Pakistani Paranoia And The Roots Of Duplicity

Sixty-four years ago Pakistan came into being. It
was carved –some say it was sliced- out of India.
Three years later, Hans Morgenthau (then Director
of the Centre For the Study Of American Foreign
Policy at the University of Chicago) adamantly
asserted that: “Pakistan is not a nation
and hardly a state. It has no justification,
ethnic origin, language, civilization or the
consciousness of those who make up its
population. They have no interest in common
except one: fear of Hindu domination.”

In 1950 Morgenthau was right. In 2011
Morgenthau’s assessment of Pakistan is still
correct. Precious little has changed in Pakistan.
Indeed, there are only two dramatic differences
between what Pakistan was in 1947 and what it is
now in 2011.

First and most worrisome, Pakistan is now a nuclear
nation. It claims the world’s fifth largest and
fastest growing nuclear arsenal. But Pakistan’s
nukes are a subject for another day. Still, those
nukes are uncomfortably related to the other
monumental change in Pakistan.

The second dramatic change in Pakistan is
its exploding population. There are now four
times as many Pakistanis as there were in 1947.
Pakistan has the world’s second fastest growing
population. Only Bangladesh, once part of Pakistan,
is growing faster.

But more importantly, the overarching common
interest of Pakistan's multiplying masses is still
the fear of Hindu domination. That fear is best
understood as pathological paranoia. It It is that
pervasive paranoia which is a prime reason for
Pakistani duplicity in foreign affairs.

But let’s start at Pakistan’s beginning. In 1947
Pakistan included Bangladesh. When the
latter –then known as East Pakistan – seceded in
1971, Pakistan felt betrayed by the distinct absence
of American support. But by that date, the seeds of
insecurity and duplicity had long since been planted.

A decade earlier, on May 1, 1960, Pakistan and
the U.S. had colluded by sending an American U-2
aircraft to spy on the U.S.S.R. Amidst much
fanfare, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
announced that the Soviets shot down that
aircraft and captured its pilot. The U.S.
denied that it had sent a spy plane. The U.S.
denied that the pilot, Gary Powers, was a
CIA agent. The U.S. affirmatively asserted that
a “weather plane” had "strayed" into Soviet
airspace and had crashed “due to oxygen problems.”

To its great embarrassment, the U.S. version of
that U-2 incident was soon exposed to the world
as a series of naked fabrications. Pakistan
learned about diplomatic disinformation and
duplicity from that incident. But what is little
known is that America’s U-2 spy plane actually
took off from a Pakistani air base near Peshawar.
In fact, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower had
previously received express permission from the
Pakistani Prime Minister authorizing such spy
flights from Pakistan.

So, five years later, when Pakistan went to war
withIndia, Pakistan could have reasonably
anticipated American support. Wrong. The United
States stayed neutral. Thus, the seeds of
insecurity and duplicity were implanted into
the Pakistani mentality.

Then, in the 1980s, Pakistan and the U.S.
cooperated to arm and train mujahideen to
fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. But when
America learned that Pakistan had developed
a successful nuclear capacity, the United
States responded with sanctions and cut off
economic assistance. The seeds of Pakistan’s
insecurity and duplicity were ripening.

Not incidentally, India had already successfully
tested a nuclear "device” in 1974. In direct
response to that disturbing disclosure,
Pakistan’s then Prime Minister,Ali Bhutto,
asserted that Pakistan must develop its own
"Islamic bomb." As such, Pakistani paranoia
with India was further exacerbated when
Pakistan's perceived security was imperiled
by a "Hindu bomb."

Time passed. When America entered Afghanistan
to root out al-Qaeda after 9/11, Pakistan
appeared willing to aid U.S. efforts. America
needed Pakistani supply routes. It got them.
America needed to attack terrorist sanctuaries
in Pakistan's tribal areas. Pakistan tacitly
consented. But Pakistan was not pleased with
the infringement on its territorial
sovereignty. This circumstance has further
fertilized the seeds of Pakistani insecurity
and diplomatic duplicity.

At the very same time that Pakistan was
seemingly supporting American objectives
in Afghanistan, Pakistan was also providing
aid and support to the Taliban. That was hardly
news to the Americans. Indeed, the Taliban –to
the extent that such a monolithic entity
exists- is predominantly comprised of ethnic
Pashtuns. There are eleven million Pashtuns
in Afghanistan. But there are also
thirty-two million Pashtuns living right
across the border in Pakistan.

The Pashtuns are tribal brothers. The
arbitrary border aka The Durand Line)
between Pakistan and Afghanistan is a
diplomatic fiasco to the Pashtuns. More
pointedly, Afghanistan has never
recognized the validity of the border with
Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan and Afghanistan
almost went to war in the 1950s over the
Pashtun desire for the creation of an
independent Pashtunistan. That proposed
entity would have comprised half of
Afghanistan plus much of western Pakistan.
Pakistan's territorial integrity was
again imperiled.

Considering that scenario combined with
the omnipresence of the Pashtun/Taliban in
that region, Pakistani cooperation with
the Taliban was almost a given. As such,
Pakistan currently provides succor to
the Haqqani network, a Pakistani-based
and al-Qaeda affilliated fighting force
of Pashtun/Taliban that targets the U.S.
military in Afghanistan.

Not unexpectedly, the Haqqani network has
been quite immune from attack by the
Pakistani military. It is, therefore, not
only conceivable, but also quite probable
that the whereabouts of Mullah Omar are
hidden in a web of Pakistani connivance.
So, the seeds of Pakistani duplicity
continue to ripen.

All this returns us to Pakistan’s fear
of Hindu domination and paranoia about India.
As a by-product of Pakistan's pathology,
both India and Pakistan have abundant reason
to cultivate relations with Afghanistan. The
Pakistani tie with the Afghani Pashtuns is
a familial bond of Pashtun brotherhood.
That bond is combined with Pakistan's need
for strategic depth in Afghanistan
as a defense to a future confrontation with India.

But India is all too cognizant of Pakistan's
paranoia about Hindu domination. As a result,
India has consciously crafted a policy
calculated to encircle Pakistan via a plethora
of Indian enterprises throughout Afghanistan.
These enterprises are designed to ingratiate
India with Afghanistan. India’s sole purpose
is to deprive Pakistan of the strategic depth
which it deems absolutely criticalto its survival.

To Pakistan’s chagrin, India’s endeavors in
Afghanistan have been conspicuously fruitful.
This success prompted Pakistan to dispatch a
fifty-six page document to the U.S. urging the
Americans to get India out of Afghanistan.

India's successes in Afghanistan also prompted
General Stanley McCrystal, then the U.S.
commander in Afghanistan, to author a sixty-six
page report to the U.S. administration. In that
2010 report, McCrystal asserted that:
"Unbridled Indian interference is pushing the
chaos in Afghanistan to the point of being
intractable." Premises considered,
Pakistan has ample reason to fear encirclement
by its arch enemy. In the process, Pakistani
paranoia has been further fueled.

Additionally, Pakistan knows that India has
actually reached a formal understanding with Iran
about Pakistan. Iran agreed that if and when
Pakistan ever attacks India, then India -by treaty-
can use Iranian territory to flank Pakistan, enter
Afghanistan via Iran and thence proceed on to
Islamabad. The result is enhanced Pakistani
insecurity and heightened paranoia.

To rub salt in the wounds of Pakistani
insecurity, the United States surreptitiously
(but with abundant justification) flaunted
Pakistani territorial sovereignty to get Bin
Laden. At the same time, the Pakistanis
correctly perceive that the United States has
been and is cozying up to India. The impact
of these circumstances is foreseeable. Pakistan
will become more paranoid about India and
even more duplicitous in its relations
with America.

So, a critical question looms. Will Pakistan,
the Islamic nation afflicted by the world’s worst
case of paranoia and owner of the world’s worst
record on nuclear proliferation, deteriorate into
a rogue, nuclear-armed, jihadist state?

Was Pakistan Complicit Or Incompetent?

In the aftermath Bin Laden's dramatic death
in Pakistan, several critical questions beg for
answers. First, was Pakistan contumaciously
complicit in harboring Bin Laden? Second,
is the Pakistani government really that incompetent?

A unqualified answer to the above is elusive.
Definitive answers presuppose incontrovertible
evidence. Pointedly, accurate assessments in
geopolitical matters -most decidedly in
Pakistan- are shrouded in complexities, befogged
by irreconcilable contradictions and distorted
by disinformation.

But it is essential to recognize that covert
agencies deliberately obfuscate how they get
intelligence. Of necessity, they beshroud
operational specifics. They distort and camouflage
facts. This misdirects and misleads attentive
enemies. This approach confuses arm-chair
strategists and beclouds their understanding.
This accounts for the proliferation of conflicting
information surrounding the Bin Laden escapade in Pakistan.

That said, even absent smoking-gun evidence,
circumstantial considerations can provide abundant
illumination. It is not rocket science to extrapolate
from known facts to reach compelling conclusions.
Assuredly, there is a great deal that is abundantly
clear about a wide range of illuminating
circumstances in Pakistan.

Let's begin at the beginning. Pakistan was
created in 1947. It was carved out of India
with the express intent of creating a Moslem
nation. In fact, Pakistan is the only such
nation ever created with that express international
intent. At the same time, Pakistan was to become a
democratic republic.

Some sixty-four years later, Pakistan is a
decidedly Moslem nation which seems to be
drifting to an assertive Islamic nationalism.
As for Pakistani democracy, never in its six
decades of existence has a civilian Pakistani
government successfully served out its full
term in office. These two facts form and
inform the crux of existential life in
Pakistan. Indeed, a proper understanding
of Pakistan must discern what daily life in
Pakistan truly is all about.

Pakistan, a nation twice the size of California,
is divided by region, segregated by ethnicity,
fractured by languages, beset by religious
dissension and muddied by political dysfunction.
It is a nation whose 180 million citizens number
four times those who were there when Pakistan
was created. More importantly, Pakistan’s
population is exploding. By 2050 it will host
335 million people. As such, the realities
besetting Pakistan’s population are a
prime source for insight into that nation.
Pakistan’s realities illuminate the basis for
widespread incompetence, but also suggest
considerations that argue for complicity.

Initially, 42% of Pakistanis are under age
fourteen. That makes for a massive populace that
is impressionable, malleable and volatile. Add to
this the fact that one of every two Pakistanis is
illiterate. But why is this so since the Pakistani
Constitution promises free elementary education to all?

The short answer is that free education in Pakistan
is constitutionally subject to available resources.
Indeed, less than one percent of Pakistani GDP is
allocated to education. As a result, 78% of
Pakistani schools have no electricity, 60% have
no toilets, 40% have no running water, one of
four teachers simply do not show up for work
each day, only one of five citizens ever attended
secondary school and half of the people in
Pakistan over age ten have never attended any
school. Such deplorable educational circumstances
predispose Pakistan to ineptitude.

That state of affairs is compounded by a
linguistically fractured society that speaks sixty
different languages. And yet, Urdu, Pakistan’s
national language, is the mother tongue of only
8% of Pakistanis. Urdu is the second language
of the literate few, but Urdu is quite unspoken by
most Pakistanis. How does one competently run
such a country?

How Pakistan is run presents yet another insight
into whether Pakistan was complicit or simply
incompetent. Pakistan has seventeen political
parties. But Pakistan has only 34 million voters
(less than one fifth of the population).
Moreover, Pakistan’s civilian government is
widely regarded as unusually incapable, widely
incompetent, generally dysfunctional and
pervasively corrupt. Understanding these
operational liabilities, after Pakistan’s
disastrous flooding last year, the government
felt compelled to issue humiliating assurances
that donations for flood relief would not
be stolen. Utter incompetence abounds.

Add to the foregoing the fact that Pakistan
was one of only three governments that formally
recognized the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan.
The other two were Myanmar and Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan’s Sunni soul-mate. Given that
redoubtable association, complicity was
almost predictable.

That said, two final matters directly relate
to considerations of complicity in the Bin Laden
affair. These are the role of Islam in Pakistan
and the status of the Pakistani military.

Islam is the state religion in Pakistan.
Ninety-five percent of Pakistanis are Moslem.
Pakistan should be a homogenous and harmonious
society, but it is not. Why? Theoretically,
every Pakistani is free to practice, profess
and propagate his/her own religion. But that
theory is trumped by a Constitutional provision
that allows reasonable restrictions on free
speech for “the glory of Islam.” In practice,
the masthead of Pakistan’s Ministry Of
Religious Affairs instructively asserts:
“Islam is the only religion acceptable to God.”

But Islam is not monolithic. Seventy-five
percent of Pakistanis are Sunni. Many Sunnis
consider their Shiite co-religionists to be
apostates and/or idolators. The festering
Sunni dislike of Pakistan’s Shia populace
periodically erupts into murderous violence.
But both the Sunni and the Shia spurn
Pakistan’s Ahmadi Moslems.

In fact, virulent legislative antipathy to
Pakistan’s Ahmadis precludes them from even
calling themselves Moslems, from quoting the
Quran or from using the traditional Moslem
call to prayer. On the other hand, Pakistan’s
government is predisposed to favor almost
anything that is Sunni. However simplistic,
it must be remembered that Bin Laden’s
ideology arose from his passionate Sunni
beliefs. Here again, Pakistan’s propensity
to complicity raises its ugly head.

Which leads us to the Pakistani military.
Pakistan’s army is the world’s sixth largest
fighting force. It has directly ruled Pakistan
for half of that nation’s history. Pakistan’s
military receives one-third of Pakistan’s
budget. Indeed, it is said that whereas nation
states have armies, the Pakistani army has a
state. But the Pakistani army also has nukes.
In fact,it has a quite substantial nuclear
arsenal. That argues for competence.

Furthermore, it is widely accepted that the
most powerful man in Pakistan is not President
Zadari, but rather the head of Pakistan’s
military, General Asfaq Kayani. He is known
to be contemptuous of India, contentious and
quitecompetent. If something is going on in
Pakistan, he and/or the ISI (Pakistani
intelligence) presumably know about it.
From this perspective, Pakistani complicity
seems totrump its widespread incompetence.

One final thought. For years it was assumed
that Bin Laden was holed up in Pakistan’s
untamed tribal areas which are adjacent to
Afghanistan. No government has ever exerted
substantial control there. But Bin Laden was
not reduced to a cave-like existence in
North or South Waziristan. He was hiding
in plain sight virtually next door to a
Pakistani military installation. How could
that be? Was Pakistan complicit or simply
that incompetent?

In response, an aphorism from Pakistan’s
wild Waziristan may be illuminating. It
recounts what would happen if a Mesud
tribesman were to enter a room where
he saw a Wazir tribesman and a venomous
snake. The aphorism asserts that the Mesud
would first kill the Waziri and only then
would he slay the snake. Bin Laden was
neither a Mesud nor a Waziri. He was a Saudi
and a Sunni. Until two weeks ago, he was
an unmolested viper ensconced in a
substantially more-than-modest Pakistani
country house. Absent Pakistani action, U.S.
Seals entered the house and killed the snake.

So, was Pakistan complicit, incompetent or both?
You now have the facts. You be the judge.