The Brewing Mideast Storm

Tehran had an early snow last week. This past week the I.A.E.A. issued a stormy report about Iran’s nuclear intentions. Last week Israeli hawks fretted about a possible flight to chill Iran’s nuke program. At the same time, Russia was frosty about enhanced Security Council sanctions against Iran. Meanwhile, the Arab League suspended Syria because it continued to rain bullets on dissidents. The geopolitical weather in the Mideast last week was rotten. Even the future forecast is dismal.

Actually, unsettled conditions seem to be the norm in the always fractured and fractious Mideast. The continuing turbulence in Syria combined with Iran’s legendary duplicity suggests that a geopolitical storm may be brewing.

Consider that Iran and Syria have been allies for the past thirty years. In fact, the Iranian-born Lebanese Shiite cleric Musa Sadr provided religious legitimacy to the Assad regime. In a 1973 Fatwa, Sadr declared that Syria’s ruling Alawites are Shiites. Sadr also acted as liaison between Hafez al-Assad and Khomeini's aides before the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Indeed, the relationship between Iran and Syria is a marriage of convenience that has repeatedly satisfied both parties’ diplomatic needs. And that is the crux of an incipient problem for the region.

Long before the current situation in Syria, Iran aided and abetted the Syrian regime. It served Iranian objectives to foster Syria’s meddling in Lebanon, to encourage Syria’s less-than-furtive flirtation with Hezbollah and to goad Syria’s insidious assignation with Hamas.

In so doing, Iran covertly exploits its overtly explicit anti-Israel and anti-West agenda. By collaborating with the Assad regime, Iran seeks to extend its strategically significant influence across the arc of the Mideast all the way to the Mediterranean .

By continually enabling the Assad regime, Iran is betting that Assad –if he somehow survives Syria’s Arab spring- will be even more eager to accommodate Iranian aspirations to be the regional hegemon. That is a craving deeply rooted in the Iranian psyche.

It also seems clear that Iranian aspirations have been newly enhanced in Iraq, which –not incidentally- borders both Syria and Iran. The recently announced U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq presents a power vacuum which Iran is eager to fill.

The current Iraqi government is dominated by Shia leaders. They have a decided affinity with the Iranian Shia. The latter are sufficiently astute to have studiously cultivated relations with Syria’s ruling Alawites who are Shia. It is also noteworthy that the three Arab League nations that did not vote to suspend Syria's membership (Iraq, Lebanon & Yemen) all have politically vocal Shiite populations.

That said, America’s apparent loss of influence in Iraq combined with an Assad win in Syria could dramatically alter the balance of power in the Mideast. The geopolitical map could then reflect a swath of Iranian sway that extends from the Persian Gulf across Iraq and Syria into Lebanon and then down into the Gaza strip.

Not coincidentally, this scenario –at least theoretically- places Iran on the borders of Israel. Of course, it can be argued that, by dint of existential circumstances, Iran is already there. Still, Iran’s position will be immeasurably enhanced assuming that the Assad regime outlasts Syria’s soggy Arab Spring.

On the other hand, Assad's downfall would deal a distinct blow to Iran's broad diplomatic machinations. As such, Iran is watching the Syrian spring with bated breath. But others –with equally bated breath- are also watching.

Turkey, which not so long ago was attempting to broker a peace between Syria and Israel, has all but severed relations with both the Assad regime and with Israel. Of course, Turkey has its own self-serving agenda. It wants to be the region’s top dog.

It is in Turkey’s bests interests to disrupt any scenario that might elevate Iran’s claim to hegemony. As such, Turkey has abruptly sided with Syria's Sunni dissidents. It is not that the Turks like Syria’s dissidents so much more than Assad, it is just that they dislike the Iranians with much greater intensity. Furthermore, ingratiating itself with the Arab Spring also serves to enhance Turkey’s aspirations to regional leadership.

Pointedly, both the Turks and the Iranians are Moslems. But the Turks are Sunnis whereas the Iranians are Shiites. The long-festering animosity between these Islamic sects is palpable. Furthermore, there is no love lost between ethnic Turks and ethnic Persians. Need it also be said that neither the Turks nor the Iranians are Arabs. Complicating matters, the Turks and the Iranians not particularly fond of the Arabs and vice versa. So the plot thickens.

The Saudis are Arabs. The Saudis are Sunni. The Saudis absolutely abhor the ruling Syrian Alawites who are Shiites. The Saudis say the Syrian Alawites are apostates, polytheists and pagans. Conversely, the Syrian Alawites disparage the Saudis for their “Bedouin thinking” and extreme fundamentalist Sunni (Wahabi) beliefs. But the Saudis also look with equally derisive contempt at the Iranians and at the repugnant possibility of a Shiite crescent across the Mideast.

That leaves us with the Israelis. They are not ethnic Persians or ethnic Turks. The Israelis are ethnic Semites. So are the Arabs. Most Arabs are Sunni Moslems. With exceptions, Israelis are not Moslems. That said, the Israelis have no love lost for Assad, an Alawite/Shiite Moslem. But neither are the Israelis sanguine about the possibility of seeing Assad replaced by a fundamentalist Sunni Moslem regime.

Both the Iranians and the Turks want to rule the Mideast roost. That prospect is exquisitely distasteful to the Saudis. The Israelis have their hands full detaching themselves from the Palestinians. But like the Saudis and the Turks, the Israelis are justifiably apprehensive about the possibility of a Shiite/Iranian crescent overspreading the Mideast.

All of which may breathe renewed relevance into that caustic Arabic adage: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend!”

.

Al-The-Alevi & Syria’s Arab Spring

Syria’s Arab Spring sprung about nine months ago. During that pregnant period, Syria’s dissidents have labored to terminate Bashir al-Assad's unsavory regime. So far, the dissidents have utterly failed. Instead, Syria’s nascent Arab Spring has seemingly miscarried.

In fact, many reports about the Syrian opposition originate outside Syria and/or from anti-Assad elements inside Syria. These reports may well be skewed and/or self-serving. They depict images and relate stories detailing violent repression and/or predicting Assad's impending demise.

It has been incredulously alleged that Al Jazeera, the most popular Arab news channel, has fabricated footage depicting suppression of anti-government demonstrations. Purportedly, Al Jazeera even built replicas of Syrian towns as backdrops for faked violence against dissidents. Indeed, much of what is said and printed about the Syrian situation is, arguably, hype and/or flimflam.

That said, the real truth on-the-ground is hard to come by, especially in a police state like Syria. But some semblance of actuality periodically leaks out in curious places. Take the tennis court for example.

Several weeks ago, I happened to play several sets of tennis with a Syrian physician who now practices in the American South. Let’s just call him “Al.” And, lest you think I jest, Al is not an abbreviation for Alabama nor is it a veiled allusion to Al-Jazeera, to al-Arab or to al-Assad.

So, who is Al and what does he say about Syria?

Well, Al is a native of Tartous, Syria. His Arab parents still live there. Al visits Tartous regularly. When I met Al on a Florida tennis court, he had just returned from Syria. He was surprised to learn that I have not only visited his hometown, but that I know a little -precious little- Arabic.

In fact, Al even paused to correct my pronunciation of the term “Alevi.” That is the name of the Syria’s ruling elite sect. Syrian President Bashir al-Assad is an Alevi. Depending on who is counting, between six and ten percent of the Syrians are Alevis. The Syrian military is heavily Alevi. Syria’s business elite is predominantly Alevi. The richest man in Syria is Alevi (He is also Bashir al-Assad’s cousin). Even Dr. Al is an Alevi. And that may be precisely on point.

Clearly, Dr. Al espouses the perspective of Syria’s ruling Alevi elites. Al has vested interests in seeing the continuing rule of the Assad regime. But, Al’s vision did not seem unduly blurred by media depictions of the Arab Spring in Syria. After all, Al had just flown into and out of Damascus. He had just visited extensively with family in Tartous. He had just met with neighbors, shared refreshments with friends and conversed with colleagues. He had just been out on the town in Tartous. Surely, Al had a feel for –and even a taste of- the bona fide realities in Syria.

So, between points for the better part of two hours, Al and I conducted a running (we were playing tennis) conversation about the state of affairs in Syria. I flatly questioned Al: “What’s really happening in Syria? Will Assad fall? Are things on the ground as bad as the press says they are?”

Al pointedly responded: “Everything’s pretty cool. Don’t get bent out of shape about what you hear. Yes, there is always some dissent. It depends where you look and what you want to see. But what you read and hear is terribly overblown.” Perhaps.

Certainly, it is critically important to recognize that Assad’s military is loyal, disciplined and highly organized. Syria’s military, its officer corps and a host of governmental appointees (a disproportionate number of whom are Alevi) have a strong vested interest in preserving their privileged position in the status quo.

Pointedly, the Alevi (aka Alawites) are a distinct and often reviled religious minority in heavily (74%) Sunni Syria. The Alawites are an extreme offshoot of Shiite Islam. Some Alawite beliefs are not only secret, but also incorporate some Christian elements. In fact, Sunnis customarily deem the Alawites to be unbelievers, polytheists and apostates. As such, Alevi lives, both professionally and personally, may well be imperiled if and when the Assad regime dissolves.

On the other hand, Assad's decidedly disloyal opposition is undisciplined, disorganized, fragmented, effectively leaderless, essentially unarmed and both tactically and strategically impoverished. Score a couple of clear aces for Assad’s side.

Now then, you might also want to serve up the fact that Syria has been a police state for the better part of four decades. Indeed, Hafez al-Assad (President Bashir al-Assad’s father) came into power shortly after Colonel Qadaffi conducted his own coup in Libya. Syria’s secret police (the feared Mukhabarat) has a long history of ruthlessly suppressing dissent under the rule of both Hafez and Bashir al-Assad. That said, Qadaffi is dead, but the Mukhabarat yet lives. Score another critical point for the Assad regime.

Need it also be said that, for almost fifty years (since 1963), Syria officially operated under emergency rule. That Emergency Law even predated the Assads’ dictatorial reign. The oppressive reality of a half-century of emergency rule clearly qualifies as sustained, pervasive and daunting governmental control.

Yet, this past April, while under intense pressure from dissidents, President Bashir al-Assad actually abolished that long-standing Emergency Law. But the simple stroke of Bashir’s pen could not and will not glibly obliterate or cavalierly expunge the haunting spectre of emergency rule from Syria’s public psyche. Score yet another decisive point for the Assad regime.

And not least of all, Syrian dissidents cannot help but be continually reminded of the single deadliest act by any Arab government against its people in the modern Mideast. That event was the massacre of 15,000 dissidents at Hama, Syria in 1982. Said action was orchestrated by the fiat of then President Hafez al-Assad. Is it conceivable that Bashir al-Assad has not learned to replicate his father’s deadly home court serve? Score one more blistering, overhead smash for the Assad regime.

Premises considered, if Al-The-Alevi was a tennis broadcaster, he could ably articulate the current contest against Assad. I can almost hear Al’s slightly-accented Arab voice: “O.K., that’s game, set and…well, not quite match. Assad remains in firm control. But no one is invincible. Even court dictators like Federer and Nadal now lose to that dissident Djokovic. Syria’s fracas could still be a long five-setter. So far, Assad leads his opposition two sets to love. Only one thing is certain, there is absolutely no love lost or left in Syria’s Arab Spring!”

What Happened To Egypt's Arab Spring?

Egypt’s Arab Spring sprung early last winter. That was eight months ago. That’s when the Egyptian military ousted long-time President Hosni Mubarak. The voice of the Egyptian people had been heard. Democracy was distantly visible on the Egyptian horizon. The reins of government would be held –but on an interim basis only- by the Egyptian military. That military was widely and favorably viewed as the protector of Egyptian stability. Timely elections were to be held. A new Constitution was to be promulgated. Fresh spring air was seemingly wafting through Cairo’s Tahrir Square.

But wait. Not so fast. That fresh spring air was –and is – polluted. In fact, with Mubarak gone, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and its head, Field Marshall Tantawi, assumed absolute control. Contrary to fond expectations, very little has changed.

In March, with Mubarak’s ouster still fresh, the Egyptian military arrested, tried and sentenced Maikel Nabil Sanad to three years in prison. Maikel was a young, dissident blogger. His crime was that he had posted an article criticizing the military’s role in the Egyptian revolution. Maikel had argued that the military was a nemesis to the protestors. Maikel pulled no punches. He flatly asserted: “The revolution has so far managed to get rid of the dictator, but not the dictatorship!”

Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces deemed Maikel’s comments
to be “a clear transgression of all boundaries of insult and libel.”
More pointedly, dissident bloggers had been routinely imprisoned by Mubarak’s regime. But Maikel’s imprisonment by the SCAF served as an early red flag that even free expression would not be tolerated in Egypt. It was thus that Egypt’s Arab Spring began to be rained out.

That said, Maikel’s travails are also an clear indication that Egypt’s military is not disposed to surrender power any time soon. Indeed, as another dissident Egyptian blogger recently wrote: “The military wants to annihilate anyone who questions what it does.” That blogger -with abundant premeditation - identified himself as “Kafaya Punk” (roughly translated as "The Defiant Punk!").

And so it is that we arrive back in Cairo on 9 October 2011. The scene was yet again one of chaos, confusion and virtual anarchy. But this time, the mood and targets of the mobs were different. For the first time, the military itself was also targeted by demonstrators.

As it happens, the Coptic Church, which claims about 10 percent of Egypt's 83 million people, accused the military of purposely failing control a Moslem mob. The Copts had been peacefully protesting against attacks on their churches. The Moslem mob turned that protest into a violent sectarian riot. Inexplicably, the military somehow failed to prevent the death of about two dozen Coptic Christians.

Indeed, recent months have witnessed an undercurrent of growing disaffection with the military. Anti-military rhetoric has been on the upswing. In fact, disparate groups, upset with the military, had begun denouncing the SCAF for willfully obstructing the Egypt's evolution into
a democracy.

But it was not until October 9th that protestors used weapons against the military. While the identity of those rioters remains unclear, at least one message is clear. The Egyptian military’s image as a neutral arbiter and/or protector of the people has now been called into question.

As the mob scene developed on October 9th, three distinct factions revealed themselves, i.e. the Copts, the Moslems and the military. Arguably, the military sided with neither the Copts or the Moslems. But that perception may be skewed.

It was widely rumored that Copts were attacking soldiers. True or not, that perception catalyzed a Moslem mob into action. Some threateningly chanted: "Islamiyyah, Islamiyyah" (only an Islamic state!). Simultaneously, the military-controlled media conveniently characterized Copts as the primary perpetrators of the riot.

The bottom line of all this is that Egypt remains fractured by a broad spectrum of opposition groups. Each group espouses its own platform, promotes its own self-interested objectives and awaits its own preconceived expectations for the future of Egypt.

The most important, the most self-interested and the group with the most to lose is the Egyptian military. Without question, the military was (under Mubarak) and still is (under the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) the most critical entity in Egypt. That is true with reference to virtually every aspect of life in Egypt. It is especially true (to no little extent) as to the pregnant issue of whether or not Egypt devolves from a technically secular state into an officially Islamic nation.

Need it be said that Egypt's military establishment has, in many respects, been decidedly astute. For four decades the military was the power behind Mubarak. But, when it served the military’s interests to do so, it simply ousted Mubarak from office. When Tahrir Square exploded with anti-Mubarak demonstrations, the military studiously avoided becoming embroiled in the demonstrations. The military carefully distanced itself from Mubarak’s policies and skillfully portrayed itself as the sole guarantor of Egyptian stability.

It is now crystal clear that the military has out-maneuvered Egypt’s dissidents. Some among latter had high hopes that military rule would only be a transitional bridge to a democratic Egypt. Other dissidents of an Islamist stripe envisioned an Egypt that would –sooner or later – become officially Islamic. But by now both factions must recognize that the Egyptian military may well harbor a third and completely different vision for Egypt’s future.

It is virtually axiomatic –if not also Machiavellian– that preservation of the status quo is the primary aspiration and objective of those in power. Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is in power. It was the power behind Mubarak's Presidency. Furthermore, it seems increasingly clear that the SCAF has little intention of willingly yielding power to democratic secularists, to the Muslim Brotherhood or to any other aspiring entity of whatever ilk.

What happens next is subject to all manner of speculation. Will the SCAF proceed with the Parliamentary elections scheduled for November 28th? Will the SCAF willingly transfer its power to a democratically elected civilian government? Will the elections be rigged to ensure continued military control?

Additionally, will the SCAF act to keep Egyptian dissidents divided and/or to provoke further discord? Is it in the SCAF's interest to contain or to exacerbate sectarian strife? Will it be a surprise if the SCAF decides that the continuing unrest merits a calculated delay in the path to democracy? Or will the SCAF decide that a growing level of Egyptian dissent is sufficient to simply cancel elections and justify the imposition of emergency rule?

Clearly, the SCAF's reign has already dampened -and may yet completely drench- Egypt's Arab Spring. It is thus that the felonious words of Egypt’s imprisoned dissident blogger now resonate with ever increasing intensity: “The revolution has so far managed to get rid of the dictator, but not the dictatorship!”

So much for the Arab Spring in Egypt!

Pity The Palestinians

It is truly sad, even pitiful. The Palestinians have no state. They have never had a state. They need a state. They cannot get the Israelis to unilaterally declare the existence of a Palestinian state. They cannot convince the U.N. Security Council to proclaim the creation of a Palestinian state. They cannot even cajole the rest of the massive Arab world to carve out a little space for a Palestinian state. In short, the Palestinians get no respect. They are the Rodney Dangerfields of the Arab world.

But wait. It is not the Israelis who disrespect the Palestinians. The Israelis know better. The Israelis recognize that, by and large, the Palestinians are well-educated and well-attuned to their geopolitical realities. The Israelis know that the Palestinians are –as is evidenced by last year’s enviable 7.6% growth on the West Bank – able to manage an economy. The Israelis know that stability on the West Bank reflects the Palestinian capacity to run a state. The Israelis know that the Palestinians are neither intellectually inferior nor culturally impoverished.

So, if the Israelis do not disrespect the Palestinians as a people who does? Kindly check out the conduct of the Arab world. Indeed, it is the Palestinians’ own Arab brethren who have repeatedly demonstrated disrespect for the Palestinians.

But is that news? Anyone conversant with the stateless plight of the Palestinians knows that the Palestinians have long been the bane of the Arab world. Arabs will rush to deny that inglorious allegation, but historical facts speak to the veracity of that assertion. Thus, a candid review of the history of Palestine and the Palestinians is in order.

In the beginning God created heaven and earth. But God chose not create Palestine so the region was called Canaan. Time passed. In due course, Abraham begot a son named Ishmael. He became the forefather of the Arab Palestinians. But the term Palestinian has its origin elsewhere. So where does the term “Palestinian” come from?

In antiquity there was no such people known as the Palestinians. The closest one comes to fabricating a “Palestinian” ancestry is a people known as the Philistines. Arguably, the Philistines came from somewhere in the Aegean. They settled along the eastern Mediterranean coast where they built a pentapolis one of whose cities was named Gaza.

The Philistines evicted the local Canaanites and expropriated their lands. This occurred about the time that Joshua and the twelve Israelite tribes were invading Canaan. That’s when Jericho’s walls came tumbling down. Like the Philistines, the Israelite tribes evicted the locals and expropriated their lands.

In due course, the Israelites expanded westward while the Philistines were expanding eastward. That’s when Samson (the Israelite) got into trouble with Delilah (a Philistine). That’s when David (the Israelite) slew Goliath (a Philistine). My goodness, the Philistines were at odds with the Israelites just like the Palestinians are at odds with the Israelis.

But, long story short, the Philistines were not Arabs. The Philistines were not Semites. The Arab Palestinians are Semites. The Philistines are not the long lost forefathers of the Palestinians. In fact, by about seven hundred years before Jesus, the Philistines had disappeared from history.

Fast forward another seven hundred years. That’s when the Roman General Pompey appeared in the Mideast. Upon learning that the Mediterranean coast had once been populated by the Philistines, Pompey labeled that region Palestina. The “Ph” from Philistine morphed into the “P” of Palestina. It took another several thousand years for the region to become widely known as Palestine. Not incidentally, the P and the F (Ph) are essentially the same alphabetical letter, the P just has a stronger accent. Thus, the relationship between the Philistines and the Palestinians is purely alphabetical and linguistic, but not genetic

All of which (by way of a very telescoped history) brings us to the twentieth century. With seeming suddeness, the region’s residents –now identified by the Anglicized name of Palestine- were labeled as Palestinians. And now the plot thickens.

Jump to 1947. By fiat, the U.N. created two new entities in Palestine. One entity was to be a Jewish State. The other entity was to be an Arab State. There was no mention of a Palestinian State. That was no oversight. Back in 1947 a Palestinian State would have been a figment of a demographer’s fertile imagination.

Be that as it may, Arab nations attacked the fledgling Jewish State. The ensuing war created refugees. The refugees were locals. Perforce, the refugees were called Palestinians.

Time marched on. Jordan “occupied” Jerusalem and the West Bank. In 1967, Israel kicked Jordan out of Jerusalem and retook the West Bank. Depending on one’s perspective, the West Bank and East Jerusalem then became either “occupied” or “disputed” territory. Since that catastrophe, the Palestinians have yearned to regain “their” territory.

Meanwhile, Palestinian refugees had fled. The refugees found homes, but not havens, across the entirety of the Arab Mideast. And the Palestinian refugees multiplied.

It was and is in Arab nations that the Palestinians have suffered widespread discrimination simply because they are Palestinians. It was in Arab nations that the Palestinians were forbidden to enjoy state healthcare, were precluded from being professionals, were restricted from owning real estate, were restricted in their right to travel, were denied citizenship and were even consigned to squalid refugee camps.

These indignities were thrust upon the Palestinians by the own Arab brethern. Palestinian refugees and their progeny were welcomed across their Arab Mideast with disaffection, were often treated with disrespect and were frequently denigrated by rejection.

In fact, by 1965 the plight of the Palestinian refugees across the Arab Mideast had become so pitiful that the Arab League convened a conference designed to ameliorate the substantial adversities afflicting the Palestinians. What resulted was a proclamation known as The Casablanca Protocol.

But Morocco, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia adamantly refused to sign the Protocol. Lebanon, Libya and Kuwait only signed the Protocol with explicit reservations. That posture left about a million Palestinian refugees trapped in a pathetic state of affairs.

As such, in its 1991 campaign of explicit ethnic cleansing, Kuwait unceremoniously expelled 370,000 of the 400,000 Palestinians then living in that country. Why? Because the Palestinian leader, Yassir Arafat, had sided with Saddam Hussein whose army had invaded Kuwait.

In 1995, Libya expelled its 30,000 Palestinians as punishment for Palestinian peace talks with Israel. In his madness, Col. Qadaffi reasoned that even more Palestinian refugees would punish Israel!

As late as 7 March 2011, Lebanon’s 300,000 Palestinians were still denied the right to own real estate, were still denied access to state healthcare and were still forbidden to practice law or medicine.

As recently as mid-2011, Palestinian President Abbas felt constrained to beg Iraqi President Talabani to protect Iraq’s 15,000-30,000 Palestinians from assaults by Iraqi Shia. Additionally, Palestinians in Iraq are still required to regularly reapply for residence papers.

As of this very moment, the approximate half-million or more Palestinian refugees in Saudi Arabia are still the only Moslems in the world who can never become Saudi citizens. The Saudis argue that this policy is designed “…to avoid dissolution of their (Palestinian) identity & to protect their right to return to their homeland.” Geopolitical hogwash!

Premises considered, the Palestinians must surely merit the world's concern and compassion, if not also sympathy. Lest we forget, the Palestinians still have no state, they still have little or no standing in many Arab nations and they still have no Philistine forefathers. And, candidly, absent those redoubtable Philistine ancestors, even the Palestinian claim to Palestine still remains putrid. Pity the Palestinians!

The Soggy Syrian Spring

While paying my bill at a restaurant on the outskirts of Damascus, I noticed a picture hanging above that establishment’s portals. The picture depicted President Bashir al-Assad and deceased President Hafez al-Assad with Hezzbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah.

“Why,” I questioned the proprietor, “are the Assads pictured with Nasrallah?” Without hesitation, the proprietor answered in Arabic: “Adoo adoowe sadeechee” (the enemy of my enemy is my friend)! Then, he conspiratorially winked at me and closed his cash register.

That exchange occurred just a few years ago. Back then Syria was generally calm, its populace was seemingly serene and the Assad regime was in firm control. In fact, the overwhelming atmosphere in Damascus, the world’s oldest continuously inhabited city, was unusually welcoming. The widespread attitude throughout that nation was clearly upbeat. The sudden advent of the Arab Spring changed all that.

Well, not exactly. As it happens, Syria has always been a confounding, sectarian labyrinth of disparate ethnicities, divergent religious persuasions and differing loyalties. Indeed, Syria’s twenty-two million citizens include Sunnis, Shiites, Alawites, Orthodox Christians, Kurds, Druse, Circassians, Armenians, Turkmen, a smattering of Jews and others.

To a remarkable extent, these strikingly different groups have coexisted in relative communal quietude. Indeed, Syria could justifiably boast that its populace was unusually blessed with religious freedom, pluralism and broad cultural diversity.

Of course, all the above operated on Syria’s societal surface. Still, Syrian society seemed to function reasonably well. Regrettably, that is a relatively superficial view of those uninitiated in the subtleties of the Mideast. Beneath the surface a seething cauldron of unrest, dissent and disquiet quietly stewed. It all boiled over into the Arab Spring. Why?

One answer is the Syria has also always been that region’s most combustible geopolitical flashpoint. Syria sits precisely at a strategic crossroads of the world. It has –seemingly forever- been the battlefield of expanding empires. It has been overrun, occupied and/or ruled by the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Moslems, the Crusaders, the Egyptians, the Ottomans and even the French. This circumstance blessed the region with a magnificent cultural diversity; it also cursed Syria in that it rarely ruled itself.

The bottom line resulting from repeated foreign rule was that Syria failed to develop as a true national entity. Syria became a region where loyalty remained remarkably local. It became a society in which citizens still identify much more closely with their cities, their extended families, their ethnicities and their religious sects than with their national government.

This situation ultimately fostered a minority mentality among the populace. No group was strong enough to exert its sway on the national scene. Many entities were –consciously and/or subconsciously- suspicious of other groups. No one group had sufficient influence or power to create or sustain a national consensus. And none did. Even after gaining independence in 1946, Syria was continually rocked by military coup after military coup. Then, in 1971, the Assad family seized (and I mean “seized”) control.

Hafez al-Assad ruled ruthlessly for almost three decades. It was on his watch that the single deadliest act by any Arab government against its people in the modern Mideast was perpetrated. That massacre was at the Syrian city of Hama in 1982 when 15,000 Sunni members of the Muslim Brotherhood were slaughtered. The Assad family had and has zero tolerance for political dissent.

That Hama is now again in the news and reaping reprisals for its political dissent only illustrates that Bashir al-Assad views his father as a clear role model. Is it then any wonder that Assad, the son, is now irreverently referred to as “The Butcher of Damascus?” Those who pinned hopes on his leadership could have been more perspicacious.

In 2000 Bashir al-Assad gave up life as a British ophthalmologist to become President of Syria. He was 34 years old. His brother Basil, thought to be his father's preferred heir, had died in a car accident. The Syrians were enamored with Bashir’s youthful appearance, his pleasant disposition and his seemingly open-minded demeanor. Still, they forgot the consequential import of the expression: “Like father like son.” Assad, the son, fit nicely into the dictatorial and autocratic shoes of Assad, the father.

Premises considered, is it any wonder that Syrian citizens have also been seduced by the fragrance of the Arab Spring? The problem in Syria is that those seductions appealed to a wide variety of disparate, disjoint and terribly disorganized groups. Each group seems to have its own agenda. That bifurcation of aims, goals and desiderata serves Assad and his Alawite regime well.

The Alawites comprise only six percent of the Syrian population. But the Alawites are Syria's privileged elite. Alawites hold an unusually disproportionate number of top government posts and ranking military positions. They have benefited hugely from the regime’s largesse and patronage. They are understandably and demonstrably loyal to President Assad.

On the other hand, the Syrian Sunnis are 74% of the Syrian populace. Their Shia co-religionists are 13% of the population. Both groups are effectively leaderless. There is also no love lost between the Sunni and Shia communities. Even if that were not true, their loyalties remain decidedly local.

So, there is no apparent, currently acceptable or even safe alternative to Assad. And yet, the seductive fragrance of the Arab Spring has long since wafted far away from Assad. But, like it or not, Assad, the son, learned from Assad, the father. He understands how to exploit the substantial differences and fractures that perfuse Syrian society. Bashir understands, as did his father, that when all else fails, ruthless repression customarily silences dissenting souls.

Still, in the early months of the Arab Spring, President Assad adamantly told the Wall Street Journal that “Syria is immune from unrest” because he understands his people’s needs.

It remains to be seen if the Syrian people’s needs truly comport with what their President says that he understands. In the meantime, the Arab Spring is turning increasingly soggy in Syria

The Arabs Spring Into Summer Or Is It Winter?

The Arab Spring remains a seductive illusion. If you beg to differ, kindly consider what's really going on in the Arab Mideast.

Seven months have dissolved into the shifting sands of that region since the Arab Spring first sprung. Substantive elections have yet to be held in either Tunisia or Egypt. Angry demonstrations still reverberate in Cairo's Tahrir Square. Egyptian Salafists openly joust with secular protestors. Ex-President Mubarak is being tried (in a building bearing his name) on charges brought by the same police he appointed. Field Marshal Tantawi, head of Egypt's ruling Supreme Military Council, has banned foreign observers from elections in November. What does all that tell you?

Please also observe that The Madman Of The Mideast still rants in Tripoli while his disloyal Libyan rebels still rave in Benghazi. That is where the top rebel general and his aides were recently assassinated, arguably by even more patriotic rebels. In fact, Benghazi rebels are not only at odds with each other, they also have significant rifts with their rebel compatriots in Libya's west. The Libyan rebels may be as odious and treacherous as are Gaddafi loyalists. That should be old news, but it is not. Why?

Meanwhile, NATO is still bombing Qadaffi-held Tripoli into everything but submission. NATO bombs, designed to protect the Libyan populace, have killed 1,100 civilians. Apparently, there are too few bona fide targets in Tripoli. So NATO deemed it prudent to destroy a Tripoli TV station in order to kill the broadcast of Qadaffi's "murderous rhetoric." Meanwhile, the rest of the Arab world (Qatar excepted) spectates from the sidelines in perplexed apprehension as to which of them is next and for what?

Quietly underreported, the sweeping swath of the Saudi sword has totally cut off the protests of the Bahreini Shia. Their Saudi enforced silence speaks volumes about the alleged fecundity of the Arab Spring.

Affairs in Iraq remain unsettled, severely sectarian and in tragi-comic political disarray. Take faint heart that the absence of more widespread turmoil in the Arab Mideast suggests that the Arab Spring has failed to give birth to either a progressive or a productive Arab Summer. Indeed, not a single Arab monarchy has been seduced by or succumbed to the enticing fragrance of the Arab Spring.

Still, feel free to bemoan the fact that the Arab Spring has miscarried its alluring message of hope. The aborted Arab Spring has even engendered a dismal forecast for further Mideast fragmentation and fracture. If there was an Arab Spring, its air quality was polluted by a variety of toxic pollens to which the Arab world is seemingly allergic.

More pointedly, in this year of the media-perfumed Arab Spring, the sword of Saudi justice has unceremoniously already severed the lives of dozens of its own less-than-exemplary citizens. But that sad circumstance was a mere prelude to incipient legal changes on sacred Saudi soil.

The Saudis -in their infinite Wahabi wisdom- have enacted a litany of new rules. These are designed not to liberalize and democratize Saudi society, but rather to further shackle its citizens in servitude to that nation's reactionary predilections and regressive predispositions. .

Saudi legislation (awaiting official imprimatur) is so draconian that it will criminalize every vestige of legitimate dissent. Said regulations cast a conspicuously wide net of culpability. The chilling effect of these laws turns thoughts of a pervasive Arab Spring into an ice-cold winter of dampened dissent.

Given Saudi Arabia's deeply repressive policies and practices, may I respectfully suggest that a much hotter than normal Arab summer is in progress.

But then you might argue that Saudi Arabia is certainly not synonymous with the Arab Mideast. And you would be quite correct. Indeed, the residue of the Arab Mideast is simply plagued by and infected with a host of problems distinctly peculiar (and I mean peculiar) to each of the disparate Arab nations.

Consider that Yemen remains a chaotic and ungovernable snakepit. Its wounded President is still recovering in Saudi Arabia. His nation is aimlessly wandering in a leaderless wilderness of uncertainty. Yemeni society has splintered into an unpalatable witch's brew of hostile tribes, secessionists, Islamists, pan-Arabists, Jihadists and al-Qaeda opportunists.

Meanwhile, Syria -home to the Mideast's most complex sectarian labyrinth- is the region's most combustible geopolitical flashpoint. The Syrian political weather forecast calls for intermittent military thunderclaps accompanied by bolts of damaging lightning from government weaponry. This poses imminent and lethal danger to protestors. Can it be that NATO is bombing the wrong regime while protecting the wrong civilians in the wrong country?

Premises considered, there regrettably was no Arab Spring this year. That mythical season is now being followed by an all too realistic and undoubtedly sweltering Arab Summer.

But wait. Do not despair. Just because the sudden spring thaw in the four-decades-long Arab Winter was less than pervasive, that does not mean that there can be no truly bone fide Arab Spring. Perhaps the Arabs must first weather The Arab Fall. That's when the leaves fall from the trees in the Arab Mideast. Oh, you are right. Palm trees don't shed their fronds; they just turn brown, hang there and dessicate. Perhaps there is also no such thing as an Arab Fall.

So, do the Arabs have a choice? Can they still opt for a real Arab Spring? Will they remain chilled in an enduring Winter of Arab discontent? Or will they languish in the heated disarray of an Arab Summer?

Personally, as a mere non-Arab who frequently visits ten Arab nations, it looks to me like the Arabs still have a very long, hot summer ahead of them. Need I note that today's actual temperature in Mecca was 111 degrees. The political heat index across the Arab Mideast is much higher and there is no relief in sight!

The Arab Spring?

The Arab Spring is a mirage. It appeared seemingly out of nowhere. It is now evaporating into the always shifting political sands of the Arab Mideast.

That said, aspects of The Arab Spring are crystal clear. The Arab Spring is not simply a myth; it is an illusion. The Arab Spring has no singular direction. The Arab Spring has no defining vision. The Arab Spring has no cohesion. The Arab Spring has virtually no pan-Arab collegiality. The Arab
Spring has a dirth of pervasive purpose. In fact, the entire Arab Mideast reflects an decided absence of uniformity. But if that is news, it should not be. The Arab Spring is a figment of the West's fervid imagination.

But even crystal clarity about the myth of the Arab Spring cannot dispel that term's captivating imagery. Regrettably, the notion of The Arab Spring was foisted upon the world by pundits whose familiarity with the Mideast is suspect.

Alternatively stated, Mideast cognoscenti have long been fully aware that the Arab Mideast is -and has long been- fractured, fragmented and fissured. Nothing in the alleged Arab Spring has altered that condition. Indeed,
the so-called Arab Spring has only exposed the ruptures, hacked away at the perpetual splinters and confirmed the critical cracks that traditionally roil the Arab Mideast.

It has been argued -sometimes vociferously- that the Arab Spring was/is an outburst of yearning by disaffected masses of Arabs for dignity, freedom and democracy. Perhaps. It has been suggested that the protests and demonstrations were/are the beginnings of a political tsunami which would bring a wave of new life, enhanced liberty and a broader capacity to pursue happiness by and for the Arab masses. Wrong, at least so far.

Yes, there have been multiple demonstrations and prodigious protests. But demonstrations and protests are not synonymous with substantive revolts. Yes, there have been revolts, but revolts are not necessarily revolutions. Yes, there have been what appear to be revolutions, but these have not yet produced widespread regime change. And where there has been regime change, there has not been demonstrable change in the actual control and management of governmental affairs. Furthermore, even where there has been regime change (Tunisia and Egypt), there has been not been a headlong rush to democratic reform by the powers that be.

On the other hand, it is abundantly clear that there are substantive threads that weave their way through the Mideast turmoil. These threads include a broad disaffection with brazen corruption, a pervasive disenchantment with economic exclusion by privileged elites and a widespread alienation of the woefully unemployed Arab youth. These matters are hugely important; they should not be lightly dismissed.

But, contrary to wishful thinking in the West, a pervasive hunger for democracy is barely distinguishable in the above threads. That is understandable. The Arab Spring -such as it is- is not really about democracy. To a great extent, the Mideast tumult is about the ardent desire by widely divergent and disparate Arab populaces to get a fair shake and to get their fair share in life. Pointedly, for the exploding numbers of Arab youth (whose unemployment level is incredibly high), a slice of the bread of prosperity takes clear precedence over a ringside seat at the circus of democracy.

Perhaps it is best to cite chapter and verse. Egypt, the Arab Mideast's most populous nation, is the prime case in point. Cairo's Tahrir Square experienced large and protracted demonstrations. Masses of Egyptians clamored for regime change. So the Egyptian military forced President Mubarak out of office.

The Egyptian military also got rid Gamal Mubarak and his fiscally predatory cronies, thirty-nine of whom became billionaires. But now that the dust surrounding the Egyptian Spring is settling, it seems clear that what the Egyptians got was not regime change. Instead, the Egyptians acquired a barely disguised preservation of the status quo by the same military men who once served and then rejected Mubarak.

Yes, Hosni Mubarak and Gamal Mubarak are gone; but the High Council of Egypt's Armed Forces is still in firm control. The Egyptian state bureaucracy is still managing the store. The Egyptian National Police are still operating what has been characterized as a "nationwide protection racket." Egypt's college graduates are still ten times less likely to have a job than the Egyptian masses who hold rudimentary educations. Egypt's per capita income is still about two and a half times less than in neighboring Libya. And don't think that the Egyptians don't recognize that Saudi citizens right across the Red Sea still earn about four times more than does the average Egyptian.

So, yes, the Egyptians got rid of an autocratic tyrant, but that does not mean that much more has changed, at least not yet. All of which leads us back to the rest of the Arab Mideast and the mythical Arab Spring.

Amidst all the Arab unrest, not one Arab monarchy has fallen. Only one Arab royal house has been seriously challenged. That sole unique exception is Bahrein's tiny Emirate whose population is one hundred times smaller than that of Egypt. Premises considered, Bahrein's neighboring Saudi monarchy rushed headlong to Bahrein's rescue.

Bahrein's Shia were ruthlessly subdued. Some forty Shiite mosques were unceremoniously leveled to the ground. The protests for a voice in government by Bahrein's Shiite majority were crushed into silence. With the illuminating exceptions of Iraqi Shia and Hezbollah Shia, the rest of the Arab Mideast watched passively in virtually mute acquiescence.

Amidst all the Mideast chaos, it is only the dictatorial autocracies that are experiencing continuing and significant turmoil. Amidst all the upheaval, it is only the autocratic tyrants in Libya, Syria and Yemen whose regimes are now truly threatened by the Arab Spring.

Pointedly, the societal, demographic, governmental and political circumstances in each of these autocracies differ dramatically. One of the few commonalities of Libya, Syria and Yemen is that their citizens are dying while in pursuit of whatever it is that they are pursuing. And precisely what these diverse groups are seeking is not terribly clear.

Need it be said that dissent in the Arab monarchies has just been more ably suppressed and/or seduced into temporary quietude by flagrant bribes disguised as beneficent governmental largesse. So much for the Arab Spring.

What all this says about pan-Arab yearning for freedom and democracy remains hazy and uncertain. But, if the illusion of the Arab Spring teaches anything, it is that diversity, fragmentation, authoritarianism, anarchy and volatility remain staples of life in the Arab Mideast. That inescapable reality is no mirage.