing problem may be the rapid spread of Afghanistan’s Taliban insurgency into and across north-west Pakistan. That concern is exacerbated by the fact that Pakistan’s notorious ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence Agency) has been flagrantly lending succor and support to the Taliban. Pakistan’s President has admitted that militants hold “huge amounts of land.” The Obama Administration has openly conceded the bitter truth of these egregious circumstances. Yet, while the U.S. is sending more and more troops to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan, projected U. S. aid to Pakistan may well –at least indirectly- aid the Taliban. Curiouser and Curiouser.
The threat of anarchy poses another problem for Pakistan. It is little reported, but there have been more than sixty suicide bombings during the past two years in Pakistan. Attacks on government entities and roadside bombs are almost daily events. There is an incipient revolt brewing in the Pakistani state of Baluchistan. The Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorist group (which admittedly supplied the operational know-how and training for last November’s terrorist attack on Mumbai) continues to operate and retains substantial support among Pakistan’s ISI.
And, of course, it was less than a year ago that Pakistan’s government was rocked by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Her husband (Ali Zadari), Pakistan’s current president, also fears for his life. He may have good cause. Eighty-one percent of Pakistanis dislike him. Additionally, Zadari is at visceral odds with Nawaz Sharif, his bitter and popular political opponent. The latter (Sharif) likes to remind his adversaries of his bold decision (when he was Pakistan’s Prime Minister) to test a Pakistani nuclear device in 1998 despite threats from the world powers. One wonders what Sharif now thinks about Iran’s nuclear ambitions? Lest we forget, the Sunni (Moslem) Pakistanis already possess the nuclear device to which its neighboring Shia (Moslem) Iranians so assiduously aspire. And there is certainly no love lost between the Sunnis and the Shia.
Of equal interest, Mr. Sharif heads up Pakistan’s Muslin League. The Pakistani Muslim League has its roots in the All-India Muslim League. The latter was founded in 1906 to protect the interests of Muslims in what was then British India. In 1940, the Muslim League adopted the Lahore Resolution (usually referred to as the "Pakistan Resolution") and successfully spearheaded the movement for the creation of an independent homeland for Indian Muslims, i.e. Pakistan. But, then, the tension between Pakistan’s Moslems and Hindu India is yet another major issue that has long beset and befogged Pakistani affairs. Kashmir is the face of that issue.
Jammu & Kashmir, as that region is properly known, is India’s only Muslim majority state. That situation –in and of itself- has major implications for other areas of India which are heavily populated by 154 million Moslems. Still, while India controls most of Kashmir, Pakistan has –not without substantial justification- historically laid claim to every inch of Kashmir. Clearly, most Kashmiris (including virtually all Kashmiri Muslims) resent being a part of India. If Kashmiris would be allowed to vote (as India originally promised, but which promise has never been kept), Kashmiris would undoubtedly vote to secede from India. Whether they would choose to join Pakistan is quite another matter.
That said, neither India nor Pakistan is prepared to relinquish their continually contentious -and often volatile- claims to Kashmir. On one side of the issue, the Pakistani military has a decided predilection to antagonize India. That attitude is predicated upon the belief that Hindu India was and is Pakistan’s mortal enemy.
On the other hand, India is fully aware that the major rivers (the Indus tributaries) feeding Pakistan flow through the Indian-controlled vale of Kashmir. The implications to Pakistan of this geopolitical circumstance are all too clear. As such, it is unlikely that India will ever permit the Kashmiris to vote or that India will ever make serious concessions to Pakistan on Kashmir. If conceivable, the Palestinian-Israeli issue may be easier to resolve. One wonders if that is why Sen. Mitchell was sent to the Mideast and Mr. Holbrooke was sent to Pakistan?
Of course, all the foregoing assumes an awareness of the presence of Islamist terrorists (probably including al-Qaeda and Osama) in Pakistan’s tribal area where the Wuziristan region borders Afghanistan. To suggest that this area is akin to America’s old wild west is to severely understate the unruly realities on the ground north, west and south of Peshawar. For the record, Peshawar is no shrinking violet when it comes to rough and rowdy towns.
Need it also be said that Pakistan is anything-but-immune to the global economic slowdown. Thus, about one third of Pakistan’s textile factories have ceased operations. Notably, Pakistan’s textile industry provides a virtual majority of industrial employment in Pakistan. Textiles are also the source of approximately half of Pakistan’s foreign-exchange earnings. As a proximate result of this state of economic disarray, Pakistan had to plead to the International Monetary Fund for a 7.6 billion dollar bailout to avoid defaulting on its external debt. Undaunted, the USA is still about to funnel many more billions into Pakistani coffers. Curiouser and curiouser. Still, is throwing good money after bad a proper political prerequisite given the exigencies in Pakistan? That’s a riddle worthy of the Mad Hatter.
In the final analysis, it is perhaps best to return to the plight of Alice in Wonderland. She was famously asked by the Mad Hatter: “Why is a raven like a writing desk?” Having received no reply, the Mad Hatter then queried Alice: “Have you guessed the riddle yet?” “No, I give up,” Alice replied. “What’s the answer?” To which the Mad Hatter promptly responded: “I haven’t the slightest idea.” Regrettably, the same can be said about resolving the pressing problems in Pakistan!
When Alice In Wonderland proclaimed that matters were becoming curiouser and curiouser, she could have been ruminating about Pakistan. Just a fleeting glance Through The (geopolitical) Looking Glass reveals that virtually every aspect of life in Pakistan is beset by some level of consternation, confusion and commotion, often bordering on chaos. The disarray afflicting Pakistan could even make the March Hare’s delirious confusion more disturbing. Assuredly, Pakistan’s profusion of disorder would make the Mad Hatter’s eccentric behavior almost seem tame.
Yet in light -or in spite- of the foregoing, the Obama Administration has now announced plans to send 4.3 billion dollars in aid to Pakistan. Given this substantial bequest of American taxpayer funds, it seems fitting to examine the plight of Pakistan in greater detail. In fact, Richard Holbrooke, America’s special envoy to Pakistan, recently addressed an influential group of Pakistanis and queried: “What is the crisis of Pakistan?” One wonders if the responses he received included the following concerns.
Pakistan’s most pressing problem may be the rapid spread of Afghanistan’s Taliban insurgency into and across north-west Pakistan. That concern is exacerbated by the fact that Pakistan’s notorious ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence Agency) has been flagrantly lending succor and support to the Taliban. Pakistan’s President has admitted that militants hold “huge amounts of land.” The Obama Administration has openly conceded the bitter truth of these egregious circumstances. Yet, while the U.S. is sending more and more troops to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan, projected U. S. aid to Pakistan may well –at least indirectly- aid the Taliban. Curiouser and Curiouser.
The threat of anarchy poses another problem for Pakistan. It is little reported, but there have been more than sixty suicide bombings during the past two years in Pakistan. Attacks on government entities and roadside bombs are almost daily events. There is an incipient revolt brewing in the Pakistani state of Baluchistan. The Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorist group (which admittedly supplied the operational know-how and training for last November’s terrorist attack on Mumbai) continues to operate and retains substantial support among Pakistan’s ISI.
And, of course, it was less than a year ago that Pakistan’s government was rocked by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Her husband (Ali Zadari), Pakistan’s current president, also fears for his life. He may have good cause. Eighty-one percent of Pakistanis dislike him. Additionally, Zadari is at visceral odds with Nawaz Sharif, his bitter and popular political opponent. The latter (Sharif) likes to remind his adversaries of his bold decision (when he was Pakistan’s Prime Minister) to test a Pakistani nuclear device in 1998 despite threats from the world powers. One wonders what Sharif now thinks about Iran’s nuclear ambitions? Lest we forget, the Sunni (Moslem) Pakistanis already possess the nuclear device to which its neighboring Shia (Moslem) Iranians so assiduously aspire. And there is certainly no love lost between the Sunnis and the Shia.
Of equal interest, Mr. Sharif heads up Pakistan’s Muslin League. The Pakistani Muslim League has its roots in the All-India Muslim League. The latter was founded in 1906 to protect the interests of Muslims in what was then British India. In 1940, the Muslim League adopted the Lahore Resolution (usually referred to as the "Pakistan Resolution") and successfully spearheaded the movement for the creation of an independent homeland for Indian Muslims, i.e. Pakistan. But, then, the tension between Pakistan’s Moslems and Hindu India is yet another major issue that has long beset and befogged Pakistani affairs. Kashmir is the face of that issue.
Jammu & Kashmir, as that region is properly known, is India’s only Muslim majority state. That situation –in and of itself- has major implications for other areas of India which are heavily populated by 154 million Moslems. Still, while India controls most of Kashmir, Pakistan has –not without substantial justification- historically laid claim to every inch of Kashmir. Clearly, most Kashmiris (including virtually all Kashmiri Muslims) resent being a part of India. If Kashmiris would be allowed to vote (as India originally promised, but which promise has never been kept), Kashmiris would undoubtedly vote to secede from India. Whether they would choose to join Pakistan is quite another matter.
That said, neither India nor Pakistan is prepared to relinquish their continually contentious -and often volatile- claims to Kashmir. On one side of the issue, the Pakistani military has a decided predilection to antagonize India. That attitude is predicated upon the belief that Hindu India was and is Pakistan’s mortal enemy.
On the other hand, India is fully aware that the major rivers (the Indus tributaries) feeding Pakistan flow through the Indian-controlled vale of Kashmir. The implications to Pakistan of this geopolitical circumstance are all too clear. As such, it is unlikely that India will ever permit the Kashmiris to vote or that India will ever make serious concessions to Pakistan on Kashmir. If conceivable, the Palestinian-Israeli issue may be easier to resolve. One wonders if that is why Sen. Mitchell was sent to the Mideast and Mr. Holbrooke was sent to Pakistan?
Of course, all the foregoing assumes an awareness of the presence of Islamist terrorists (probably including al-Qaeda and Osama) in Pakistan’s tribal area where the Wuziristan region borders Afghanistan. To suggest that this area is akin to America’s old wild west is to severely understate the unruly realities on the ground north, west and south of Peshawar. For the record, Peshawar is no shrinking violet when it comes to rough and rowdy towns.
Need it also be said that Pakistan is anything-but-immune to the global economic slowdown. Thus, about one third of Pakistan’s textile factories have ceased operations. Notably, Pakistan’s textile industry provides a virtual majority of industrial employment in Pakistan. Textiles are also the source of approximately half of Pakistan’s foreign-exchange earnings. As a proximate result of this state of economic disarray, Pakistan had to plead to the International Monetary Fund for a 7.6 billion dollar bailout to avoid defaulting on its external debt. Undaunted, the USA is still about to funnel many more billions into Pakistani coffers. Curiouser and curiouser. Still, is throwing good money after bad a proper political prerequisite given the exigencies in Pakistan? That’s a riddle worthy of the Mad Hatter.
In the final analysis, it is perhaps best to return to the plight of Alice in Wonderland. She was famously asked by the Mad Hatter: “Why is a raven like a writing desk?” Having received no reply, the Mad Hatter then queried Alice: “Have you guessed the riddle yet?” “No, I give up,” Alice replied. “What’s the answer?” To which the Mad Hatter promptly responded: “I haven’t the slightest idea.” Regrettably, the same can be said about resolving the pressing problems in Pakistan!
Saturday, March 28, 2009
Unveiling The Arab Mideast
Most Westerners possess precious little insight into the Arab world. There is little substantive understanding of the Palestinians. For that matter, few are those outside the Middle East who can discourse knowledgeably on Islam. Even fewer are those who are able to differentiate between Jihadists, Islamists, Moslems, Sunnis and Shiites. How many can even define what an Arab is or explain what makes someone a Palestinian refugee. The confusion is understandable.
That lack of clarity is further aggravated by long-standing disputes that repeatedly replay themselves in the Middle East . For starters, it is well to consider that the status of Gaza remains unstable, that there is a continuing bitter division between Islamist-oriented Hamas and secularist-oriented Fatah, and, most especially, that the sixty (60) year old Palestinian refugee problem still draws rapt media coverage from Britain to Bahrein to Brunei. As such, a crash course into the Palestinian/Arab issue may be illuminating.
Let’s begin with Gaza . The conventional wisdom is that Gaza ’s desperate state of affairs is the product of Israel ’s military incursions and oppressive economic sanctions. That understanding is unusually myopic. It is equally uninformed.
Gaza cannot be addressed in a geopolitical vacuum. Quite the contrary is true. The plight of the Palestinians in Gaza can only be understood as part of the Arab vortex whirling throughout the Mideast .
Permit me to be crystal clear. The problems in Gaza began six decades ago when the Arabs made a calculated decision to reject the U.N.’s partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab (there was no mention of a Palestinian state!). Having taken that position and then lost their ensuing war with Israel , the Arab states fixed upon a most remarkable policy. The Arab world adopted a strategy that has since crippled the Palestinians and emasculated their aspirations.
The Arab approach was bizarre. They manufactured a Palestinian refugee problem. Arab tactics to create this issue were as insidious as they have been effective. The Arab plan for the Palestinians after 1948 was simple. Henceforth, Arab nations would respectively initiate legislation that would preclude any and all Palestinians –and their progeny- from ever becoming citizens in any Arab nation.
By refusing to integrate Palestinians into their respective societies, the Arab nations opined -with unusual perspicacity- that the Palestinians would always remain identifiable to the world as presumably pitiful refugees. By so doing, the Palestinian plight as a stateless people could also be used as a weapon to denounce Israel . The Arabs succeeded in this endeavor.
But more importantly, the Arab plan extended far beyond those Palestinians who actually fled Israel during the 1948 war. In actual practice, the descendants of Palestinian refugees –expressly including an unending line of their progeny- can never become citizens of their adopted Arab states. Saudi Arabia is the prime example of how this policy was –and still does- operate.
Saudi law mandates that no Palestinian refugee may become a Saudi subject. No Palestinian may acquire Saudi citizenship. No Palestinian may carry a Saudi passport. Indeed, the child of a bona fide Palestinian refugee born in Saudi Arabia is also deemed to be a Palestinian refugee. That child’s children and their children’s children remain classified as Palestinian refugees for eternity. As a result, multiple generations of Arabs who were born in Saudi Arabia and who have never seen the sands of Gaza nor trod the hills of the West Bank are still denominated as Palestinian refugees. On the other hand, non-Palestinian immigrants to Saudi Arabia from other Moslem countries may become Saudi citizens. In short, the Saudis –their rationalizations notwithstanding- intentionally discriminate against their 250,000 Palestinian brothers living on sacred Saudi soil.
Sad as this may be, hundreds of thousands of Arabs in the Gaza strip still live in squalid refugee camps. This situation -created, conceived and controlled by Arabs- serves to perpetuate the artfully described plight of the Palestinians. But there is more.
With insidious premeditation, the Arab world has also encouraged Palestinian refugees in Gaza to have a high birth rate (The birth rate in Gaza is 5.9 children per woman versus 2.4 children for Israeli women). This, the Arabs also accurately understand, breeds an abundant pool of Palestinian refugees who can produce a human tsunami designed to flood Israel out of existence. Indeed, it was that notorious, non-Palestinian Yassir Arafat who cynically proclaimed: “The Palestinian woman’s womb is my best weapon!”
One erudite Palestinian woman (who grew up in Gaza and whose fedayeen (self-sacrificing terrorist) father was assassinated by the Israelis) recently articulated the issue much better that I. With abundant bitterness and copious sarcasm dripping from her pen, she wrote: “Arabs claim they love the Palestinian people, but they seem more interested in sacrificing them…The Arab world must end the Palestinians’ refugee status and thereby their desire to harm Israel…It is time for the Arab world to truly help the Palestinians, not use them.”
Most Westerners possess precious little insight into the Arab world. There is little substantive understanding of the Palestinians. For that matter, few are those outside the Middle East who can discourse knowledgeably on Islam. Even fewer are those who are able to differentiate between Jihadists, Islamists, Moslems, Sunnis and Shiites. How many can even define what an Arab is or explain what makes someone a Palestinian refugee. The confusion is understandable.
That lack of clarity is further aggravated by long-standing disputes that repeatedly replay themselves in the Middle East . For starters, it is well to consider that the status of Gaza remains unstable, that there is a continuing bitter division between Islamist-oriented Hamas and secularist-oriented Fatah, and, most especially, that the sixty (60) year old Palestinian refugee problem still draws rapt media coverage from Britain to Bahrein to Brunei. As such, a crash course into the Palestinian/Arab issue may be illuminating.
Let’s begin with Gaza . The conventional wisdom is that Gaza ’s desperate state of affairs is the product of Israel ’s military incursions and oppressive economic sanctions. That understanding is unusually myopic. It is equally uninformed.
Gaza cannot be addressed in a geopolitical vacuum. Quite the contrary is true. The plight of the Palestinians in Gaza can only be understood as part of the Arab vortex whirling throughout the Mideast .
Permit me to be crystal clear. The problems in Gaza began six decades ago when the Arabs made a calculated decision to reject the U.N.’s partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab (there was no mention of a Palestinian state!). Having taken that position and then lost their ensuing war with Israel , the Arab states fixed upon a most remarkable policy. The Arab world adopted a strategy that has since crippled the Palestinians and emasculated their aspirations.
The Arab approach was bizarre. They manufactured a Palestinian refugee problem. Arab tactics to create this issue were as insidious as they have been effective. The Arab plan for the Palestinians after 1948 was simple. Henceforth, Arab nations would respectively initiate legislation that would preclude any and all Palestinians –and their progeny- from ever becoming citizens in any Arab nation.
By refusing to integrate Palestinians into their respective societies, the Arab nations opined -with unusual perspicacity- that the Palestinians would always remain identifiable to the world as presumably pitiful refugees. By so doing, the Palestinian plight as a stateless people could also be used as a weapon to denounce Israel . The Arabs succeeded in this endeavor.
But more importantly, the Arab plan extended far beyond those Palestinians who actually fled Israel during the 1948 war. In actual practice, the descendants of Palestinian refugees –expressly including an unending line of their progeny- can never become citizens of their adopted Arab states. Saudi Arabia is the prime example of how this policy was –and still does- operate.
Saudi law mandates that no Palestinian refugee may become a Saudi subject. No Palestinian may acquire Saudi citizenship. No Palestinian may carry a Saudi passport. Indeed, the child of a bona fide Palestinian refugee born in Saudi Arabia is also deemed to be a Palestinian refugee. That child’s children and their children’s children remain classified as Palestinian refugees for eternity. As a result, multiple generations of Arabs who were born in Saudi Arabia and who have never seen the sands of Gaza nor trod the hills of the West Bank are still denominated as Palestinian refugees. On the other hand, non-Palestinian immigrants to Saudi Arabia from other Moslem countries may become Saudi citizens. In short, the Saudis –their rationalizations notwithstanding- intentionally discriminate against their 250,000 Palestinian brothers living on sacred Saudi soil.
Sad as this may be, hundreds of thousands of Arabs in the Gaza strip still live in squalid refugee camps. This situation -created, conceived and controlled by Arabs- serves to perpetuate the artfully described plight of the Palestinians. But there is more.
With insidious premeditation, the Arab world has also encouraged Palestinian refugees in Gaza to have a high birth rate (The birth rate in Gaza is 5.9 children per woman versus 2.4 children for Israeli women). This, the Arabs also accurately understand, breeds an abundant pool of Palestinian refugees who can produce a human tsunami designed to flood Israel out of existence. Indeed, it was that notorious, non-Palestinian Yassir Arafat who cynically proclaimed: “The Palestinian woman’s womb is my best weapon!”
One erudite Palestinian woman (who grew up in Gaza and whose fedayeen (self-sacrificing terrorist) father was assassinated by the Israelis) recently articulated the issue much better that I. With abundant bitterness and copious sarcasm dripping from her pen, she wrote: “Arabs claim they love the Palestinian people, but they seem more interested in sacrificing them…The Arab world must end the Palestinians’ refugee status and thereby their desire to harm Israel…It is time for the Arab world to truly help the Palestinians, not use them.”
Friday, March 27, 2009
Chinese Expansionism Amidst Global Slowdown
Earlier this month I spent some time in Shanghai. In due course, I became attuned to an unfortunate attitude currently emerging among some American geopolitical strategists. That position argues that China's growing military expansion poses a growing threat to invade Taiwan. I beg to differ.
While it is true that China's military (especially its navy) is rapidly expanding, the argument that the Chinese military poses a threat to Taiwan is conceptually flawed. Yes, China has long sought reunification with Taiwan. Yes, China bitterly opposes independence for Taiwan. But since Deng Xiaoping famously intoned that “It is glorious to get rich,” China has relentlessly focused upon the notion that economic clout inevitably yields geopolitical clout. As such, China has implicitly rejected foreseeable reunification with Taiwan in favor of astutely pursuing its broader goal of worldwide economic domination (subjugation may be a bit too strong).
Still, is it not time that China pundits cease making the wrong mistake (per Yogi Berra) about China’s intentions and refocus their sights away from China’s alleged military preoccupation with invading Taiwan? An invasion of Taiwan would precipitate a worldwide economic conflagration that would be diametrically contrary to China’s studiously conceived and carefully calculated economic game plan.
Most pointedly, China is, by dint of both geographical and economic predisposition, disinclined to expand territorially. As such, the growth of the Chinese military (especially its blue water navy) is primarily focused not on Taiwan, but rather on protecting China’s ever expanding economic horizons. These horizons have now been dramatically extended into the Indian Ocean and into Africa. Indeed, as early as 1993 an official of the People's Liberation Army proclaimed that: "We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as an ocean only of the Indians." Shortly thereafter, the Chinese began their economic invasion of Africa. Indeed, it is especially in the Indian Ocean and Africa that China’s economic expansionism is most palpable and -for the fiscally faint- insidious.
It must be pointed out that China has been successfully planting its economic flag throughout Africa. At the same time, the West has -with conspicuous geopolitical myopia- been busy dangling dollars unattractively attached to conditions that amount to interference in African nations' domestic affairs. Meanwhile, China has been flooding these same African nations with copious aid devoid of strings. In payment for its aid, China has astutely exacted the right to procure the precious minerals and natural resources which it needs to fuel its (somewhat stalled, but still chugging) economic engine. In fact, it is China’s economic (not military) expansionism that has made an absolute mockery of International Monetary Fund aid and Western influence not only in Africa, but across an ever-enlarging worldwide geopolitical spectrum.
Premises considered, Taiwan is small potatoes in the broader context of China’s finely-honed economic assault on the West. The real peril posed by China’s military is not an invasion of Taiwan, but its growing -and assuredly legitimate- capacity to protect China’s dramatically expanding economic interests while continually encircling China’s economic adversaries.
When we in the West seek to expand our geopolitical and economic spheres of influence, we applaud such efforts when successful. Yet, when China (America's economic rival/competitor/adversary) acts to pursue these self-same objectives, China's behavior is all-too-often seen as ominous and perilous. Perhaps the Chinese are simply more adept at pursuing their best economic interests than the West is prepared to either acknowledge or confront.
In short, the Chinese dragon has a voracious appetite. Taiwan is –at best- an economic appetizer!
Earlier this month I spent some time in Shanghai. In due course, I became attuned to an unfortunate attitude currently emerging among some American geopolitical strategists. That position argues that China's growing military expansion poses a growing threat to invade Taiwan. I beg to differ.
While it is true that China's military (especially its navy) is rapidly expanding, the argument that the Chinese military poses a threat to Taiwan is conceptually flawed. Yes, China has long sought reunification with Taiwan. Yes, China bitterly opposes independence for Taiwan. But since Deng Xiaoping famously intoned that “It is glorious to get rich,” China has relentlessly focused upon the notion that economic clout inevitably yields geopolitical clout. As such, China has implicitly rejected foreseeable reunification with Taiwan in favor of astutely pursuing its broader goal of worldwide economic domination (subjugation may be a bit too strong).
Still, is it not time that China pundits cease making the wrong mistake (per Yogi Berra) about China’s intentions and refocus their sights away from China’s alleged military preoccupation with invading Taiwan? An invasion of Taiwan would precipitate a worldwide economic conflagration that would be diametrically contrary to China’s studiously conceived and carefully calculated economic game plan.
Most pointedly, China is, by dint of both geographical and economic predisposition, disinclined to expand territorially. As such, the growth of the Chinese military (especially its blue water navy) is primarily focused not on Taiwan, but rather on protecting China’s ever expanding economic horizons. These horizons have now been dramatically extended into the Indian Ocean and into Africa. Indeed, as early as 1993 an official of the People's Liberation Army proclaimed that: "We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as an ocean only of the Indians." Shortly thereafter, the Chinese began their economic invasion of Africa. Indeed, it is especially in the Indian Ocean and Africa that China’s economic expansionism is most palpable and -for the fiscally faint- insidious.
It must be pointed out that China has been successfully planting its economic flag throughout Africa. At the same time, the West has -with conspicuous geopolitical myopia- been busy dangling dollars unattractively attached to conditions that amount to interference in African nations' domestic affairs. Meanwhile, China has been flooding these same African nations with copious aid devoid of strings. In payment for its aid, China has astutely exacted the right to procure the precious minerals and natural resources which it needs to fuel its (somewhat stalled, but still chugging) economic engine. In fact, it is China’s economic (not military) expansionism that has made an absolute mockery of International Monetary Fund aid and Western influence not only in Africa, but across an ever-enlarging worldwide geopolitical spectrum.
Premises considered, Taiwan is small potatoes in the broader context of China’s finely-honed economic assault on the West. The real peril posed by China’s military is not an invasion of Taiwan, but its growing -and assuredly legitimate- capacity to protect China’s dramatically expanding economic interests while continually encircling China’s economic adversaries.
When we in the West seek to expand our geopolitical and economic spheres of influence, we applaud such efforts when successful. Yet, when China (America's economic rival/competitor/adversary) acts to pursue these self-same objectives, China's behavior is all-too-often seen as ominous and perilous. Perhaps the Chinese are simply more adept at pursuing their best economic interests than the West is prepared to either acknowledge or confront.
In short, the Chinese dragon has a voracious appetite. Taiwan is –at best- an economic appetizer!
Hamas, Iran & Moderate Extremism
Yesterday's (26/3/2009) New York Times ran a not-so-trenchant and less-than-revealing Op Ed piece by Roger Cohen. His column was also conceptually flawed and ideologically misleading. Cohen suggests that the Obama administration would do well to involve “moderate elements of Hamas” in any attempts to resolve the sixty year old conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. But Cohen fails to reveal just what a “moderate element” of Hamas really is.
That question calls to mind a conversation I had just last week during a delightful lunch with Lord David Trimble. He is a gentleman who knows a bit about the search for peace. Indeed, Lord Trimble was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1998 for his part in resolving the troubles in Belfast, Ireland.
In striving to apply the lessons of Northern Ireland to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Lord Trimble spoke of his dealings with “moderate extremists” in Northern Ireland. That term mystified me. So I asked: “Just what is a moderate extremist?” In fact, I then used Hamas as an example. I politely queried Lord Trimble: “If a Hamas extremist is dedicated to expunging Israel’s existence, is a moderate Hamas extremist one who still seeks to expunge Israel, but is willing to do so in a less-than-overt fashion?”
The latter scenario is precisely the approach implicitly advocated in Roger Cohen’s cited Op-Ed piece. The argument suggests that Hamas could join a Palestinian unity government which might then make peace with Israel. In that event, by use of this unity government subterfuge, Hamas could technically deny that it recognized Israel. As such, Hamas’ recognition of Israel would be de facto and not dejure. It sounds so nice. It's almost palatable. But there's a rub.
That approach has multiple flaws. The most critical is the presumption that moderate elements of Hamas either control or form a decisive portion of Hamas. That assumption is certainly egregious, probably fallacious and quite unsupported by certifiable facts. And we haven't yet defined what a moderate extremist is. Still, when dealing with subterfuge, political doublespeak and/or the masking of reality, itis always easier to simply foam at the mouth.
That said, there is a good deal of political foaming currently afloat in Iran, which -not incidentally- is Hamas’ primary banker. In fact, the run-up to Iran’s Presidential elections is a veritable cesspool of political doublespeak and linguistic obfuscation. Indeed, Iran’s presidential contest is plagued by the use of multiple terms whose meanings are confusing, overlapping and mystifying. A few cases may be illuminating. Now pause a minute and take a breath. Here goes.
Mohammed Khatami (Iran’s President from 1997-2005) recently withdrew his presidential candidacy. He had been alternately described as a moderate and/or as a reformist. Of course, what a moderate is and what constitutes a reformist depends on an observer’s subjective view. Still, it was widely thought that Khatami’s moderate reformism was reflected in his liberal (sic) interpretation of Islam. Thus, Khatami’s political posture was portrayed as being contrary to that of thec onservatives and/or hardliners who hate him, i.e. Mr. Ahmadinejad. Indeed, Khatami has asserted (much to Ahmadinejad’s disgust) that “the Holocaust is an historical event and we reformers do not deny it, but more important, the issue has nothing to do with us.” Well and good. So on to another candidate.
Mir Hossein Mousavi (Iran’s Prime Minister during its ten year war with Iraq) is a moderate reformist on social and economic issues. But he is also known to be a radical revolutionary Islamic ideologue and a radical on international issues such as Iran’s enrichment of uranium and on his antagonism toIsrael. If those descriptions are not sufficiently disconcerting, then consider that Mousavi prefers to describe himself as a principalist. Just what that is will be examined when we discuss the current IranianPresident.
Medhi Karroubi is a reformist oriented cleric who is also an ex-speaker of the Iranian parliament. He is also critical of Ahmadinejad. His presidential campaign slogan is “Change.” Regardless of where Karroubi found the inspiration for his sly slogan, he has yet to articulate the precise direction of the change he favors. So, Karroubi is the reformist candidate for change in an unspecified direction. Seems clear enough does it not?
Then there’s the unannounced, but aspiring, presidential candidate Abdullah Nuri. He was once Iran’s Vice President during Khatami’s administration. Nuri is viewed as a liberal, but only because he favors opening links to dealing with America. Mr.Nuri spent five years in jail for insulting Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Commander-In Chief, and holder of the unilateral power to declare war. Virtually nothing of import happens in Iran without his imprimatur. So, Abdullah Nuri can kiss his presidential aspirations good-bye.
And, finally, there’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He now describes himself not as a conservative, but as a "principalist" (the Farsi term is: osul-gara). Those in the know say that the Farsi term is most meaningfully translated as fundamentalist. Indeed, Ahmadinejad is a member of the Hajjatieh. That group is a secret society known for its virulent anti-West and fanatically anti-Sunni attitudes. It believes, as does Ahmadinejad, that the return of the Islamic Messiah (The Mahdi) can only result from the creation of chaos on earth. (Do you catch my drift?) That said, Ahmadinajad has a leg up -but not a lock- on being re-elected. He has Khamenei’s imprimatur.
The long and short of the Iranian presidential campaign is really not so complex. The Iranian media has described reformers, moderate reformers, conservatives and moderate conservatives, radicals and even one alleged liberal (who defiantly rejects that label). But everyone running for president wants to be called a principalist (don't forget, that's Farsi for fundamentalist!).
In actuality, it is absolutely foolish to label any Iranian presidential candidate as either reformist, conservative or any not-so-subtle variation thereof. Any close inspection suggests that -to a great extent- they all represent little more than varying flavors of the same political pie. Clearly, a reformist candidate may not be a reformer at all. In some cases, the reformist candidate is simply a conservative seeking to attract reformist votes to his principalist candidacy, whatever that means.
So back to where we began this foray into disconcerting political terminology. Maybe the mentality behind all the double-speak and verbal subterfuge is not all that confusing. Maybe a moderate extremist– be he in Iran, in Hamas or in Northern Ireland– is still someone who seeks to do harm, only in moderation or not right away. It only remains to be asked: "How moderate and when?”
Yesterday's (26/3/2009) New York Times ran a not-so-trenchant and less-than-revealing Op Ed piece by Roger Cohen. His column was also conceptually flawed and ideologically misleading. Cohen suggests that the Obama administration would do well to involve “moderate elements of Hamas” in any attempts to resolve the sixty year old conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. But Cohen fails to reveal just what a “moderate element” of Hamas really is.
That question calls to mind a conversation I had just last week during a delightful lunch with Lord David Trimble. He is a gentleman who knows a bit about the search for peace. Indeed, Lord Trimble was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1998 for his part in resolving the troubles in Belfast, Ireland.
In striving to apply the lessons of Northern Ireland to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Lord Trimble spoke of his dealings with “moderate extremists” in Northern Ireland. That term mystified me. So I asked: “Just what is a moderate extremist?” In fact, I then used Hamas as an example. I politely queried Lord Trimble: “If a Hamas extremist is dedicated to expunging Israel’s existence, is a moderate Hamas extremist one who still seeks to expunge Israel, but is willing to do so in a less-than-overt fashion?”
The latter scenario is precisely the approach implicitly advocated in Roger Cohen’s cited Op-Ed piece. The argument suggests that Hamas could join a Palestinian unity government which might then make peace with Israel. In that event, by use of this unity government subterfuge, Hamas could technically deny that it recognized Israel. As such, Hamas’ recognition of Israel would be de facto and not dejure. It sounds so nice. It's almost palatable. But there's a rub.
That approach has multiple flaws. The most critical is the presumption that moderate elements of Hamas either control or form a decisive portion of Hamas. That assumption is certainly egregious, probably fallacious and quite unsupported by certifiable facts. And we haven't yet defined what a moderate extremist is. Still, when dealing with subterfuge, political doublespeak and/or the masking of reality, itis always easier to simply foam at the mouth.
That said, there is a good deal of political foaming currently afloat in Iran, which -not incidentally- is Hamas’ primary banker. In fact, the run-up to Iran’s Presidential elections is a veritable cesspool of political doublespeak and linguistic obfuscation. Indeed, Iran’s presidential contest is plagued by the use of multiple terms whose meanings are confusing, overlapping and mystifying. A few cases may be illuminating. Now pause a minute and take a breath. Here goes.
Mohammed Khatami (Iran’s President from 1997-2005) recently withdrew his presidential candidacy. He had been alternately described as a moderate and/or as a reformist. Of course, what a moderate is and what constitutes a reformist depends on an observer’s subjective view. Still, it was widely thought that Khatami’s moderate reformism was reflected in his liberal (sic) interpretation of Islam. Thus, Khatami’s political posture was portrayed as being contrary to that of thec onservatives and/or hardliners who hate him, i.e. Mr. Ahmadinejad. Indeed, Khatami has asserted (much to Ahmadinejad’s disgust) that “the Holocaust is an historical event and we reformers do not deny it, but more important, the issue has nothing to do with us.” Well and good. So on to another candidate.
Mir Hossein Mousavi (Iran’s Prime Minister during its ten year war with Iraq) is a moderate reformist on social and economic issues. But he is also known to be a radical revolutionary Islamic ideologue and a radical on international issues such as Iran’s enrichment of uranium and on his antagonism toIsrael. If those descriptions are not sufficiently disconcerting, then consider that Mousavi prefers to describe himself as a principalist. Just what that is will be examined when we discuss the current IranianPresident.
Medhi Karroubi is a reformist oriented cleric who is also an ex-speaker of the Iranian parliament. He is also critical of Ahmadinejad. His presidential campaign slogan is “Change.” Regardless of where Karroubi found the inspiration for his sly slogan, he has yet to articulate the precise direction of the change he favors. So, Karroubi is the reformist candidate for change in an unspecified direction. Seems clear enough does it not?
Then there’s the unannounced, but aspiring, presidential candidate Abdullah Nuri. He was once Iran’s Vice President during Khatami’s administration. Nuri is viewed as a liberal, but only because he favors opening links to dealing with America. Mr.Nuri spent five years in jail for insulting Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Commander-In Chief, and holder of the unilateral power to declare war. Virtually nothing of import happens in Iran without his imprimatur. So, Abdullah Nuri can kiss his presidential aspirations good-bye.
And, finally, there’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He now describes himself not as a conservative, but as a "principalist" (the Farsi term is: osul-gara). Those in the know say that the Farsi term is most meaningfully translated as fundamentalist. Indeed, Ahmadinejad is a member of the Hajjatieh. That group is a secret society known for its virulent anti-West and fanatically anti-Sunni attitudes. It believes, as does Ahmadinejad, that the return of the Islamic Messiah (The Mahdi) can only result from the creation of chaos on earth. (Do you catch my drift?) That said, Ahmadinajad has a leg up -but not a lock- on being re-elected. He has Khamenei’s imprimatur.
The long and short of the Iranian presidential campaign is really not so complex. The Iranian media has described reformers, moderate reformers, conservatives and moderate conservatives, radicals and even one alleged liberal (who defiantly rejects that label). But everyone running for president wants to be called a principalist (don't forget, that's Farsi for fundamentalist!).
In actuality, it is absolutely foolish to label any Iranian presidential candidate as either reformist, conservative or any not-so-subtle variation thereof. Any close inspection suggests that -to a great extent- they all represent little more than varying flavors of the same political pie. Clearly, a reformist candidate may not be a reformer at all. In some cases, the reformist candidate is simply a conservative seeking to attract reformist votes to his principalist candidacy, whatever that means.
So back to where we began this foray into disconcerting political terminology. Maybe the mentality behind all the double-speak and verbal subterfuge is not all that confusing. Maybe a moderate extremist– be he in Iran, in Hamas or in Northern Ireland– is still someone who seeks to do harm, only in moderation or not right away. It only remains to be asked: "How moderate and when?”
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