Untying The Syrian Knot

Five years ago, I chanced to be exiting a Damascus restaurant. A piece of art was hanging askew above that establishment’s portal. The painting depicted three men. The man in the middle was deceased Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. He was flanked by current Syrian President Bashir al-Assad. The third image was the likeness of Sheikh Hasan Nazralleh, radical Shiite leader of Hezbollah.

I was curious at the seemingly awkward juxtaposition of Sheikh Nazrallah with Presidents Hafez and Bashir al-Assad. I queried the restaurant’s proprietor: “Why is a Hezbollah terrorist pictured with Syria’s presidents?” The proprietor’s response was illuminating. His Arabic response was ensconced in an acerbic –if not venerable- Arabic aphorism: “Adoo adoowee sadeechee” (The enemy of my enemy is my friend)!

Not satisfied with that enigmatic response, I pressed for clarification. I questioned: “Who is the enemy of your enemy?” The proprietor’s response was unequivocal. “Mr. Bush is the enemy and Sheikh Nazrallah is the enemy of our enemy!” An abundance of caution enveloped me. I terminated my discussion with that restauranteur.

Once outside the restaurant, I posed a not unrelated question to a knowledgeable Syrian. His response was also instructive. He said: “Syrians hate Mr. Bush’s foreign policy. We do not hate Americans. I cannot say more. I cannot cross the red-line. They count my words.”

Intrigued, I pressed on. “Who counts your words?” The response was designedly oblique, but sufficiently transparent. “The Alevis count my words. More I will not say.”

To those in the know, the Alevis are the ruling coterie of seemingly secular Syrian Shiites. That sounds, seems and smells like an inexplicable contradiction. It is. But it paints a proper portrait of Syrian society and its politics.

The elite Alawite sect includes the leaders of the ruling socialist Baath party. They are abetted by affluent businessmen, industrialists and Syria’s notorious secret police, the Mukhabarat. These people run Syria. Indeed, of the 250 parliamentary seats, 170 are constitutionally reserved for the ruling Baath party and its allies. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Baath party has not lost a single election since 1963.

That said, Syria sits at the strategic crossroads of the Middle East. Syria has repeatedly been a geopolitical flashpoint and the battlefield for expanding empires. As a result, Syria has rarely ruled itself. That fact has molded the Syrian mentality. Repeated foreign invasions (by the Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Egyptians and Ottomans) have been a blessing and a curse to the Syrians.

Foreign rule blessed Syria with wonderful cultural diversity. But foreign rule also implanted a paranoia about Syria’s national identity. In fact, Syrians demonstrate an absence of national cohesiveness as well as demonstrable mistrust for their central government.

As a result, Syrian loyalty is fragmented. Syrian allegiances are local. Syrian fidelity and trust depend on local, ethnic and religious considerations. Given its history, an oppressed minority mentality pervades Syria’s national persona. That is illuminating.

Still, Syrians do have universal suffrage, albeit in the powerful presence of one-party rule. Additionally, it is also notable that half of Syria’s twenty-two million citizens are too young to vote. Most of these are still under age fifteen. As such, they are impressionable, malleable and unpredictable.

Of equal import, Syria is not monolithic. While it is a country whose citizens are overwhelmingly Arab (90%), Syria also encompasses substantial non-Arab groups, notably Kurds and Armenians. Additionally, while about 70% of Syrians are Sunni Moslems, there are also Shiite Moslems (13%), Orthodox Christians (10%), Alevis (6%) and Druze (1%). There also are strong Greek, Armenian and Syrian Orthodox churches.

Perhaps unexpectedly, freedom of religion does exist in Syria. Contrast that with Saudi Arabia where the public practice of any religion except Islam is not only strictly forbidden, but where apostasy from Islam is punishable by death.

Even more significantly regarding religion in Syria, a 1950 plebiscite officially rejected Islam as the national religion. That policy still stands. That is a matter of no little consequence in a region suffused with Islamic
militancy. This lends greater import to the fact that Syria still bans The Muslim Brotherhood.

Interestingly, Syria’s existence as a staunchly socialist, secularized, Arab nation should –but does not- fly in the face of Iran’s non-Arab, Shiite/Islamic theocracy. Somehow that reality goes unnoticed. But the very existence of a nominally secular Syrian state ruled by apostate Alevis is absolutely anathema to Saudi Arabia’s fundamentalist Sunni monarchy. As such, the blatant animosity of Saudi royalty for the Syrian Alevis (and Syrian Shiites) is yet another –often unrecognized - fly in the geopolitical ointment that greases the region.

These are not bland differences without bold distinctions. This is dramatic reality. This is a region where the fourteen-century old animosity between Sunnis and Shiites is palpable. As one Mideast expert opined, anyone who thinks that there can be détente between the Sunnis and Shiites displays an “arrogant ignorance of Islam.”

That said, Syria’s constitution requires its President to be a Moslem. Yet President Bashir al-Assad is an Alevi, a secularized, secret and somewhat Christianized sect. Alevi ties to Shiite Islam are tenuous, at best. As a result, an arrangement with a prominent Shiite cleric produced a fatwa (Moslem religious edict) proclaiming that Alevis are still Shiites. Thus, Bashir Al-Asad’s presidency technically complies with the mandate of the Syrian constitution.

The Syrian government says that the Alevis constitute 10-16% of Syria’s population. Street demographers in Damascus’ alleyways beg to differ. They protest that the Alevis constitute only three per cent of the population. The truth lies in between. But, percentages aside, the tension between the ruling Alevis and the residue of effectively disenfranchised Syrian citizens seems clear.

The bottom line is that the Syrian government is a roguish entity
suffused with unsavory predilections and distasteful predispositions. The
Syrian government officially restricts public meetings, censors the media,
controls transportation, hosts terrorist organization offices (Hamas; Hezbollah; Islamic Jihad; Kurdish rebel groups), sponsors state terrorism and remains in cahoots with Iran in suspect endeavors.

In the midst of all this, Israel’s Ha’aretz newspaper prominently asserted: “…it is preferable to have Bashir Assad sitting in Damascus rather than the Muslim Brotherhood.”

Of course, it is crystal clear that the Assad government harbors a decided lack of love for the West. At the same time, most Syrians have precious little more than an expedient affection for Iran, Syria’s political paramour. To the extent that Iran is Syria’s friend, it is because Iran not only supplies political, economic and military support, but also because Iran is the enemy of Syria’s enemy, the Great Satan of the West.

In fact, it may not be inappropriate for Western diplomats to explore precisely what it takes to turn an enemy into a friend. Is it unreasonable to suggest that Western foreign policy makers should take instruction from an old Syrian proverb. It affirms: “Every knot has someone who can undo it” (i.e. every problem has a solution). At the very least, that seems worth talking about. But will Bashir al-Assad ever talk turkey?

Turkey? Isn’t that where Syrian dissidents and defectors find sanctuary?

Al-The-Alevi & Syria’s Arab Spring

Syria’s Arab Spring sprung about nine months ago. During that pregnant period, Syria’s dissidents have labored to terminate Bashir al-Assad's unsavory regime. So far, the dissidents have utterly failed. Instead, Syria’s nascent Arab Spring has seemingly miscarried.

In fact, many reports about the Syrian opposition originate outside Syria and/or from anti-Assad elements inside Syria. These reports may well be skewed and/or self-serving. They depict images and relate stories detailing violent repression and/or predicting Assad's impending demise.

It has been incredulously alleged that Al Jazeera, the most popular Arab news channel, has fabricated footage depicting suppression of anti-government demonstrations. Purportedly, Al Jazeera even built replicas of Syrian towns as backdrops for faked violence against dissidents. Indeed, much of what is said and printed about the Syrian situation is, arguably, hype and/or flimflam.

That said, the real truth on-the-ground is hard to come by, especially in a police state like Syria. But some semblance of actuality periodically leaks out in curious places. Take the tennis court for example.

Several weeks ago, I happened to play several sets of tennis with a Syrian physician who now practices in the American South. Let’s just call him “Al.” And, lest you think I jest, Al is not an abbreviation for Alabama nor is it a veiled allusion to Al-Jazeera, to al-Arab or to al-Assad.

So, who is Al and what does he say about Syria?

Well, Al is a native of Tartous, Syria. His Arab parents still live there. Al visits Tartous regularly. When I met Al on a Florida tennis court, he had just returned from Syria. He was surprised to learn that I have not only visited his hometown, but that I know a little -precious little- Arabic.

In fact, Al even paused to correct my pronunciation of the term “Alevi.” That is the name of the Syria’s ruling elite sect. Syrian President Bashir al-Assad is an Alevi. Depending on who is counting, between six and ten percent of the Syrians are Alevis. The Syrian military is heavily Alevi. Syria’s business elite is predominantly Alevi. The richest man in Syria is Alevi (He is also Bashir al-Assad’s cousin). Even Dr. Al is an Alevi. And that may be precisely on point.

Clearly, Dr. Al espouses the perspective of Syria’s ruling Alevi elites. Al has vested interests in seeing the continuing rule of the Assad regime. But, Al’s vision did not seem unduly blurred by media depictions of the Arab Spring in Syria. After all, Al had just flown into and out of Damascus. He had just visited extensively with family in Tartous. He had just met with neighbors, shared refreshments with friends and conversed with colleagues. He had just been out on the town in Tartous. Surely, Al had a feel for –and even a taste of- the bona fide realities in Syria.

So, between points for the better part of two hours, Al and I conducted a running (we were playing tennis) conversation about the state of affairs in Syria. I flatly questioned Al: “What’s really happening in Syria? Will Assad fall? Are things on the ground as bad as the press says they are?”

Al pointedly responded: “Everything’s pretty cool. Don’t get bent out of shape about what you hear. Yes, there is always some dissent. It depends where you look and what you want to see. But what you read and hear is terribly overblown.” Perhaps.

Certainly, it is critically important to recognize that Assad’s military is loyal, disciplined and highly organized. Syria’s military, its officer corps and a host of governmental appointees (a disproportionate number of whom are Alevi) have a strong vested interest in preserving their privileged position in the status quo.

Pointedly, the Alevi (aka Alawites) are a distinct and often reviled religious minority in heavily (74%) Sunni Syria. The Alawites are an extreme offshoot of Shiite Islam. Some Alawite beliefs are not only secret, but also incorporate some Christian elements. In fact, Sunnis customarily deem the Alawites to be unbelievers, polytheists and apostates. As such, Alevi lives, both professionally and personally, may well be imperiled if and when the Assad regime dissolves.

On the other hand, Assad's decidedly disloyal opposition is undisciplined, disorganized, fragmented, effectively leaderless, essentially unarmed and both tactically and strategically impoverished. Score a couple of clear aces for Assad’s side.

Now then, you might also want to serve up the fact that Syria has been a police state for the better part of four decades. Indeed, Hafez al-Assad (President Bashir al-Assad’s father) came into power shortly after Colonel Qadaffi conducted his own coup in Libya. Syria’s secret police (the feared Mukhabarat) has a long history of ruthlessly suppressing dissent under the rule of both Hafez and Bashir al-Assad. That said, Qadaffi is dead, but the Mukhabarat yet lives. Score another critical point for the Assad regime.

Need it also be said that, for almost fifty years (since 1963), Syria officially operated under emergency rule. That Emergency Law even predated the Assads’ dictatorial reign. The oppressive reality of a half-century of emergency rule clearly qualifies as sustained, pervasive and daunting governmental control.

Yet, this past April, while under intense pressure from dissidents, President Bashir al-Assad actually abolished that long-standing Emergency Law. But the simple stroke of Bashir’s pen could not and will not glibly obliterate or cavalierly expunge the haunting spectre of emergency rule from Syria’s public psyche. Score yet another decisive point for the Assad regime.

And not least of all, Syrian dissidents cannot help but be continually reminded of the single deadliest act by any Arab government against its people in the modern Mideast. That event was the massacre of 15,000 dissidents at Hama, Syria in 1982. Said action was orchestrated by the fiat of then President Hafez al-Assad. Is it conceivable that Bashir al-Assad has not learned to replicate his father’s deadly home court serve? Score one more blistering, overhead smash for the Assad regime.

Premises considered, if Al-The-Alevi was a tennis broadcaster, he could ably articulate the current contest against Assad. I can almost hear Al’s slightly-accented Arab voice: “O.K., that’s game, set and…well, not quite match. Assad remains in firm control. But no one is invincible. Even court dictators like Federer and Nadal now lose to that dissident Djokovic. Syria’s fracas could still be a long five-setter. So far, Assad leads his opposition two sets to love. Only one thing is certain, there is absolutely no love lost or left in Syria’s Arab Spring!”