The Soggy Syrian Spring

While paying my bill at a restaurant on the outskirts of Damascus, I noticed a picture hanging above that establishment’s portals. The picture depicted President Bashir al-Assad and deceased President Hafez al-Assad with Hezzbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah.

“Why,” I questioned the proprietor, “are the Assads pictured with Nasrallah?” Without hesitation, the proprietor answered in Arabic: “Adoo adoowe sadeechee” (the enemy of my enemy is my friend)! Then, he conspiratorially winked at me and closed his cash register.

That exchange occurred just a few years ago. Back then Syria was generally calm, its populace was seemingly serene and the Assad regime was in firm control. In fact, the overwhelming atmosphere in Damascus, the world’s oldest continuously inhabited city, was unusually welcoming. The widespread attitude throughout that nation was clearly upbeat. The sudden advent of the Arab Spring changed all that.

Well, not exactly. As it happens, Syria has always been a confounding, sectarian labyrinth of disparate ethnicities, divergent religious persuasions and differing loyalties. Indeed, Syria’s twenty-two million citizens include Sunnis, Shiites, Alawites, Orthodox Christians, Kurds, Druse, Circassians, Armenians, Turkmen, a smattering of Jews and others.

To a remarkable extent, these strikingly different groups have coexisted in relative communal quietude. Indeed, Syria could justifiably boast that its populace was unusually blessed with religious freedom, pluralism and broad cultural diversity.

Of course, all the above operated on Syria’s societal surface. Still, Syrian society seemed to function reasonably well. Regrettably, that is a relatively superficial view of those uninitiated in the subtleties of the Mideast. Beneath the surface a seething cauldron of unrest, dissent and disquiet quietly stewed. It all boiled over into the Arab Spring. Why?

One answer is the Syria has also always been that region’s most combustible geopolitical flashpoint. Syria sits precisely at a strategic crossroads of the world. It has –seemingly forever- been the battlefield of expanding empires. It has been overrun, occupied and/or ruled by the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Moslems, the Crusaders, the Egyptians, the Ottomans and even the French. This circumstance blessed the region with a magnificent cultural diversity; it also cursed Syria in that it rarely ruled itself.

The bottom line resulting from repeated foreign rule was that Syria failed to develop as a true national entity. Syria became a region where loyalty remained remarkably local. It became a society in which citizens still identify much more closely with their cities, their extended families, their ethnicities and their religious sects than with their national government.

This situation ultimately fostered a minority mentality among the populace. No group was strong enough to exert its sway on the national scene. Many entities were –consciously and/or subconsciously- suspicious of other groups. No one group had sufficient influence or power to create or sustain a national consensus. And none did. Even after gaining independence in 1946, Syria was continually rocked by military coup after military coup. Then, in 1971, the Assad family seized (and I mean “seized”) control.

Hafez al-Assad ruled ruthlessly for almost three decades. It was on his watch that the single deadliest act by any Arab government against its people in the modern Mideast was perpetrated. That massacre was at the Syrian city of Hama in 1982 when 15,000 Sunni members of the Muslim Brotherhood were slaughtered. The Assad family had and has zero tolerance for political dissent.

That Hama is now again in the news and reaping reprisals for its political dissent only illustrates that Bashir al-Assad views his father as a clear role model. Is it then any wonder that Assad, the son, is now irreverently referred to as “The Butcher of Damascus?” Those who pinned hopes on his leadership could have been more perspicacious.

In 2000 Bashir al-Assad gave up life as a British ophthalmologist to become President of Syria. He was 34 years old. His brother Basil, thought to be his father's preferred heir, had died in a car accident. The Syrians were enamored with Bashir’s youthful appearance, his pleasant disposition and his seemingly open-minded demeanor. Still, they forgot the consequential import of the expression: “Like father like son.” Assad, the son, fit nicely into the dictatorial and autocratic shoes of Assad, the father.

Premises considered, is it any wonder that Syrian citizens have also been seduced by the fragrance of the Arab Spring? The problem in Syria is that those seductions appealed to a wide variety of disparate, disjoint and terribly disorganized groups. Each group seems to have its own agenda. That bifurcation of aims, goals and desiderata serves Assad and his Alawite regime well.

The Alawites comprise only six percent of the Syrian population. But the Alawites are Syria's privileged elite. Alawites hold an unusually disproportionate number of top government posts and ranking military positions. They have benefited hugely from the regime’s largesse and patronage. They are understandably and demonstrably loyal to President Assad.

On the other hand, the Syrian Sunnis are 74% of the Syrian populace. Their Shia co-religionists are 13% of the population. Both groups are effectively leaderless. There is also no love lost between the Sunni and Shia communities. Even if that were not true, their loyalties remain decidedly local.

So, there is no apparent, currently acceptable or even safe alternative to Assad. And yet, the seductive fragrance of the Arab Spring has long since wafted far away from Assad. But, like it or not, Assad, the son, learned from Assad, the father. He understands how to exploit the substantial differences and fractures that perfuse Syrian society. Bashir understands, as did his father, that when all else fails, ruthless repression customarily silences dissenting souls.

Still, in the early months of the Arab Spring, President Assad adamantly told the Wall Street Journal that “Syria is immune from unrest” because he understands his people’s needs.

It remains to be seen if the Syrian people’s needs truly comport with what their President says that he understands. In the meantime, the Arab Spring is turning increasingly soggy in Syria