Wednesday, July 13, 2011

The Arab Spring?

The Arab Spring is a mirage. It appeared seemingly out of nowhere. It is now evaporating into the always shifting political sands of the Arab Mideast.

That said, aspects of The Arab Spring are crystal clear. The Arab Spring is not simply a myth; it is an illusion. The Arab Spring has no singular direction. The Arab Spring has no defining vision. The Arab Spring has no cohesion. The Arab Spring has virtually no pan-Arab collegiality. The Arab
Spring has a dirth of pervasive purpose. In fact, the entire Arab Mideast reflects an decided absence of uniformity. But if that is news, it should not be. The Arab Spring is a figment of the West's fervid imagination.

But even crystal clarity about the myth of the Arab Spring cannot dispel that term's captivating imagery. Regrettably, the notion of The Arab Spring was foisted upon the world by pundits whose familiarity with the Mideast is suspect.

Alternatively stated, Mideast cognoscenti have long been fully aware that the Arab Mideast is -and has long been- fractured, fragmented and fissured. Nothing in the alleged Arab Spring has altered that condition. Indeed,
the so-called Arab Spring has only exposed the ruptures, hacked away at the perpetual splinters and confirmed the critical cracks that traditionally roil the Arab Mideast.

It has been argued -sometimes vociferously- that the Arab Spring was/is an outburst of yearning by disaffected masses of Arabs for dignity, freedom and democracy. Perhaps. It has been suggested that the protests and demonstrations were/are the beginnings of a political tsunami which would bring a wave of new life, enhanced liberty and a broader capacity to pursue happiness by and for the Arab masses. Wrong, at least so far.

Yes, there have been multiple demonstrations and prodigious protests. But demonstrations and protests are not synonymous with substantive revolts. Yes, there have been revolts, but revolts are not necessarily revolutions. Yes, there have been what appear to be revolutions, but these have not yet produced widespread regime change. And where there has been regime change, there has not been demonstrable change in the actual control and management of governmental affairs. Furthermore, even where there has been regime change (Tunisia and Egypt), there has been not been a headlong rush to democratic reform by the powers that be.

On the other hand, it is abundantly clear that there are substantive threads that weave their way through the Mideast turmoil. These threads include a broad disaffection with brazen corruption, a pervasive disenchantment with economic exclusion by privileged elites and a widespread alienation of the woefully unemployed Arab youth. These matters are hugely important; they should not be lightly dismissed.

But, contrary to wishful thinking in the West, a pervasive hunger for democracy is barely distinguishable in the above threads. That is understandable. The Arab Spring -such as it is- is not really about democracy. To a great extent, the Mideast tumult is about the ardent desire by widely divergent and disparate Arab populaces to get a fair shake and to get their fair share in life. Pointedly, for the exploding numbers of Arab youth (whose unemployment level is incredibly high), a slice of the bread of prosperity takes clear precedence over a ringside seat at the circus of democracy.

Perhaps it is best to cite chapter and verse. Egypt, the Arab Mideast's most populous nation, is the prime case in point. Cairo's Tahrir Square experienced large and protracted demonstrations. Masses of Egyptians clamored for regime change. So the Egyptian military forced President Mubarak out of office.

The Egyptian military also got rid Gamal Mubarak and his fiscally predatory cronies, thirty-nine of whom became billionaires. But now that the dust surrounding the Egyptian Spring is settling, it seems clear that what the Egyptians got was not regime change. Instead, the Egyptians acquired a barely disguised preservation of the status quo by the same military men who once served and then rejected Mubarak.

Yes, Hosni Mubarak and Gamal Mubarak are gone; but the High Council of Egypt's Armed Forces is still in firm control. The Egyptian state bureaucracy is still managing the store. The Egyptian National Police are still operating what has been characterized as a "nationwide protection racket." Egypt's college graduates are still ten times less likely to have a job than the Egyptian masses who hold rudimentary educations. Egypt's per capita income is still about two and a half times less than in neighboring Libya. And don't think that the Egyptians don't recognize that Saudi citizens right across the Red Sea still earn about four times more than does the average Egyptian.

So, yes, the Egyptians got rid of an autocratic tyrant, but that does not mean that much more has changed, at least not yet. All of which leads us back to the rest of the Arab Mideast and the mythical Arab Spring.

Amidst all the Arab unrest, not one Arab monarchy has fallen. Only one Arab royal house has been seriously challenged. That sole unique exception is Bahrein's tiny Emirate whose population is one hundred times smaller than that of Egypt. Premises considered, Bahrein's neighboring Saudi monarchy rushed headlong to Bahrein's rescue.

Bahrein's Shia were ruthlessly subdued. Some forty Shiite mosques were unceremoniously leveled to the ground. The protests for a voice in government by Bahrein's Shiite majority were crushed into silence. With the illuminating exceptions of Iraqi Shia and Hezbollah Shia, the rest of the Arab Mideast watched passively in virtually mute acquiescence.

Amidst all the Mideast chaos, it is only the dictatorial autocracies that are experiencing continuing and significant turmoil. Amidst all the upheaval, it is only the autocratic tyrants in Libya, Syria and Yemen whose regimes are now truly threatened by the Arab Spring.

Pointedly, the societal, demographic, governmental and political circumstances in each of these autocracies differ dramatically. One of the few commonalities of Libya, Syria and Yemen is that their citizens are dying while in pursuit of whatever it is that they are pursuing. And precisely what these diverse groups are seeking is not terribly clear.

Need it be said that dissent in the Arab monarchies has just been more ably suppressed and/or seduced into temporary quietude by flagrant bribes disguised as beneficent governmental largesse. So much for the Arab Spring.

What all this says about pan-Arab yearning for freedom and democracy remains hazy and uncertain. But, if the illusion of the Arab Spring teaches anything, it is that diversity, fragmentation, authoritarianism, anarchy and volatility remain staples of life in the Arab Mideast. That inescapable reality is no mirage.