North Korea Has Juche!

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) may be the world’s most egregious nuclear proliferator, most flagrant WMD prevaricator, most Machavellian nuclear negotiator and most provocative missile manufacturer. These circumstances may well be a direct outgrowth of No. Korea’s cornerstone ideology known as Juche. That doctrine (promulgated in 1956 by No. Korea’s eternal president, Kim Il Song) advocates the relentless pursuit of self-reliance. That concept, enshrined in Article III of the DPRK Constitution, was and is the guiding principle of all No. Korean workers. And yet, Juche has never been achieved by the DPRK, except in the sphere of nuclear and missile development.

Indeed, when No. Korea first established a missile research facility at Hamhung in 1965, few nations paid much attention. When No. Korea acq uired the Russian FROG missile system in 1967, that event went largely unnoticed. When No. Korea began reverse engineering more advanced Russian missile systems, the West was already hamstrung by its own geopolitical ineptitude. When No. Korea initiated a multi-faceted ballistic missile program to counter So. Korea’s White Bear (Paethon) program, the West watched helplessly. When the DPRK signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, the West was a bit beguiled, but mostly befogged. And when, in 1992, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Association) discovered that No. Korea was diverting plutonium for its nuclear program, U.N. sanctions had no pronounced effect.

So, when No. Korea announced (in 1993) its intentions to withdraw from the NPT, that withdrawal was averted only by the 1994 signing of The Agreed Framework between the United States and No. Korea. The Agreed Framework specified that the DPRK would freeze its illicit plutonium production in exchange for two proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors plus the receipt by the DPRK of one-half million tons of heavy fuel oil. Not unexpectedly, the DPRK received its fuel, but observed its agreement in the breach.

That said, in 1998, the DPRK launched its long-range Taepodong 1 missile with the purported intent of placing a small satellite into orbit. That launch over Japan was deemed to be provocative. But life on the North Korean peninsula proceeded apace without measurable impact from the world’s vocal disapproval.

When No. Korea began enriching uranium in an effort to produce an atomic bomb, the West blustered and threatened, but did little else of consequence. By 2002, the United States had labeled No. Korea as a charter member of The Axis of Evil.

So, it was no surprise when the DPRK expelled IAEA inspectors in 2003. This led to the initiation of the so-called Six Party Talks. That characterization was unusually apt. Six years later, the parties are still talking, albeit with disquieting infrequency and associated duplicity. It must assuredly be observed that each of the other five parties possesses its own self-interested agenda with reference to No. Korea. More pointedly, the positions and postures of the parties are often diametrically at odds with each other. North Korean negotiators are undoubtedly bemused by that recurring diplomatic spectacle.

In due course, the DPRK (in 2006) saw fit to launch its Taepodong 2 long-range missile. Its alleged purpose was to place a small satellite into orbit. That missile launch was also deemed to be a provocative act. But the world’s ensuing bluster had no quantifiable effect. And when No. Korea finally exploded an atomic device in late 2006, it did so with substantial impunity.

In the meantime, No. Korea has been an unenthusiastic, but cleverly calculating, participant in at least six rounds of essentially futile Six-Party Talks. Still, by early 2008, it superficially appeared that the Six Party negotiations (involving China, Russia, Japan, So. Korea, the United States and North Korea) were finally yielding some positive results. Yes, No. Korea had agree d to not only dismantle, but also to disable its nuclear program. Yes, No. Korea had agreed to disclose the sites of nuclear activity. But yes, No. Korea had once again snookered the West into providing more heavy fuel oil. This time the fuel oil was to be in an amount double that specified by the 1994 Agreed Framework.

So, as was eminently foreseeable based upon No. Korea’s prior behavior patterns, the Six Party Talks have now floundered and all-but fallen apart. The reasons for this have long been readily apparent, except to Chief U.S. negotiator Chris Hill, who (in early 2008) effusively proclaimed substantive progress because there were “lots of details; very useful.”

Initially, the parties agreed that No. Korea would dismantle and disable its nuclear program “as quickly as possible.” That phraseology was eerily reminiscent of the U.S. Supreme Court decision that required race desegregation “with all deliberate speed.” And everyone knows what that meant.

More importantly, the 2008 Six Party Agreement was plagued by an absurd and deafening silence on numerous critical issues. Pointedly, there was no requirement for No. Korea to destroy its existing nuclear arsenal; there were no details concerning how the Yongbyon reactor was to be disabled; there was no timetable for reporting the existence or status of nuclear materials; there was absolutely no discussion concerning the fact that No. Korea’s missile program would remain intact. There was, however, a clear mandate for the U.S. to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK plus the guarantee that the U.S. would remove No. Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Even at the date of this last Agreement, it was all to clear that these arrangements were an exercise in diplomatic double-speak. That Agreement purposely deflected attention from unresolved issues, it masked realities, it obscured critical concerns and it beshrouded the plain truth in diplomatic circumlocution.

It was, therefore, eminently foreseeable that No. Korea would sooner or later –in the face and in spite of widespread international opprobrium- launch yet another long-range ICBM over Japan and eastward across the Pacific toward the USA. It did so on April 5, 2009. And once again, No. Korea claimed that it was merely seeking to place a satellite into orbit. In response, the Obama Administration is stridently seeking strong Security Council resolutions. But any resulting sanctions –due to Chinese and Russian predispositions on North Korea- are likely to be void, vacuous and vacant of substance and/or substantially unenforceable. Of course, North Korea fully understands, calculates and depends upon these repeated international exercises in diplomatic futility.

Premises considered, it is likely that No. Korea will ultimately return to the six party negotiating table with a renewed set of demands. For No. Korea, this has become an almost seamless process. Indeed, while No. Korea remains one of the poorest and least self-reliant nations on earth (especially regarding food and fuel), it has also displayed unusual diplomatic perspicacity in pursuit of its goals. So, perhaps the No. Koreans really do have a lot of Juche, at least in sphere of geopolitical know-how. It certainly seems that No. Korea has developed a uniquely successful and productive formula for diplomatic self-reliance.

One can only hope that the Iranians (with their nuclear aspirations) are not learning from the lessons being so diligently taught by No. Korea. If No. Korea can continually squeeze more Juche from its diplomatic pouch, then Iran certainly has abundant wherewithal to replace the nationalistic Juche the once flowed so freely under Cyrus The Great during the awesome Persian Empire.