Nukes & The Original Aryans

“No country without an atomic bomb can properly call itself independent.” Ahmadinejad did not say that. Charles de Gaulle did!

If spoken by Ahmadinejad, those words would be a demagogic diatribe by an apocalyptic nutcase. But in the mouth of President de Gaulle, that viewpoint was an expression of geopolitical reality.

Back then (1954-1960), nuclear weapons were a national status symbol and
a path to international prestige. So, France acquired Nukes. That is also
substantially why Iran is hell bent on joining Club Nuke.

So, why does Iran want what it does not need? The answer involves a history lesson.

Iran was not always Iran. For centuries it was Persia. That is Iran’s glory. In fact, Persia may be the first truly significant empire in history. That may be arguable. But what is not subject to debate is that Persia’s celebrated Emperor, Cyrus, was the first person in history to be called “The Great.” That is of great significance to Iran.

Under Cyrus’ reign, the Persian empire stretched from India to Egypt and Greece. During Cyrus’ benevolent rule, disparate ethnicities and subject nations were permitted to conduct their own affairs and to practice their own customs and beliefs.

In addition, Cyrus bestowed upon the world its first charter of human rights. In recognition of his immense accomplishments, Cyrus is extolled as the Father of the Iranian nation. Cyrus-The-Great was and is the focal point of Iranian history and of Iran’s national psyche.

Not tangentially, Cyrus even emancipated the Jews of Persia. They had been brought there in 586 BCE by the Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar. He had conquered the Kingdom of Judah and deported its Jews. Cryus permitted the Jews to return to their homeland. In gratitude for his largesse, the Jews labeled Cyrus as “The Anointed Of The Lord.”

Cyrus’ towering greatness is illustrated by an anecdote concerning President Harry Truman. He was, not incidentally, the American President who ordered that an atomic bomb be detonated over Japan. President Truman also had the outlandish temerity –some call it Chutzpa- to formally recognize the existence of the State Of Israel.

Shortly after that momentous event, Truman is said to have been present at a party. A quarrelsome guest approached the President. The guest reproached Truman by questioning: “Who in the hell do you think you are recognizing Israel?” To which provocation Truman allegedly threw his hands skyward and haughtily exclaimed: “I am Cyrus!”

Ahmadinejad is no Cyrus. In actuality, nothing significant happens in Iran without the tacit imprimatur of its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But he too is no Cyrus. Both Ahmadinejad and Khamenei assuredly recognize that they are but existential blips in Iran’s long history dating back to Cyrus. And that’s the rub.

Ahmadinejad, Khamenei and Iranian nationalists clearly aspire to recapture the glory of Cyrus and the Persian Empire. That is not an evil. That is a goal to be applauded. That national aspiration could be as noble, as elegant and as inspirational as was Cyrus.

Regrettably, the path to regional hegemony pursued by contemporary Iran is perverted by its fixation on acquiring what it wants but does not need. Iran must now distance itself from the notion that a nation needs nukes to survive or to acquire eminence.

Twenty-first century Iran is not cold war era France which thought it needed nukes for prestige. But, is there a contemporary nation with significant international stature, extensive influence and hegemonic capacity that does not possess nukes? With the possible exception of Brazil, none exist. That is the conundrum facing Iran…and the world.

By virtue of its size, its geographic location, its resources, its demographics, its culture, its history and even its name, Iran believes –with abundant justification – that it deserves to be a regional power.

It is noteworthy that the name Iran derives from the Sanskrit term Arya.
In fact, Persians are the original Aryans. Arya means elevated, exalted
or noble. It denotes a patrician culture. It refers to the upper crust
of society. It implies ascendancy, preeminence and dominance.

The opposite of Aryan is Anaryan. A person so classified is deemed to
be a low-class, plebian peasant. Anaryan is arguably the opposite of everything Iranian. As such, Iranians habitually refer to Arabs as Anaryans.

Underneath the bluster and bellicosity, what Iran really wants is to
return to its Aryan origins. It aspires to be a noble, exalted and prestigious regional hegemon. That eminent status is implicit it its
name. Iran does not need nukes to achieve that goal.

But, considering the braggadocio & bravado about its growing nuclear prowess, Iran’s leaders should consider Margaret Thatcher’s trenchant aphorism: “Power is like being a lady... if you have to tell people you are, you aren't.”

Dragon Breath And Bear Claws

What do bears and dragons have in common? Nothing. Well, not exactly. That’s only true if dragons are mythical animals. On the other hand, even if dragons are mythical, their contemporary manifestations are all too real.

Take a moment to think about bears and dragons. Real or mythical, they are dangerous. On the one hand, bears are not terribly subtle. They often seem clumsy. When agitated, they tend to maul anything that moves nearby. On the other hand, it is also never wise to antagonize a dragon. Dragons have bad breath. When stressed, they spew fire.

So, let’s talk bears and dragons. Does anyone remember the Russian Bear? Oh yes, it’s alive and well. It certainly was not hibernating while the Security Council was deliberating about Syria. When it came time to vote, the Russian Bear acted completely in character. It flat-out mauled the Security Council’s resolution with one swipe of its massive bear claw. How could even a casual observer not see that claw coming?

That said, is there any doubt about the rising reality of the Chinese Dragon? Of course not. In fact, the Chinese Dragon has a long standing pattern of passively prowling around while just watching and waiting to exhale fire. The Chinese expressly refer to that calculated behavior as Deng Xiaoping’s Twenty-four Character strategy.

Deng’s policy requires the Dragon to observe affairs calmly, to bide its time, to maintain a low profile and to never claim leadership. That is precisely how the Chinese Dragon conducted itself while the Security Council agonized about censuring Syria. Indeed, The Dragon was delighted to let the Russian Bear lead the veto and take considerable heat for opposing the proposed resolution.

In the aftermath of the Russian and Chinese vetoes, can anyone dispute the perilous reality of The Bear and The Dragon on prowl at the U.N.? Just ask, Susan Rice, the American Ambassador to the U.N. She literally fumed that the Russian Bear and the Chinese Dragon are absolutely “disgusting.” Did she expect something else from bear stench and dragon breath?

Ambassador Rice may not like dealing with The Bear and The Dragon. But she should have been wise enough not to even hope for their votes. Regrettably, the good Ambassador’s considerable pique suggests that she simply may not be sufficiently attuned to The Bear and The Dragon. Why else was she so viscerally upset when both Russia and China acted precisely as even a casual observer would have foreseen?

The Russian Bear has vested interests in Syria. It sells weapons to Syria. It does significant business with Syria. It has a budding naval base at Tartous, Syria. It has a long-standing relationship with Syria’s Alawite government. In fact, Russia has been aligned with Syria for decades. And not least of all, Russia does not have a reputation as a fickle friend. As such, The Bear’s veto was a foregone conclusion.

So, too was The Dragon’s veto. China has a long standing policy of strict non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. Even when The Dragon gives substantial aid to or invests big bucks in other countries, it expressly does so without conditions and without strings attached.

Ambassador Rice assuredly knows this about The Dragon. She surely knows that China refused to intervene with its client Sudan about the latter's unconscionable behavior in Darfur. She clearly knows that China was less-than-pleased with the West’s armed intervention that helped topple Qadaffi. Indeed, she knows that neither China nor Russia voted for the U.N. resolution upon which NATO relied to bomb Libya.

Maybe it’s simply that Ambassador Rice was too focused on toppling the al-Assad regime. Maybe she did not properly pause to appreciate precisely what the Russian Bear and the Chinese Dragon are really all about. Perhaps she was just peeved that The Bear and The Dragon screwed up her hard work to pressure Syria to alter its reprehensible behavior. Ms. Rice must have harbored fond hopes that this time The Bear and The Dragon would act conscionably. Wrong!

The problem is that the Russian Bear and the Chinese Dragon naturally comport themselves as do bears and dragons. That is precisely why they are known as The Russian Bear and The Chinese Dragon. Their behaviors do not arise out of concerned conscience. They do not pontificate. Their acts are not grounded in compassion. Their comportment is not calculated to empathize, moralize or democratize.

Quite the contrary. The Russian Bear and The Chinese Dragon are named for creatures consumed with self-interest and self-preservation. They –those animals, the Russians and the Chinese – customarily pursue their objectives ruthlessly and relentlessly.

That said, it is no wonder that the Russian Bear saw fit to bare its claws at the Security Council. It was not at all unexpected that the Chinese Dragon would consort with the Russian Bear to extrude its own considerable talons. Regrettably, the American Eagle’s wings were also summarily –if temporarily- clipped at last Saturday’s session of the U.N. Security Council.

What does that say about the American Eagle’s ability to effectively launch itself into more critical matters? Can and will The Eagle confront Iran’s drive to join Club Nuke?

Whose Lunch Is The Dragon Eating?

China! Now that’s an economic, demographic and geopolitical mouthful. In fact, China is a much bigger now than it ever used to be. O.K., so China is not getting geographically larger, but it is growing in virtually every other respect.

But wait, the Chinese prefer to say that China is rising. That’s a semantic nicety. It’s an artful euphemism. It’s a diplomatically astute technique that cleverly deflects the world’s attention from the fact that China is expanding everywhere. The Chinese Dragon is desperately trying to satiate its prodigious appetite for resources. In short, the Chinese Dragon is eating the world’s lunch.

Now, let’s be crystal clear. The Chinese Dragon has a right to eat lunch. In fact, the self-interests of the Chinese Dragon do not differ dramatically from the self-preservation needs of the Russian Bear or the American Eagle. But with about nine times Russia’s population and four times the number of Americans, the Chinese Dragon needs a whole lot more to eat to keep it happy. And, that’s not necessarily a bad thing. But seeing the Chinese Dragon gobble up resources is not easy to watch. It’s a scenario that merits closer inspection.

Take a minute and consider the Burmese. You may remember them. They share a border with China. They now call their country Myanmar. Well, most everyone calls it Myanmar except its most famous citizen, Aung San Suu Kyi, who still calls it Burma.

Burma is rich in natural resources. Burma has the oil, gas, timber, minerals and water resources that the Dragon eyes with envy. So, the Dragon eagerly chose to construct the 3.6 billion dollar Myistone dam on Burma’s Irrawaddy River. China had also begun building oil and gas pipelines across the old Burma Road into China. That pipeline project costs 2.5 billion dollars. In the process, the Dragon will get oil, gas and hydro-electric resources while the Burmese will get cash. Sounds good, but not so fast.

The Burmese may be poor, but they are not dumb. The Myistone dam would have destroyed one of the world’s most bio-diverse hotspots. It would have displaced ten thousand Kachin tribesmen, submerged many of their unique cultural heritage sites and flooded the rain forest.

Amazingly, Burma's ruling junta (now cloaked in civilian garb) just nixed the whole dam project while it was being built. That ticked off the Chinese Dragon which will lose both its multi-billion dollar investment and the hydro-electricity that would have been generated, 90% of which was to be sent to China. But, as many Burmese fumed: “Dam be damned!”

So, what made the Burmese abruptly alter course and risk the ire of the Dragon? That’s easy. To paraphrase the Burmese: “We got tired of the Dragon trotting into our kitchen, eating our lunch and then leaving the rubbish.” That is certainly a simplification of what happened. But, to the Dragon’s chagrin, the Irrawaddy dam project is now on indefinite hold.

The oil/gas pipeline projects across Burma from the Andaman Sea into China are now also undergoing extensive scrutiny and reconsideration. The Dragon is anxiously watching those developments. Those oil/gas pipelines would save China 1,200 kilometers of transport across sea lanes through the Strait of Malacca. Those pipelines, once operational, would have mitigated China’s worrisome “Malacca dilemma.” The demise of the pipeline projects would be a significant and strategic loss to the Dragon. Can you feel hot Dragon breath?

The Mekong River is another case in point. It is another “resource” that the Dragon wants to drink. So, what’s going on with the Mekong? Well, for starters, the Mekong is not just a Vietnamese river. Quite the contrary, about half of the mighty Mekong flows through China where the Mekong is known as the Lancang River.

What’s the problem? The Mekong is Vietnam’s lifeblood. But the Mekong is now experiencing its lowest water level in fifty years. Less water means less fish. Less fish mean less fishermen. Less water also means less irrigation. Less irrigation yields less rice. Less water means less shrimp. Less fish, less shrimp and less rice mean less commerce. The Vietnamese are justifiably concerned. Enter the Dragon.

Back up in China on the Lancang River, the Dragon is watching the completion of the Xiowan dam. When completed this spring, it will be as tall as the Eiffel tower, i.e. about as tall as a 100 story skyscraper. The Xiowan Dam will create a lake that is 820 feet deep. More importantly, the dam will further deplete the amount of water flowing down the Mekong into Vietnam. Do you catch my drift: Less water less….

Not unexpectedly, the Dragon did not consult the Vietnamese Tiger about the dam’s ominous repercussions. In fact, the Dragon has repeatedly refused to enter into a single water-sharing agreement with any of the Dragon’s riparian neighbors. In fact, in its thirst for water resources, the Dragon has become the world’s most aggressive water hegemon. Still, the Dragon needs water to drink. That is elementary to the Dragon’s very survival.

And so it goes. The Dragon must drink and the Dragon must eat. Indeed, the Chinese Dragon has a prodigious thirst and a voracious appetite. That should leave the rest of the world wondering: Whose lunch will the Dragon eat next?

Untying The Syrian Knot

Five years ago, I chanced to be exiting a Damascus restaurant. A piece of art was hanging askew above that establishment’s portal. The painting depicted three men. The man in the middle was deceased Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. He was flanked by current Syrian President Bashir al-Assad. The third image was the likeness of Sheikh Hasan Nazralleh, radical Shiite leader of Hezbollah.

I was curious at the seemingly awkward juxtaposition of Sheikh Nazrallah with Presidents Hafez and Bashir al-Assad. I queried the restaurant’s proprietor: “Why is a Hezbollah terrorist pictured with Syria’s presidents?” The proprietor’s response was illuminating. His Arabic response was ensconced in an acerbic –if not venerable- Arabic aphorism: “Adoo adoowee sadeechee” (The enemy of my enemy is my friend)!

Not satisfied with that enigmatic response, I pressed for clarification. I questioned: “Who is the enemy of your enemy?” The proprietor’s response was unequivocal. “Mr. Bush is the enemy and Sheikh Nazrallah is the enemy of our enemy!” An abundance of caution enveloped me. I terminated my discussion with that restauranteur.

Once outside the restaurant, I posed a not unrelated question to a knowledgeable Syrian. His response was also instructive. He said: “Syrians hate Mr. Bush’s foreign policy. We do not hate Americans. I cannot say more. I cannot cross the red-line. They count my words.”

Intrigued, I pressed on. “Who counts your words?” The response was designedly oblique, but sufficiently transparent. “The Alevis count my words. More I will not say.”

To those in the know, the Alevis are the ruling coterie of seemingly secular Syrian Shiites. That sounds, seems and smells like an inexplicable contradiction. It is. But it paints a proper portrait of Syrian society and its politics.

The elite Alawite sect includes the leaders of the ruling socialist Baath party. They are abetted by affluent businessmen, industrialists and Syria’s notorious secret police, the Mukhabarat. These people run Syria. Indeed, of the 250 parliamentary seats, 170 are constitutionally reserved for the ruling Baath party and its allies. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Baath party has not lost a single election since 1963.

That said, Syria sits at the strategic crossroads of the Middle East. Syria has repeatedly been a geopolitical flashpoint and the battlefield for expanding empires. As a result, Syria has rarely ruled itself. That fact has molded the Syrian mentality. Repeated foreign invasions (by the Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Egyptians and Ottomans) have been a blessing and a curse to the Syrians.

Foreign rule blessed Syria with wonderful cultural diversity. But foreign rule also implanted a paranoia about Syria’s national identity. In fact, Syrians demonstrate an absence of national cohesiveness as well as demonstrable mistrust for their central government.

As a result, Syrian loyalty is fragmented. Syrian allegiances are local. Syrian fidelity and trust depend on local, ethnic and religious considerations. Given its history, an oppressed minority mentality pervades Syria’s national persona. That is illuminating.

Still, Syrians do have universal suffrage, albeit in the powerful presence of one-party rule. Additionally, it is also notable that half of Syria’s twenty-two million citizens are too young to vote. Most of these are still under age fifteen. As such, they are impressionable, malleable and unpredictable.

Of equal import, Syria is not monolithic. While it is a country whose citizens are overwhelmingly Arab (90%), Syria also encompasses substantial non-Arab groups, notably Kurds and Armenians. Additionally, while about 70% of Syrians are Sunni Moslems, there are also Shiite Moslems (13%), Orthodox Christians (10%), Alevis (6%) and Druze (1%). There also are strong Greek, Armenian and Syrian Orthodox churches.

Perhaps unexpectedly, freedom of religion does exist in Syria. Contrast that with Saudi Arabia where the public practice of any religion except Islam is not only strictly forbidden, but where apostasy from Islam is punishable by death.

Even more significantly regarding religion in Syria, a 1950 plebiscite officially rejected Islam as the national religion. That policy still stands. That is a matter of no little consequence in a region suffused with Islamic
militancy. This lends greater import to the fact that Syria still bans The Muslim Brotherhood.

Interestingly, Syria’s existence as a staunchly socialist, secularized, Arab nation should –but does not- fly in the face of Iran’s non-Arab, Shiite/Islamic theocracy. Somehow that reality goes unnoticed. But the very existence of a nominally secular Syrian state ruled by apostate Alevis is absolutely anathema to Saudi Arabia’s fundamentalist Sunni monarchy. As such, the blatant animosity of Saudi royalty for the Syrian Alevis (and Syrian Shiites) is yet another –often unrecognized - fly in the geopolitical ointment that greases the region.

These are not bland differences without bold distinctions. This is dramatic reality. This is a region where the fourteen-century old animosity between Sunnis and Shiites is palpable. As one Mideast expert opined, anyone who thinks that there can be détente between the Sunnis and Shiites displays an “arrogant ignorance of Islam.”

That said, Syria’s constitution requires its President to be a Moslem. Yet President Bashir al-Assad is an Alevi, a secularized, secret and somewhat Christianized sect. Alevi ties to Shiite Islam are tenuous, at best. As a result, an arrangement with a prominent Shiite cleric produced a fatwa (Moslem religious edict) proclaiming that Alevis are still Shiites. Thus, Bashir Al-Asad’s presidency technically complies with the mandate of the Syrian constitution.

The Syrian government says that the Alevis constitute 10-16% of Syria’s population. Street demographers in Damascus’ alleyways beg to differ. They protest that the Alevis constitute only three per cent of the population. The truth lies in between. But, percentages aside, the tension between the ruling Alevis and the residue of effectively disenfranchised Syrian citizens seems clear.

The bottom line is that the Syrian government is a roguish entity
suffused with unsavory predilections and distasteful predispositions. The
Syrian government officially restricts public meetings, censors the media,
controls transportation, hosts terrorist organization offices (Hamas; Hezbollah; Islamic Jihad; Kurdish rebel groups), sponsors state terrorism and remains in cahoots with Iran in suspect endeavors.

In the midst of all this, Israel’s Ha’aretz newspaper prominently asserted: “…it is preferable to have Bashir Assad sitting in Damascus rather than the Muslim Brotherhood.”

Of course, it is crystal clear that the Assad government harbors a decided lack of love for the West. At the same time, most Syrians have precious little more than an expedient affection for Iran, Syria’s political paramour. To the extent that Iran is Syria’s friend, it is because Iran not only supplies political, economic and military support, but also because Iran is the enemy of Syria’s enemy, the Great Satan of the West.

In fact, it may not be inappropriate for Western diplomats to explore precisely what it takes to turn an enemy into a friend. Is it unreasonable to suggest that Western foreign policy makers should take instruction from an old Syrian proverb. It affirms: “Every knot has someone who can undo it” (i.e. every problem has a solution). At the very least, that seems worth talking about. But will Bashir al-Assad ever talk turkey?

Turkey? Isn’t that where Syrian dissidents and defectors find sanctuary?

The Brewing Mideast Storm

Tehran had an early snow last week. This past week the I.A.E.A. issued a stormy report about Iran’s nuclear intentions. Last week Israeli hawks fretted about a possible flight to chill Iran’s nuke program. At the same time, Russia was frosty about enhanced Security Council sanctions against Iran. Meanwhile, the Arab League suspended Syria because it continued to rain bullets on dissidents. The geopolitical weather in the Mideast last week was rotten. Even the future forecast is dismal.

Actually, unsettled conditions seem to be the norm in the always fractured and fractious Mideast. The continuing turbulence in Syria combined with Iran’s legendary duplicity suggests that a geopolitical storm may be brewing.

Consider that Iran and Syria have been allies for the past thirty years. In fact, the Iranian-born Lebanese Shiite cleric Musa Sadr provided religious legitimacy to the Assad regime. In a 1973 Fatwa, Sadr declared that Syria’s ruling Alawites are Shiites. Sadr also acted as liaison between Hafez al-Assad and Khomeini's aides before the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Indeed, the relationship between Iran and Syria is a marriage of convenience that has repeatedly satisfied both parties’ diplomatic needs. And that is the crux of an incipient problem for the region.

Long before the current situation in Syria, Iran aided and abetted the Syrian regime. It served Iranian objectives to foster Syria’s meddling in Lebanon, to encourage Syria’s less-than-furtive flirtation with Hezbollah and to goad Syria’s insidious assignation with Hamas.

In so doing, Iran covertly exploits its overtly explicit anti-Israel and anti-West agenda. By collaborating with the Assad regime, Iran seeks to extend its strategically significant influence across the arc of the Mideast all the way to the Mediterranean .

By continually enabling the Assad regime, Iran is betting that Assad –if he somehow survives Syria’s Arab spring- will be even more eager to accommodate Iranian aspirations to be the regional hegemon. That is a craving deeply rooted in the Iranian psyche.

It also seems clear that Iranian aspirations have been newly enhanced in Iraq, which –not incidentally- borders both Syria and Iran. The recently announced U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq presents a power vacuum which Iran is eager to fill.

The current Iraqi government is dominated by Shia leaders. They have a decided affinity with the Iranian Shia. The latter are sufficiently astute to have studiously cultivated relations with Syria’s ruling Alawites who are Shia. It is also noteworthy that the three Arab League nations that did not vote to suspend Syria's membership (Iraq, Lebanon & Yemen) all have politically vocal Shiite populations.

That said, America’s apparent loss of influence in Iraq combined with an Assad win in Syria could dramatically alter the balance of power in the Mideast. The geopolitical map could then reflect a swath of Iranian sway that extends from the Persian Gulf across Iraq and Syria into Lebanon and then down into the Gaza strip.

Not coincidentally, this scenario –at least theoretically- places Iran on the borders of Israel. Of course, it can be argued that, by dint of existential circumstances, Iran is already there. Still, Iran’s position will be immeasurably enhanced assuming that the Assad regime outlasts Syria’s soggy Arab Spring.

On the other hand, Assad's downfall would deal a distinct blow to Iran's broad diplomatic machinations. As such, Iran is watching the Syrian spring with bated breath. But others –with equally bated breath- are also watching.

Turkey, which not so long ago was attempting to broker a peace between Syria and Israel, has all but severed relations with both the Assad regime and with Israel. Of course, Turkey has its own self-serving agenda. It wants to be the region’s top dog.

It is in Turkey’s bests interests to disrupt any scenario that might elevate Iran’s claim to hegemony. As such, Turkey has abruptly sided with Syria's Sunni dissidents. It is not that the Turks like Syria’s dissidents so much more than Assad, it is just that they dislike the Iranians with much greater intensity. Furthermore, ingratiating itself with the Arab Spring also serves to enhance Turkey’s aspirations to regional leadership.

Pointedly, both the Turks and the Iranians are Moslems. But the Turks are Sunnis whereas the Iranians are Shiites. The long-festering animosity between these Islamic sects is palpable. Furthermore, there is no love lost between ethnic Turks and ethnic Persians. Need it also be said that neither the Turks nor the Iranians are Arabs. Complicating matters, the Turks and the Iranians not particularly fond of the Arabs and vice versa. So the plot thickens.

The Saudis are Arabs. The Saudis are Sunni. The Saudis absolutely abhor the ruling Syrian Alawites who are Shiites. The Saudis say the Syrian Alawites are apostates, polytheists and pagans. Conversely, the Syrian Alawites disparage the Saudis for their “Bedouin thinking” and extreme fundamentalist Sunni (Wahabi) beliefs. But the Saudis also look with equally derisive contempt at the Iranians and at the repugnant possibility of a Shiite crescent across the Mideast.

That leaves us with the Israelis. They are not ethnic Persians or ethnic Turks. The Israelis are ethnic Semites. So are the Arabs. Most Arabs are Sunni Moslems. With exceptions, Israelis are not Moslems. That said, the Israelis have no love lost for Assad, an Alawite/Shiite Moslem. But neither are the Israelis sanguine about the possibility of seeing Assad replaced by a fundamentalist Sunni Moslem regime.

Both the Iranians and the Turks want to rule the Mideast roost. That prospect is exquisitely distasteful to the Saudis. The Israelis have their hands full detaching themselves from the Palestinians. But like the Saudis and the Turks, the Israelis are justifiably apprehensive about the possibility of a Shiite/Iranian crescent overspreading the Mideast.

All of which may breathe renewed relevance into that caustic Arabic adage: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend!”

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Al-The-Alevi & Syria’s Arab Spring

Syria’s Arab Spring sprung about nine months ago. During that pregnant period, Syria’s dissidents have labored to terminate Bashir al-Assad's unsavory regime. So far, the dissidents have utterly failed. Instead, Syria’s nascent Arab Spring has seemingly miscarried.

In fact, many reports about the Syrian opposition originate outside Syria and/or from anti-Assad elements inside Syria. These reports may well be skewed and/or self-serving. They depict images and relate stories detailing violent repression and/or predicting Assad's impending demise.

It has been incredulously alleged that Al Jazeera, the most popular Arab news channel, has fabricated footage depicting suppression of anti-government demonstrations. Purportedly, Al Jazeera even built replicas of Syrian towns as backdrops for faked violence against dissidents. Indeed, much of what is said and printed about the Syrian situation is, arguably, hype and/or flimflam.

That said, the real truth on-the-ground is hard to come by, especially in a police state like Syria. But some semblance of actuality periodically leaks out in curious places. Take the tennis court for example.

Several weeks ago, I happened to play several sets of tennis with a Syrian physician who now practices in the American South. Let’s just call him “Al.” And, lest you think I jest, Al is not an abbreviation for Alabama nor is it a veiled allusion to Al-Jazeera, to al-Arab or to al-Assad.

So, who is Al and what does he say about Syria?

Well, Al is a native of Tartous, Syria. His Arab parents still live there. Al visits Tartous regularly. When I met Al on a Florida tennis court, he had just returned from Syria. He was surprised to learn that I have not only visited his hometown, but that I know a little -precious little- Arabic.

In fact, Al even paused to correct my pronunciation of the term “Alevi.” That is the name of the Syria’s ruling elite sect. Syrian President Bashir al-Assad is an Alevi. Depending on who is counting, between six and ten percent of the Syrians are Alevis. The Syrian military is heavily Alevi. Syria’s business elite is predominantly Alevi. The richest man in Syria is Alevi (He is also Bashir al-Assad’s cousin). Even Dr. Al is an Alevi. And that may be precisely on point.

Clearly, Dr. Al espouses the perspective of Syria’s ruling Alevi elites. Al has vested interests in seeing the continuing rule of the Assad regime. But, Al’s vision did not seem unduly blurred by media depictions of the Arab Spring in Syria. After all, Al had just flown into and out of Damascus. He had just visited extensively with family in Tartous. He had just met with neighbors, shared refreshments with friends and conversed with colleagues. He had just been out on the town in Tartous. Surely, Al had a feel for –and even a taste of- the bona fide realities in Syria.

So, between points for the better part of two hours, Al and I conducted a running (we were playing tennis) conversation about the state of affairs in Syria. I flatly questioned Al: “What’s really happening in Syria? Will Assad fall? Are things on the ground as bad as the press says they are?”

Al pointedly responded: “Everything’s pretty cool. Don’t get bent out of shape about what you hear. Yes, there is always some dissent. It depends where you look and what you want to see. But what you read and hear is terribly overblown.” Perhaps.

Certainly, it is critically important to recognize that Assad’s military is loyal, disciplined and highly organized. Syria’s military, its officer corps and a host of governmental appointees (a disproportionate number of whom are Alevi) have a strong vested interest in preserving their privileged position in the status quo.

Pointedly, the Alevi (aka Alawites) are a distinct and often reviled religious minority in heavily (74%) Sunni Syria. The Alawites are an extreme offshoot of Shiite Islam. Some Alawite beliefs are not only secret, but also incorporate some Christian elements. In fact, Sunnis customarily deem the Alawites to be unbelievers, polytheists and apostates. As such, Alevi lives, both professionally and personally, may well be imperiled if and when the Assad regime dissolves.

On the other hand, Assad's decidedly disloyal opposition is undisciplined, disorganized, fragmented, effectively leaderless, essentially unarmed and both tactically and strategically impoverished. Score a couple of clear aces for Assad’s side.

Now then, you might also want to serve up the fact that Syria has been a police state for the better part of four decades. Indeed, Hafez al-Assad (President Bashir al-Assad’s father) came into power shortly after Colonel Qadaffi conducted his own coup in Libya. Syria’s secret police (the feared Mukhabarat) has a long history of ruthlessly suppressing dissent under the rule of both Hafez and Bashir al-Assad. That said, Qadaffi is dead, but the Mukhabarat yet lives. Score another critical point for the Assad regime.

Need it also be said that, for almost fifty years (since 1963), Syria officially operated under emergency rule. That Emergency Law even predated the Assads’ dictatorial reign. The oppressive reality of a half-century of emergency rule clearly qualifies as sustained, pervasive and daunting governmental control.

Yet, this past April, while under intense pressure from dissidents, President Bashir al-Assad actually abolished that long-standing Emergency Law. But the simple stroke of Bashir’s pen could not and will not glibly obliterate or cavalierly expunge the haunting spectre of emergency rule from Syria’s public psyche. Score yet another decisive point for the Assad regime.

And not least of all, Syrian dissidents cannot help but be continually reminded of the single deadliest act by any Arab government against its people in the modern Mideast. That event was the massacre of 15,000 dissidents at Hama, Syria in 1982. Said action was orchestrated by the fiat of then President Hafez al-Assad. Is it conceivable that Bashir al-Assad has not learned to replicate his father’s deadly home court serve? Score one more blistering, overhead smash for the Assad regime.

Premises considered, if Al-The-Alevi was a tennis broadcaster, he could ably articulate the current contest against Assad. I can almost hear Al’s slightly-accented Arab voice: “O.K., that’s game, set and…well, not quite match. Assad remains in firm control. But no one is invincible. Even court dictators like Federer and Nadal now lose to that dissident Djokovic. Syria’s fracas could still be a long five-setter. So far, Assad leads his opposition two sets to love. Only one thing is certain, there is absolutely no love lost or left in Syria’s Arab Spring!”

What Happened To Egypt's Arab Spring?

Egypt’s Arab Spring sprung early last winter. That was eight months ago. That’s when the Egyptian military ousted long-time President Hosni Mubarak. The voice of the Egyptian people had been heard. Democracy was distantly visible on the Egyptian horizon. The reins of government would be held –but on an interim basis only- by the Egyptian military. That military was widely and favorably viewed as the protector of Egyptian stability. Timely elections were to be held. A new Constitution was to be promulgated. Fresh spring air was seemingly wafting through Cairo’s Tahrir Square.

But wait. Not so fast. That fresh spring air was –and is – polluted. In fact, with Mubarak gone, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and its head, Field Marshall Tantawi, assumed absolute control. Contrary to fond expectations, very little has changed.

In March, with Mubarak’s ouster still fresh, the Egyptian military arrested, tried and sentenced Maikel Nabil Sanad to three years in prison. Maikel was a young, dissident blogger. His crime was that he had posted an article criticizing the military’s role in the Egyptian revolution. Maikel had argued that the military was a nemesis to the protestors. Maikel pulled no punches. He flatly asserted: “The revolution has so far managed to get rid of the dictator, but not the dictatorship!”

Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces deemed Maikel’s comments
to be “a clear transgression of all boundaries of insult and libel.”
More pointedly, dissident bloggers had been routinely imprisoned by Mubarak’s regime. But Maikel’s imprisonment by the SCAF served as an early red flag that even free expression would not be tolerated in Egypt. It was thus that Egypt’s Arab Spring began to be rained out.

That said, Maikel’s travails are also an clear indication that Egypt’s military is not disposed to surrender power any time soon. Indeed, as another dissident Egyptian blogger recently wrote: “The military wants to annihilate anyone who questions what it does.” That blogger -with abundant premeditation - identified himself as “Kafaya Punk” (roughly translated as "The Defiant Punk!").

And so it is that we arrive back in Cairo on 9 October 2011. The scene was yet again one of chaos, confusion and virtual anarchy. But this time, the mood and targets of the mobs were different. For the first time, the military itself was also targeted by demonstrators.

As it happens, the Coptic Church, which claims about 10 percent of Egypt's 83 million people, accused the military of purposely failing control a Moslem mob. The Copts had been peacefully protesting against attacks on their churches. The Moslem mob turned that protest into a violent sectarian riot. Inexplicably, the military somehow failed to prevent the death of about two dozen Coptic Christians.

Indeed, recent months have witnessed an undercurrent of growing disaffection with the military. Anti-military rhetoric has been on the upswing. In fact, disparate groups, upset with the military, had begun denouncing the SCAF for willfully obstructing the Egypt's evolution into
a democracy.

But it was not until October 9th that protestors used weapons against the military. While the identity of those rioters remains unclear, at least one message is clear. The Egyptian military’s image as a neutral arbiter and/or protector of the people has now been called into question.

As the mob scene developed on October 9th, three distinct factions revealed themselves, i.e. the Copts, the Moslems and the military. Arguably, the military sided with neither the Copts or the Moslems. But that perception may be skewed.

It was widely rumored that Copts were attacking soldiers. True or not, that perception catalyzed a Moslem mob into action. Some threateningly chanted: "Islamiyyah, Islamiyyah" (only an Islamic state!). Simultaneously, the military-controlled media conveniently characterized Copts as the primary perpetrators of the riot.

The bottom line of all this is that Egypt remains fractured by a broad spectrum of opposition groups. Each group espouses its own platform, promotes its own self-interested objectives and awaits its own preconceived expectations for the future of Egypt.

The most important, the most self-interested and the group with the most to lose is the Egyptian military. Without question, the military was (under Mubarak) and still is (under the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) the most critical entity in Egypt. That is true with reference to virtually every aspect of life in Egypt. It is especially true (to no little extent) as to the pregnant issue of whether or not Egypt devolves from a technically secular state into an officially Islamic nation.

Need it be said that Egypt's military establishment has, in many respects, been decidedly astute. For four decades the military was the power behind Mubarak. But, when it served the military’s interests to do so, it simply ousted Mubarak from office. When Tahrir Square exploded with anti-Mubarak demonstrations, the military studiously avoided becoming embroiled in the demonstrations. The military carefully distanced itself from Mubarak’s policies and skillfully portrayed itself as the sole guarantor of Egyptian stability.

It is now crystal clear that the military has out-maneuvered Egypt’s dissidents. Some among latter had high hopes that military rule would only be a transitional bridge to a democratic Egypt. Other dissidents of an Islamist stripe envisioned an Egypt that would –sooner or later – become officially Islamic. But by now both factions must recognize that the Egyptian military may well harbor a third and completely different vision for Egypt’s future.

It is virtually axiomatic –if not also Machiavellian– that preservation of the status quo is the primary aspiration and objective of those in power. Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is in power. It was the power behind Mubarak's Presidency. Furthermore, it seems increasingly clear that the SCAF has little intention of willingly yielding power to democratic secularists, to the Muslim Brotherhood or to any other aspiring entity of whatever ilk.

What happens next is subject to all manner of speculation. Will the SCAF proceed with the Parliamentary elections scheduled for November 28th? Will the SCAF willingly transfer its power to a democratically elected civilian government? Will the elections be rigged to ensure continued military control?

Additionally, will the SCAF act to keep Egyptian dissidents divided and/or to provoke further discord? Is it in the SCAF's interest to contain or to exacerbate sectarian strife? Will it be a surprise if the SCAF decides that the continuing unrest merits a calculated delay in the path to democracy? Or will the SCAF decide that a growing level of Egyptian dissent is sufficient to simply cancel elections and justify the imposition of emergency rule?

Clearly, the SCAF's reign has already dampened -and may yet completely drench- Egypt's Arab Spring. It is thus that the felonious words of Egypt’s imprisoned dissident blogger now resonate with ever increasing intensity: “The revolution has so far managed to get rid of the dictator, but not the dictatorship!”

So much for the Arab Spring in Egypt!