Al-The-Alevi & Syria’s Arab Spring

Syria’s Arab Spring sprung about nine months ago. During that pregnant period, Syria’s dissidents have labored to terminate Bashir al-Assad's unsavory regime. So far, the dissidents have utterly failed. Instead, Syria’s nascent Arab Spring has seemingly miscarried.

In fact, many reports about the Syrian opposition originate outside Syria and/or from anti-Assad elements inside Syria. These reports may well be skewed and/or self-serving. They depict images and relate stories detailing violent repression and/or predicting Assad's impending demise.

It has been incredulously alleged that Al Jazeera, the most popular Arab news channel, has fabricated footage depicting suppression of anti-government demonstrations. Purportedly, Al Jazeera even built replicas of Syrian towns as backdrops for faked violence against dissidents. Indeed, much of what is said and printed about the Syrian situation is, arguably, hype and/or flimflam.

That said, the real truth on-the-ground is hard to come by, especially in a police state like Syria. But some semblance of actuality periodically leaks out in curious places. Take the tennis court for example.

Several weeks ago, I happened to play several sets of tennis with a Syrian physician who now practices in the American South. Let’s just call him “Al.” And, lest you think I jest, Al is not an abbreviation for Alabama nor is it a veiled allusion to Al-Jazeera, to al-Arab or to al-Assad.

So, who is Al and what does he say about Syria?

Well, Al is a native of Tartous, Syria. His Arab parents still live there. Al visits Tartous regularly. When I met Al on a Florida tennis court, he had just returned from Syria. He was surprised to learn that I have not only visited his hometown, but that I know a little -precious little- Arabic.

In fact, Al even paused to correct my pronunciation of the term “Alevi.” That is the name of the Syria’s ruling elite sect. Syrian President Bashir al-Assad is an Alevi. Depending on who is counting, between six and ten percent of the Syrians are Alevis. The Syrian military is heavily Alevi. Syria’s business elite is predominantly Alevi. The richest man in Syria is Alevi (He is also Bashir al-Assad’s cousin). Even Dr. Al is an Alevi. And that may be precisely on point.

Clearly, Dr. Al espouses the perspective of Syria’s ruling Alevi elites. Al has vested interests in seeing the continuing rule of the Assad regime. But, Al’s vision did not seem unduly blurred by media depictions of the Arab Spring in Syria. After all, Al had just flown into and out of Damascus. He had just visited extensively with family in Tartous. He had just met with neighbors, shared refreshments with friends and conversed with colleagues. He had just been out on the town in Tartous. Surely, Al had a feel for –and even a taste of- the bona fide realities in Syria.

So, between points for the better part of two hours, Al and I conducted a running (we were playing tennis) conversation about the state of affairs in Syria. I flatly questioned Al: “What’s really happening in Syria? Will Assad fall? Are things on the ground as bad as the press says they are?”

Al pointedly responded: “Everything’s pretty cool. Don’t get bent out of shape about what you hear. Yes, there is always some dissent. It depends where you look and what you want to see. But what you read and hear is terribly overblown.” Perhaps.

Certainly, it is critically important to recognize that Assad’s military is loyal, disciplined and highly organized. Syria’s military, its officer corps and a host of governmental appointees (a disproportionate number of whom are Alevi) have a strong vested interest in preserving their privileged position in the status quo.

Pointedly, the Alevi (aka Alawites) are a distinct and often reviled religious minority in heavily (74%) Sunni Syria. The Alawites are an extreme offshoot of Shiite Islam. Some Alawite beliefs are not only secret, but also incorporate some Christian elements. In fact, Sunnis customarily deem the Alawites to be unbelievers, polytheists and apostates. As such, Alevi lives, both professionally and personally, may well be imperiled if and when the Assad regime dissolves.

On the other hand, Assad's decidedly disloyal opposition is undisciplined, disorganized, fragmented, effectively leaderless, essentially unarmed and both tactically and strategically impoverished. Score a couple of clear aces for Assad’s side.

Now then, you might also want to serve up the fact that Syria has been a police state for the better part of four decades. Indeed, Hafez al-Assad (President Bashir al-Assad’s father) came into power shortly after Colonel Qadaffi conducted his own coup in Libya. Syria’s secret police (the feared Mukhabarat) has a long history of ruthlessly suppressing dissent under the rule of both Hafez and Bashir al-Assad. That said, Qadaffi is dead, but the Mukhabarat yet lives. Score another critical point for the Assad regime.

Need it also be said that, for almost fifty years (since 1963), Syria officially operated under emergency rule. That Emergency Law even predated the Assads’ dictatorial reign. The oppressive reality of a half-century of emergency rule clearly qualifies as sustained, pervasive and daunting governmental control.

Yet, this past April, while under intense pressure from dissidents, President Bashir al-Assad actually abolished that long-standing Emergency Law. But the simple stroke of Bashir’s pen could not and will not glibly obliterate or cavalierly expunge the haunting spectre of emergency rule from Syria’s public psyche. Score yet another decisive point for the Assad regime.

And not least of all, Syrian dissidents cannot help but be continually reminded of the single deadliest act by any Arab government against its people in the modern Mideast. That event was the massacre of 15,000 dissidents at Hama, Syria in 1982. Said action was orchestrated by the fiat of then President Hafez al-Assad. Is it conceivable that Bashir al-Assad has not learned to replicate his father’s deadly home court serve? Score one more blistering, overhead smash for the Assad regime.

Premises considered, if Al-The-Alevi was a tennis broadcaster, he could ably articulate the current contest against Assad. I can almost hear Al’s slightly-accented Arab voice: “O.K., that’s game, set and…well, not quite match. Assad remains in firm control. But no one is invincible. Even court dictators like Federer and Nadal now lose to that dissident Djokovic. Syria’s fracas could still be a long five-setter. So far, Assad leads his opposition two sets to love. Only one thing is certain, there is absolutely no love lost or left in Syria’s Arab Spring!”

The Soggy Syrian Spring

While paying my bill at a restaurant on the outskirts of Damascus, I noticed a picture hanging above that establishment’s portals. The picture depicted President Bashir al-Assad and deceased President Hafez al-Assad with Hezzbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah.

“Why,” I questioned the proprietor, “are the Assads pictured with Nasrallah?” Without hesitation, the proprietor answered in Arabic: “Adoo adoowe sadeechee” (the enemy of my enemy is my friend)! Then, he conspiratorially winked at me and closed his cash register.

That exchange occurred just a few years ago. Back then Syria was generally calm, its populace was seemingly serene and the Assad regime was in firm control. In fact, the overwhelming atmosphere in Damascus, the world’s oldest continuously inhabited city, was unusually welcoming. The widespread attitude throughout that nation was clearly upbeat. The sudden advent of the Arab Spring changed all that.

Well, not exactly. As it happens, Syria has always been a confounding, sectarian labyrinth of disparate ethnicities, divergent religious persuasions and differing loyalties. Indeed, Syria’s twenty-two million citizens include Sunnis, Shiites, Alawites, Orthodox Christians, Kurds, Druse, Circassians, Armenians, Turkmen, a smattering of Jews and others.

To a remarkable extent, these strikingly different groups have coexisted in relative communal quietude. Indeed, Syria could justifiably boast that its populace was unusually blessed with religious freedom, pluralism and broad cultural diversity.

Of course, all the above operated on Syria’s societal surface. Still, Syrian society seemed to function reasonably well. Regrettably, that is a relatively superficial view of those uninitiated in the subtleties of the Mideast. Beneath the surface a seething cauldron of unrest, dissent and disquiet quietly stewed. It all boiled over into the Arab Spring. Why?

One answer is the Syria has also always been that region’s most combustible geopolitical flashpoint. Syria sits precisely at a strategic crossroads of the world. It has –seemingly forever- been the battlefield of expanding empires. It has been overrun, occupied and/or ruled by the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Moslems, the Crusaders, the Egyptians, the Ottomans and even the French. This circumstance blessed the region with a magnificent cultural diversity; it also cursed Syria in that it rarely ruled itself.

The bottom line resulting from repeated foreign rule was that Syria failed to develop as a true national entity. Syria became a region where loyalty remained remarkably local. It became a society in which citizens still identify much more closely with their cities, their extended families, their ethnicities and their religious sects than with their national government.

This situation ultimately fostered a minority mentality among the populace. No group was strong enough to exert its sway on the national scene. Many entities were –consciously and/or subconsciously- suspicious of other groups. No one group had sufficient influence or power to create or sustain a national consensus. And none did. Even after gaining independence in 1946, Syria was continually rocked by military coup after military coup. Then, in 1971, the Assad family seized (and I mean “seized”) control.

Hafez al-Assad ruled ruthlessly for almost three decades. It was on his watch that the single deadliest act by any Arab government against its people in the modern Mideast was perpetrated. That massacre was at the Syrian city of Hama in 1982 when 15,000 Sunni members of the Muslim Brotherhood were slaughtered. The Assad family had and has zero tolerance for political dissent.

That Hama is now again in the news and reaping reprisals for its political dissent only illustrates that Bashir al-Assad views his father as a clear role model. Is it then any wonder that Assad, the son, is now irreverently referred to as “The Butcher of Damascus?” Those who pinned hopes on his leadership could have been more perspicacious.

In 2000 Bashir al-Assad gave up life as a British ophthalmologist to become President of Syria. He was 34 years old. His brother Basil, thought to be his father's preferred heir, had died in a car accident. The Syrians were enamored with Bashir’s youthful appearance, his pleasant disposition and his seemingly open-minded demeanor. Still, they forgot the consequential import of the expression: “Like father like son.” Assad, the son, fit nicely into the dictatorial and autocratic shoes of Assad, the father.

Premises considered, is it any wonder that Syrian citizens have also been seduced by the fragrance of the Arab Spring? The problem in Syria is that those seductions appealed to a wide variety of disparate, disjoint and terribly disorganized groups. Each group seems to have its own agenda. That bifurcation of aims, goals and desiderata serves Assad and his Alawite regime well.

The Alawites comprise only six percent of the Syrian population. But the Alawites are Syria's privileged elite. Alawites hold an unusually disproportionate number of top government posts and ranking military positions. They have benefited hugely from the regime’s largesse and patronage. They are understandably and demonstrably loyal to President Assad.

On the other hand, the Syrian Sunnis are 74% of the Syrian populace. Their Shia co-religionists are 13% of the population. Both groups are effectively leaderless. There is also no love lost between the Sunni and Shia communities. Even if that were not true, their loyalties remain decidedly local.

So, there is no apparent, currently acceptable or even safe alternative to Assad. And yet, the seductive fragrance of the Arab Spring has long since wafted far away from Assad. But, like it or not, Assad, the son, learned from Assad, the father. He understands how to exploit the substantial differences and fractures that perfuse Syrian society. Bashir understands, as did his father, that when all else fails, ruthless repression customarily silences dissenting souls.

Still, in the early months of the Arab Spring, President Assad adamantly told the Wall Street Journal that “Syria is immune from unrest” because he understands his people’s needs.

It remains to be seen if the Syrian people’s needs truly comport with what their President says that he understands. In the meantime, the Arab Spring is turning increasingly soggy in Syria