The Brewing Mideast Storm

Tehran had an early snow last week. This past week the I.A.E.A. issued a stormy report about Iran’s nuclear intentions. Last week Israeli hawks fretted about a possible flight to chill Iran’s nuke program. At the same time, Russia was frosty about enhanced Security Council sanctions against Iran. Meanwhile, the Arab League suspended Syria because it continued to rain bullets on dissidents. The geopolitical weather in the Mideast last week was rotten. Even the future forecast is dismal.

Actually, unsettled conditions seem to be the norm in the always fractured and fractious Mideast. The continuing turbulence in Syria combined with Iran’s legendary duplicity suggests that a geopolitical storm may be brewing.

Consider that Iran and Syria have been allies for the past thirty years. In fact, the Iranian-born Lebanese Shiite cleric Musa Sadr provided religious legitimacy to the Assad regime. In a 1973 Fatwa, Sadr declared that Syria’s ruling Alawites are Shiites. Sadr also acted as liaison between Hafez al-Assad and Khomeini's aides before the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Indeed, the relationship between Iran and Syria is a marriage of convenience that has repeatedly satisfied both parties’ diplomatic needs. And that is the crux of an incipient problem for the region.

Long before the current situation in Syria, Iran aided and abetted the Syrian regime. It served Iranian objectives to foster Syria’s meddling in Lebanon, to encourage Syria’s less-than-furtive flirtation with Hezbollah and to goad Syria’s insidious assignation with Hamas.

In so doing, Iran covertly exploits its overtly explicit anti-Israel and anti-West agenda. By collaborating with the Assad regime, Iran seeks to extend its strategically significant influence across the arc of the Mideast all the way to the Mediterranean .

By continually enabling the Assad regime, Iran is betting that Assad –if he somehow survives Syria’s Arab spring- will be even more eager to accommodate Iranian aspirations to be the regional hegemon. That is a craving deeply rooted in the Iranian psyche.

It also seems clear that Iranian aspirations have been newly enhanced in Iraq, which –not incidentally- borders both Syria and Iran. The recently announced U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq presents a power vacuum which Iran is eager to fill.

The current Iraqi government is dominated by Shia leaders. They have a decided affinity with the Iranian Shia. The latter are sufficiently astute to have studiously cultivated relations with Syria’s ruling Alawites who are Shia. It is also noteworthy that the three Arab League nations that did not vote to suspend Syria's membership (Iraq, Lebanon & Yemen) all have politically vocal Shiite populations.

That said, America’s apparent loss of influence in Iraq combined with an Assad win in Syria could dramatically alter the balance of power in the Mideast. The geopolitical map could then reflect a swath of Iranian sway that extends from the Persian Gulf across Iraq and Syria into Lebanon and then down into the Gaza strip.

Not coincidentally, this scenario –at least theoretically- places Iran on the borders of Israel. Of course, it can be argued that, by dint of existential circumstances, Iran is already there. Still, Iran’s position will be immeasurably enhanced assuming that the Assad regime outlasts Syria’s soggy Arab Spring.

On the other hand, Assad's downfall would deal a distinct blow to Iran's broad diplomatic machinations. As such, Iran is watching the Syrian spring with bated breath. But others –with equally bated breath- are also watching.

Turkey, which not so long ago was attempting to broker a peace between Syria and Israel, has all but severed relations with both the Assad regime and with Israel. Of course, Turkey has its own self-serving agenda. It wants to be the region’s top dog.

It is in Turkey’s bests interests to disrupt any scenario that might elevate Iran’s claim to hegemony. As such, Turkey has abruptly sided with Syria's Sunni dissidents. It is not that the Turks like Syria’s dissidents so much more than Assad, it is just that they dislike the Iranians with much greater intensity. Furthermore, ingratiating itself with the Arab Spring also serves to enhance Turkey’s aspirations to regional leadership.

Pointedly, both the Turks and the Iranians are Moslems. But the Turks are Sunnis whereas the Iranians are Shiites. The long-festering animosity between these Islamic sects is palpable. Furthermore, there is no love lost between ethnic Turks and ethnic Persians. Need it also be said that neither the Turks nor the Iranians are Arabs. Complicating matters, the Turks and the Iranians not particularly fond of the Arabs and vice versa. So the plot thickens.

The Saudis are Arabs. The Saudis are Sunni. The Saudis absolutely abhor the ruling Syrian Alawites who are Shiites. The Saudis say the Syrian Alawites are apostates, polytheists and pagans. Conversely, the Syrian Alawites disparage the Saudis for their “Bedouin thinking” and extreme fundamentalist Sunni (Wahabi) beliefs. But the Saudis also look with equally derisive contempt at the Iranians and at the repugnant possibility of a Shiite crescent across the Mideast.

That leaves us with the Israelis. They are not ethnic Persians or ethnic Turks. The Israelis are ethnic Semites. So are the Arabs. Most Arabs are Sunni Moslems. With exceptions, Israelis are not Moslems. That said, the Israelis have no love lost for Assad, an Alawite/Shiite Moslem. But neither are the Israelis sanguine about the possibility of seeing Assad replaced by a fundamentalist Sunni Moslem regime.

Both the Iranians and the Turks want to rule the Mideast roost. That prospect is exquisitely distasteful to the Saudis. The Israelis have their hands full detaching themselves from the Palestinians. But like the Saudis and the Turks, the Israelis are justifiably apprehensive about the possibility of a Shiite/Iranian crescent overspreading the Mideast.

All of which may breathe renewed relevance into that caustic Arabic adage: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend!”

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