Afghanistan Anguish

“We do know, of certain knowledge, that (Bin Laden) is either in Afghanistan or in some other country or dead.” Thus spoke Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Secretary of Defense who arrogantly asserted that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. As wrong as Rumsfeld was about Iraq, he was also equally uninformed about the whereabouts of Bin Laden and the nature of Afghanistan. That said, Afghanistan remains a confounding and confusing conundrum even to those who truly are in a position to be informed. General Stanley McCrystal, the commander of military operations in Afghanistan, is a prime case in point.

The good General has candidly admitted that affairs in Afghanistan are beclouded and beshrouded not only by Afghanistan’s rugged topography and its fractious demographics, but also by its societal organization, its culture, its religion, its government, its illiteracy, its history and by virtually every category through which one might seek to develop understanding. Indeed, General McCrystal has studiously bemoaned the fact that: “Every day I realize how little about Afghanistan I actually understand.”

Admittedly, that absence of transparency is truly not Afghanistan’s problem; rather, it is a demonstrable and virtually incomprehensible problem to and for Westerners. Generally speaking, Westerners, perhaps understandably –but inconveniently- have little awareness or cognition of the nature of daily life in southwest Asia, let alone of behavior patterns and practical affairs in Afghanistan. So, a cursory inspection into what Afghanistan is all about may be in order.

As one starting point to understanding Afghanistan, Westerners might well begin by retrojecting themselves several hundred years back into the state of affairs that once existed in the American West. That region was then wild, woolly and untamed. So is 21st century Afghanistan.

More pointedly, the American West was populated by diverse tribes of Indians (Apaches, Commanches, Sioux, Blackfoot, Cheyenne, Kiowa, Ojibwa, Pawnee and many others) who were -more often than not- at odds with and hostile to each other. While the analogy to American Indians may be facile and superficial, a not unsimilar state of affairs exists in modern Afghanistan. Indeed, one of the major hallmarks of Afghanistan is that it was, is and will foreseeably continue to be an ethnically diverse and distinctly tribal society.

Consider, if you will, that there are multiple ethnicities in Afghanistan, e.g. Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Pashtuns. The latter group alone boasts at least sixty different Pashtun tribes. These are, in turn, divided into some 400 sub-tribes or clans of Pashtuns. Each tribe and/or clan has its own predispositions and predilections. Many of the tribes, let alone different ethnic groups, are hostile to each other. Even many of the sub-tribal clans harbor an intense distaste for fellow tribesmen of a different clan. Indeed, a well-known anecdote concerning relations between the Meshud-Pashtuns and the Waziri-Pashtuns is revealing.

Thus, it is told about what would happen if member of the Meshud tribe walked into a room where he was confronted by a venomous snake and by an unarmed member of the Wazir tribe. In that situation, the Meshud tribesman would first kill the Waziri. Only then, would the Meshud kill the snake. The anecdote exposes the hostility that is not unexpected or even abnormal in Afghanistan’s tribal society.

In actual fact, the Meshuds consider the Waziris to be slow-witted and untrustworthy. The Waziris regard the Meshuds as vagabonds and cattle-rustlers. Yet, both the Meshuds and the Waziris are Pashtun tribesmen by birth. They both profess belief in Islam and both are arguably faithful to its practice. Indeed, Islam prohibits the very thievery which both project upon the other. Even a prominent lullaby chanted by Waziri mothers to their infant children intones the prayerful directive: “Be a thief and may Allah go with you.” As such, the unusual diversity, complexity and inexplicable contradictions of life in Afghanistan begin to emerge.

It is certainly true that each of Afghanistan’s distinctive ethnic groups and tribes subscribe to their own particular and often peculiar set of cultural mores and practices. But the Pashtun code of conduct is particularly critical and unusually illuminating. Pashtun society and daily living are governed by the Pashtun’s unique and comprehensive Code of Honor known as “Pashtunwali.”

The multiple elements of Pashtunwali are deeply engrained and inextricably embedded into the fabric of Pashtun society. Among the foremost features of Pastunwali are: self-respect, independence, hospitality and revenge. And let there be no mistake, Pastunwali arrogates unto itself unquestioned precedence over both dedication to Islam and allegiance to Afghan nationalism. Pastunwali is the mechanism that controls Pashtun society and makes the Pashtuns tick.

Simply put, the principles of Pashtunwali are and will presumably continue to be the dominant force in the lives, culture and identity of Afghanistan's 13.5 million Pashtuns. In fact,Pashtunwali demands that every Pashtun practice that code of behavior as a personal duty. Failure to adhere to the principles of Pashtunwali (de Pashtunwali perawano) leads wayward Pashtuns to becoming “durvand” i.e. non-Pashtun. That is not merely ethnically and tribally unacceptable, it constitutes ethnic and tribal heresy. It is worse than apostasy from Islam; it is significantly more severe than treason to the Afghan nation.

Being a Pashtun is substantially more critical to a Pashtun than being a Moslem. One’s identity as a Pashtun is a much more elevated and infinitely more prized status than one’s status as an Afghan national. For a country of some thirty-two million people, it is fearful folly to fail to understand the nature and role of the Pashtuns who comprise 42% of that nation’s population. Assuredly, Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic, diverse and disunited state. But its political center of gravity has always been and remains Pashtun.

That said, the insurgency center in Afghanistan is located in Helmand province. Helmand province is overwhelmingly Pashtun in population. Helmand province has a literacy rate of little more than 5% compared to a 30% literacy rate for the rest of Afghanistan. The Pashtuns are Sunni Moslems. They consider Afghanistan’s ethnic Hazaras, who constitute 9% of Afghan population and who are Shiite Moslems, to be damnable heretics and perverse pagans. Helmand province is arguably Afghanistan’s bloodiest province. It is also the unabashed stronghold of the Taliban.

Understanding that gives rise to the recognition that Afghanistan’s President is a Pashtun. Indeed, Hamid Karzai was elected (sic) President at the expense of Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. Not unexpectedly, Dr. Abdullah is not a Pashtun, but an ethnic Tajik. During the Taliban era, Dr. Abdullah was Foreign Minister of the Northern Alliance. That entity was Afghanistan’s officially recognized government. Notably, the Northern Alliance opposed the Taliban. Perhaps understandably then, Dr. Abdullah sometimes unconvincingly protests –for politically expedient reasons- that his father was a Pashtun.

More importantly, the current Afghan Defense Minister, Abdul Rahim Wardak, is a Pashtun. He proudly traces his lineage to tribal Pashtun chieftans. Mr. Wardak still conspiciously maintains strong Pashtun relationships. In the past, General Wardak was a Mujahadeen commander who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan. And now, in spite of his Pashtun upbringing, Defense Minister Wardak –somewhat unconvincingly- advocates a strong central Afghan government. That posture conveniently suits his personal proclivities; it is seemingly at diametric odds with his Pashtun predispositions.

Given all the foregoing, is it any wonder that understanding the dynamics of Afghanistan society is often an exercise in psychological exasperation, if not futility. Recent events in Afghanistan’s Korengal Valley illuminate this anguish.

In April 2010, a contingent of U.S. soldiers was airlifted out of the Korengal Valley in East Afghanistan. Because forty-two U.S. soldiers had died there during the next preceding twelve months, the region had been nicknamed “The Valley Of Death.”

Interestingly enough, only four thousand five hundred Afghanis live in the Korengal valley. Those people are known as Pashais. Their precise ethnic origin is unclear. They may be, but probably are not, Pashtun by lineage. But they do speak their own Pashto (Pashtun) dialect and they do practice their own unique brand of Sunni Islam.

What is important here is that the Pashtun-dominated Taliban government never really controlled the Pashais of the Korengal valley. And the people of that valley never became pro-Taliban. Quite the contrary. According to one local elder (Haji Nizamuddin), the Pashai people simply wanted to be left alone.

That was the state of affairs when U.S. forces arrived in the Korengal Valley in
2009. Regrettably, according to General McCrystal, instead of bringing stability to Korengal, the troops “largely proved to be an irritant to the people…and there was probably more fighting here than there would have been if U.S. troops had not come.”

In the final analysis, Afghanistan is infinitely more complex and confusing than most pundits, politicians and military planners are prepared to admit. Indeed, many –especially those who argue adamantly(pro and/or con)about the U.S. presence in Afghanistan- would do well to heed the admonition of General McCrystal. He cautioned: “If you do not understand the dynamics (of Afghanistan), you have no chance of getting it right!” That sounds like sage counsel. But who is listening, are they learning anything
and –if so- what?