The Arab Spring?

The Arab Spring is a mirage. It appeared seemingly out of nowhere. It is now evaporating into the always shifting political sands of the Arab Mideast.

That said, aspects of The Arab Spring are crystal clear. The Arab Spring is not simply a myth; it is an illusion. The Arab Spring has no singular direction. The Arab Spring has no defining vision. The Arab Spring has no cohesion. The Arab Spring has virtually no pan-Arab collegiality. The Arab
Spring has a dirth of pervasive purpose. In fact, the entire Arab Mideast reflects an decided absence of uniformity. But if that is news, it should not be. The Arab Spring is a figment of the West's fervid imagination.

But even crystal clarity about the myth of the Arab Spring cannot dispel that term's captivating imagery. Regrettably, the notion of The Arab Spring was foisted upon the world by pundits whose familiarity with the Mideast is suspect.

Alternatively stated, Mideast cognoscenti have long been fully aware that the Arab Mideast is -and has long been- fractured, fragmented and fissured. Nothing in the alleged Arab Spring has altered that condition. Indeed,
the so-called Arab Spring has only exposed the ruptures, hacked away at the perpetual splinters and confirmed the critical cracks that traditionally roil the Arab Mideast.

It has been argued -sometimes vociferously- that the Arab Spring was/is an outburst of yearning by disaffected masses of Arabs for dignity, freedom and democracy. Perhaps. It has been suggested that the protests and demonstrations were/are the beginnings of a political tsunami which would bring a wave of new life, enhanced liberty and a broader capacity to pursue happiness by and for the Arab masses. Wrong, at least so far.

Yes, there have been multiple demonstrations and prodigious protests. But demonstrations and protests are not synonymous with substantive revolts. Yes, there have been revolts, but revolts are not necessarily revolutions. Yes, there have been what appear to be revolutions, but these have not yet produced widespread regime change. And where there has been regime change, there has not been demonstrable change in the actual control and management of governmental affairs. Furthermore, even where there has been regime change (Tunisia and Egypt), there has been not been a headlong rush to democratic reform by the powers that be.

On the other hand, it is abundantly clear that there are substantive threads that weave their way through the Mideast turmoil. These threads include a broad disaffection with brazen corruption, a pervasive disenchantment with economic exclusion by privileged elites and a widespread alienation of the woefully unemployed Arab youth. These matters are hugely important; they should not be lightly dismissed.

But, contrary to wishful thinking in the West, a pervasive hunger for democracy is barely distinguishable in the above threads. That is understandable. The Arab Spring -such as it is- is not really about democracy. To a great extent, the Mideast tumult is about the ardent desire by widely divergent and disparate Arab populaces to get a fair shake and to get their fair share in life. Pointedly, for the exploding numbers of Arab youth (whose unemployment level is incredibly high), a slice of the bread of prosperity takes clear precedence over a ringside seat at the circus of democracy.

Perhaps it is best to cite chapter and verse. Egypt, the Arab Mideast's most populous nation, is the prime case in point. Cairo's Tahrir Square experienced large and protracted demonstrations. Masses of Egyptians clamored for regime change. So the Egyptian military forced President Mubarak out of office.

The Egyptian military also got rid Gamal Mubarak and his fiscally predatory cronies, thirty-nine of whom became billionaires. But now that the dust surrounding the Egyptian Spring is settling, it seems clear that what the Egyptians got was not regime change. Instead, the Egyptians acquired a barely disguised preservation of the status quo by the same military men who once served and then rejected Mubarak.

Yes, Hosni Mubarak and Gamal Mubarak are gone; but the High Council of Egypt's Armed Forces is still in firm control. The Egyptian state bureaucracy is still managing the store. The Egyptian National Police are still operating what has been characterized as a "nationwide protection racket." Egypt's college graduates are still ten times less likely to have a job than the Egyptian masses who hold rudimentary educations. Egypt's per capita income is still about two and a half times less than in neighboring Libya. And don't think that the Egyptians don't recognize that Saudi citizens right across the Red Sea still earn about four times more than does the average Egyptian.

So, yes, the Egyptians got rid of an autocratic tyrant, but that does not mean that much more has changed, at least not yet. All of which leads us back to the rest of the Arab Mideast and the mythical Arab Spring.

Amidst all the Arab unrest, not one Arab monarchy has fallen. Only one Arab royal house has been seriously challenged. That sole unique exception is Bahrein's tiny Emirate whose population is one hundred times smaller than that of Egypt. Premises considered, Bahrein's neighboring Saudi monarchy rushed headlong to Bahrein's rescue.

Bahrein's Shia were ruthlessly subdued. Some forty Shiite mosques were unceremoniously leveled to the ground. The protests for a voice in government by Bahrein's Shiite majority were crushed into silence. With the illuminating exceptions of Iraqi Shia and Hezbollah Shia, the rest of the Arab Mideast watched passively in virtually mute acquiescence.

Amidst all the Mideast chaos, it is only the dictatorial autocracies that are experiencing continuing and significant turmoil. Amidst all the upheaval, it is only the autocratic tyrants in Libya, Syria and Yemen whose regimes are now truly threatened by the Arab Spring.

Pointedly, the societal, demographic, governmental and political circumstances in each of these autocracies differ dramatically. One of the few commonalities of Libya, Syria and Yemen is that their citizens are dying while in pursuit of whatever it is that they are pursuing. And precisely what these diverse groups are seeking is not terribly clear.

Need it be said that dissent in the Arab monarchies has just been more ably suppressed and/or seduced into temporary quietude by flagrant bribes disguised as beneficent governmental largesse. So much for the Arab Spring.

What all this says about pan-Arab yearning for freedom and democracy remains hazy and uncertain. But, if the illusion of the Arab Spring teaches anything, it is that diversity, fragmentation, authoritarianism, anarchy and volatility remain staples of life in the Arab Mideast. That inescapable reality is no mirage.

Unveiling The Arab Mideast

"The enemy of my enemy is my friend" (adoo
adoowee sadeechee). So goes a well-known
Arabic aphorism. In fact, said aphorism is
so well-known outside Arab circles precisely
because it aptly reflects the omnipresent
Arab reality to which it refers.

Depending upon where one is located (both
geographically and existentially) in the
Arab Mideast, one’s enemy may well be the
Sunni tribes around Benghazi, or the al-Houthi
tribe/Zaidi Shiite sect in north Yemen, or
the Ismaili sect and Shiite tribes in
southeast Saudi Arabia, or the substantial
Shia majority on the island of Bahrein, or
the minority Shiite community in Syria, or
the Sunni Palestinians(Hamas and Islamic
Jihad)in Gaza, or the Shiite Hezbollah in
Lebanon and many others who should - by
all reasonable and logical considerations-
actually be friends, but who often are
horribly hateful enemies.

Indeed, affairs in the Mideast are seldom
reasonable or logical. Clearly, Colonel
Qadaffi -long ago labeled "The Mad Dog of
the Mideast"- has no monopoly on irrationality,
instability or seeming madness.

More pointedly, all the potential friends
(aka enemies)in the Mideast are ethnic Arabs
most of whom seem pay at least verbal
obeisance to Allah. Yet, they ubiquitously
somehow manage to dislike each other with
an intensity that flies in the face of and
belies their uniquely pervasive commonality
of ethnicity, language, religion and mentality.

Simply stated, the Mideast has long been
peopled by a fractured and fragmented populace
that is both superficially united, but
desperately divided by their common Semitic
ethnicity, their Arabic language, their Islamic
religion and their ubiquitous Levantine mentality.

What is a Levantine mentality? That is unusually
difficult to define. But it is arguably comparable
to a legally scurrilous definition of pornography,
i.e. you know it when you see it or hear it or
witness it. That said, a Levantine mentality is a
predisposition to think and/or function in a
pattern that may be exemplified by the customary
path to power in the Mideast.

Consider that since 1995 nine long-time Mideast
monarchs/autocrats have died. Each of them ruled
for lenghty periods. Some ruled for decades. Six
of the deceased rulers were succeeded by their
sons. The seventh ruler was replaced by his
brother and the eigth ruler was followed by his
half-brother. Only one long-time ruling autocrat
who died since 1995 (Yassir Arafat) was not
replaced by a member of his immediate family.
Not incidentally, no deceased Mideast ruler
was replaced by a woman. As fate would have it,
the ninth ruler was Arafat and he only had
a daughter.

In this current year of 2011, four rulers have
either been ousted or are facing increasing
threats to their power. Three of these (Mubarak,
Saleh and Qaddafi) were grooming a son to follow
in their respective footsteps. In Tunisia, the
ousted President's presumptive heir-in-waiting
was the President's son-in-law.

That this pattern is currently under pervasive
attack across the length and breadth of the Mideast
is simply a testament to the prevailing atmosphere
in the Levant and its existing dynamics.

The seeming similarities of public protest,
popular unrest and common cries for reform
are as different and disparate as are the
dissenters and the regimes they seek to
change.

But then this is precisely the nature of the
Mideast. Despite its pervasive commonalties,
the Mideast has always been complex, confusing,
contradictory andcapricious. The Mideast was
and is impulsive, erratic and volatile. And that
pattern is expressly why the aforesaid Arabic
aphorism encapsulates the very essence of the
Arab Mideast.

Considering the current unrest and outright
rebellion in the Mideast, it is well to remember
that the difference between enemies and friends
is no thicker and no thinner than the blood of
those who share the identical ethnic DNA, speak
the same language, profess the identical
religion and operate within the parameters of
a pervasive mentality.

And that is assuredly why “the enemy of
my enemy….” flows so mellifluously, so
glibly and so ominously from the lips of so
many in the Arab Mideast.